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ABSTRACT
To fulfill its missional imperative, the 21st Century, Western Church must engage
a postmodem culture. To facilitate such engagement the following manuscript will relate
Trinitarian theology to postmodem philosophy by using a Trinitarian grammar known as

multiperspectivalism. In particular, multiperspectivalism will be used to integrate
Trinitarian theology with the three loci ofpostmodem philosophy: non-foundational
epistemology, socially constructive linguistics, and holistic relational ontology. As these
various loci imply, postmodemism is characterized by a movement toward relationality in
epistemology, linguistics, and ontology. It is precisely this emphasis on relationality that
produces the resonance between postmodem philosophy and Trinitarian theology.
After outlining this integrative approach in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 will provide an
extended discussion of the Biblical basis and historical development of Trinitarian
theology. Chapter 3 will then introduce the Trinitarian grammar known as
multiperspectivalism. According to multiperspectivalism, the divine perichoresis gives
rise to a perichoretic interplay of three philosophical perspectives: existential perspective
(subject); situational perspective (object), and normative perspective (law). Since these
three perspectives continually arise within the diverse contexts of epistemology,
linguistics, and ontology, multiperspectivalism emerges as a Trinitarian grammar capable
of analyzing and synthesizing philosophical problems in tenns of a structured threeness
of subjectivity, objectivity, and nonnativity. Through the use of this grammar, Trinitarian
theology will first be explicated for each of the philosophical loci in Chapters 4-6
(analysis), and then the loci themselves will be arranged within a multiperspectival
framework in Chapter 7 to yield a triad of triads (synthesis). The result will be a

VI

postmodem Trinitarian philosophy that relates the heart of Christian theology to the heart
ofpostmodemity, thereby achieving an inter-contextualization.

Vll

CHAPTERl
INTRODUCTION: POSTMODERN CONTEXTUALIZATION

The transition from the modem era to the postmodem era poses a grave challenge
to the church in its mission to its own next generation. Confronted by this new context,
we dare not fall into the trap of wistfully longing for a return to the early modernity that
gave evangelicalism its birth, for we are called to minister not to the past but to the
contemporary context, and our contemporary context is influenced by postmodem ideas.
Postmodemism poses certain dangers. Nevertheless, it would be ironic-indeed, it
would be tragic-if evangelicals ended up as the last defenders of the now dying
modernity. To reach people in the new postmodem context, we must set ourselves to the
task of deciphering the implications of postmodemism for the gospel.
Imbued with the vision of God's program for the world, we must claim the new
postmodem context for Christ by embodying the Christian faith in ways that the new
generation can understand.
Stanley Grenz, A Primer on Postmodernism

As indicated above, 1 God has placed the 21st Century Western church within a
postmodem context. For this reason the church's missional imperative (Mt. 28:18-20)
calls it to familiarize itself with postmodem thought and culture in order to contextualize
the Gospel. While some may fear postmodem ideas and long for a return to modernity,
God calls the church to move forward into His "preferred and promised future. " 2 The
church does not have the option of choosing the time and the culture in which it will
minister. These choices have already been determined by God Himself. What the church
does have the option of choosing, however, is whether or not it will remain faithful to its
calling in the circumstances in which God has placed it.
Yet such a manner of speaking may cause the reader to paint an unduly negative
picture of postmodemism. As the following manuscript will show, postmodemism is a

1

Stanley J. Grenz, A Primer on Postmodernism (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1996),
10.
2
Patrick R. Keifert, We Are Here Now: A New Missional Era (Eagle, ID: Allelon Publishing, 2006).
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fertile field with great spiritual potential. Compared to the rationalism and empiricism of
modernity, its worship of science, and its rank individualism; postmodernism is a highly
relational and personal alternative which embraces mystery and paradox and therefore
has an affinity with ancient spirituality? For this reason postmodernism should prove
highly resonant with a central Christian mystery, the doctrine of the Trinity. What are
needed are theologians capable of building bridges by translating Christianity into the
postmodern idiom, and vice versa.

THE PROBLEM

To this end the following manuscript represents a work ofinter-contextualization.
First, it seeks to contextualize Trinitarian theology within three major loci ofpostmodern
philosophy. However, since this first step alone would at best produce a Trinitarian
postmodern philosophy, it also seeks to contextualize postmodern philosophy within a
Trinitarian framework, thereby producing a postmodern Trinitarian philosophy.
In affecting this work of inter-contextualization, three components will define the
specific problem to be solved. First, following the impulse of the late Stanley Grenz, the
argument will proceedfrom the motive of making the Trinity central to all of life and
thought. 4 Second, to apply this Trinitarian vision, the argument will proceed toward three
philosophical targets which Nancey Murphy has identified as the loci of postmodern
philosophy: non-foundational epistemology, socially constructive linguistics, and holistic

3

Robert Webber, Ancient-Future Faith: Rethinking Evangelicalism for a Postmodern World (Grand
Rapids, Mich.: Baker Books, 1999).
4
Stanley J. Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Sell A Trinitarian Theology of the Imago Dei
(Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001).
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relational ontology. 5 Finally, to connect Grenz' vision with Murphy's targets, the
argument will proceed by means ofVan Til's Trinitarian theology. So understood, the
present manuscript seeks to bring Grenz, Murphy, and Van Til into conversation as the
respective motive, end, and means of a common project.

METHODOLOGY
The above project will be pursued in a manner consistent with the theological
methodology of Stanley Grenz according to which systematic theology involves a 3-way
conversation between Biblical exegesis, the history of doctrine, and the embedding
cultural context. 6 Yet to solve the specific problem outlined above, a Trinitarian grammar
will be required in order to inter-relate Trinitarian theology with this embedding context.
This grammatical framework will be supplied by yet a fourth conversation partner John
M. Frame.
John Frame is a former student ofVan Til's and is also Van Til's foremost living
interpreter. In addition to studying with Van Til, however, Frame also studied with the
Yale theologian George Lindbeck, the father of postliberalism. Steeped in AngloAmerican philosophy oflanguage with heavy doses of the post-critical philosophers
Kuhn, Polanyi, and Wittgenstein, Frame is able to communicate Van Til's theology in a
culturally resonant way. In particular, building upon the insights ofVan Til, Lindbeck,
and others, Frame has developed a Trinitarian grammar known as multiperspectivalism or
triperspectivalism. This grammar provides a means of organizing philosophical problems

5

Nancey Murphy, Beyond Liberalism and Fundamentalism: How Modern and Postmodern Philosophy Set
the Theological Agenda (Valley Forge, Penn.: Trinity Press Intemational, 1996), 1-3, 152, 153.
6
Stanley J. Grenz and John R. Franke, Beyond Foundationalism: Shaping Theology in a Postmodern
Context (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001), 24, 25.
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within a Trinitarian framework of three interpenetrating perspectives: existential
(subjective), situational (objective), and nonnative (deontological). 7 For example, in
ethics the existential perspective concerns the purity of the motive; the situational
perspective concerns the utility of the ends within a particular context, and the normative
perspective concerns the lawfulness of the means employed. Because these perspectives
are interdependent, multiperspectivalism is non-foundational grammar suited to the
articulation of complex truth. 8 For this reason it serves as an ideal grammar for
translating Trinitarian categories into the postmodern idiom, and vice versa (intercontextualization).
On the basis of this discussion, the dimensions of the overall problem become
clear. The goal is to achieve inter-contextualization by using Grenz's theological method
in conjunction with Frame's enabling gratmnar. To this end, the present manuscript will
pursue the following chapter sequence. In Chapter 2 the Biblical basis and historical
development of Trinitarian theology will be presented to provide a context for the
subsequent discussion. In Chapter 3 multiperspectivalism will be set fmih as a Trinitarian
grammar ideally suited to the problems of postmodern philosophy. In Chapters 4-6,
Trinitarian theology will then be successively contextualized within the three target areas
identified by Nancey Murphy: non-foundational epistemology, socially constructive
linguistics, and holistic relational ontology. Finally, in Chapter 7 multiperspectivalism
will be used to integrate the material from Chapters 4-6 by contextualizing the three
preceding loci within a single Trinitarian framework. So understood, Chapters 4-6 will
7

John Frame, The Doctrine ofthe Knowledge of God, A Theology of Lordship (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R
Pub., 1987), 73-75.
8
In this regard, the non-foundational status of multiperspectivalism follows from the fact that the three
perspectives are not only interdependent but also fail to yield indubitable truth even in combination and
moreover depend upon the presuppositions of Trinitarian faith to recognize their perichoretic interaction.

4

constitute the centrifugal movement toward cultural contextualization, and Chapter 7 will
constitute the centripetal movement of theological integration which will complete the
project of inter-contextualization.
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CHAPTER2
THE TRINITY AND THE EMERGENCE OF COVENANT ONTOLOGY

Whenever the story of theology in the last hundred years is told, the rediscovery of the
doctrine of the Trinity that sprouted and then came to full bloom during the eight decades
following the First World War must be given center stage, and the rebirth of Trinitarian
theology must be presented as one of the most far-reaching theological developments of
the century.
Stanley Grenz, Rediscovering the Triune God: The Trinity in Contemporary Theology
A striking feature of 20th and 21st Century theology is the resurgence of the
doctrine of the Trinity from near oblivion to center stage. Having been central to the
theological construction of the early church and the speculative theology of the Middle
Ages, the doctrine of the Trinity was nearly eclipsed in the modem era, owing to the rise
of Enlightenment rationalism. Given this fact, it is interesting that the Trinitarian
renaissance closely coincides with the dawning of the postmodem age. In this regard, it
cannot be claimed that postmodemism is a direct cause of the Trinitarian recovery since
Bmih's work on the Trinity antedates the beginning of the postmodem era by at least a
generation. Nevertheless, since postmodemism provides an environment in which
Trinitarian theology can flourish, it is at least a contributing cause if not a direct one. At a
minimum, postmodemism has "added fuel to the fire" in a way that has both sustained
and accelerated the Trinitarian resurgence noted by Grenz above. 1
The reason for this resonance between postmodemism and Trinitarian theology
arises from the fact that both are relational views. Trinitarian theology expounds the
relationships between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit within God's being and the
manifestation of these relationships in God's external interaction with creation.
1

Stanley J. Grenz, Rediscovering the Triune God: The Trinity in Contemporary Theology (Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 2004), I.
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Moreover, as will be developed later in this book, postmodemism is itself relational,
being characterized by non-foundational epistemology, socially constructive linguistics,
and a relational holistic ontology which ranges from the cosmic to the subatomic scales.
Consequently, far from being intrinsically hostile to Christianity, the postmodem
environment actually provides an opening for Trinitarian views. To this end, it will be the
purpose of this book to show that the doctrine of the Trinity provides the metaphysical
basis for postmodem epistemology, linguistics, and ontology.
In pursuit of this larger goal, the focus of the present chapter will be to set forth
the doctrine of the Trinity as a basis for its application to specific problems in subsequent
chapters. In this regard, the Biblical basis for this doctrine will first be examined,
followed by a comparatively longer discussion of its historical development. As will be
argued below, the doctrine of the Trinity is latent in the New Testament, but not
theologically explicated therein. Thus, the Trinity arises as a New Testament problem
which could only be fully worked out as the church's confrontation with heretical
movements forced it to grapple with the Bible's Trinitarian implications in order to
translate these implications into the philosophical idiom of Greco-Roman culture. In this
regard, the current postmodem context provides a similar challenge and opportunity.

THE TRINITY AS A NEW TESTAMENT PROBLEM
In his exhaustive examination of the New Testament evidence for the doctrine of
the Trinity, Arthur W. Wainwright argues that the Trinity arises in the New Testament as
a theological problem to which the doctrinal development of the church provides the later
answer. In so far, therefore, as the answer is implicit in the question itself, and in so far as

7

the New Testament data reveal a conscious grappling with the basic question, the
doctrine of the Trinity may be said to emerge from the New Testament itself.
It is often supposed that the doctrine of the Trinity arose after the New
Testament had been written, and that it is a speculative doctrine, which is
not essential to the Christian message. This book has been written in the
conviction that the problem of the Trinity was being raised and answered
in the New Testament times, and had its roots in the worship, experience,
and thought of first-century Christianity. The word "problem" has been
preferred to the word "doctrine", because there is no formal statement of
the doctrine of the Trinity in the New Testament. But in so far as a
doctrine is an answer to a problem, the doctrine of the Trinity emerges in
the New Testament. The problem of the Trinity is raised there, and an
attempt is made to answer it. 2
With regard to content Wainwright identifies the divinity of Christ as the core of the
Trinitarian problem since this problem arose from an attempt to reconcile the
monotheistic faith of Israel with the deity of Christ.
The belief in the divinity of Christ raised the problem of his relation to
God. If he could be called God and Lord, if he could act as judge, creator,
and saviour, if he could be the object of prayer and worship, and be
ascribed divine titles, what was his relation to the God whom he himself
worshipped and to whom men had access through him? This is the core of
the Trinitarian problem. 3
Consistent with the centrality of Christ to the Trinitarian problem, the New
Testament contains far more data relating to the divinity of Christ than to that of the Holy
Spirit. With regard to the fonner, Wainwright examines the Biblical evidence in 7
chapters entitled: "Jesus Christ is God," "Jesus Christ is Lord," "The Worship of Jesus
Christ," "Jesus and Judgment," "Jesus and the Creation," "Jesus and Salvation," and
"Father and Son." With regard to the Holy Spirit, the data is grouped into a mere two
chapters entitled: "The Nature of the Spirit and His Relation to Christ," and "The Spirit
and God." Finally, with regard to the Trinity proper, Wainwright includes two further
2

3

Arthur William Wainwright, The Trinity in the New Testament (London,: S.P.C.K., 1962), vii.
Ibid., 171.
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chapters entitled: "The Threefold Formulae," and "The Trinitarian Thought of the New
Testament." This thorough listing ofWainwright's chapters has been given to provide
some indication of the categories of Biblical evidence which one could examine in setting
forth the doctrine of the Trinity. Due to the limited space of the current section, however,
it will not be possible to reproduce Wainwright's exhaustive treatment. Here only some
of the most obvious passages will be examined in order to provide the essential data
within a short space.
With regard to the divinity of Christ, a key passage is the prologue to John's
Gospel:
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the
Word was God. He was with God in the beginning. Through him all things
were made; without him nothing was made that has been made. In him
was life, and that life was the light of men. The light shines in the
darkness, but the darkness has not understood it. There came a man who
was sent from God; his name was John. He came as a witness to testifY
concerning that light, so that through him all men might believe. He
himself was not the light; he came only as a witness to the light. The true
light that gives light to every man was coming into the world. He was in
the world, and though the world was made through him, the world did not
recognize him. He came to that which was his own, but his own did not
receive him. Yet to all who received him, to those who believed in his
name, he gave the right to become children of God-children born not of
natural descent, nor of human decision or a husband's will, but born of
God. The word became flesh and made his dwelling among us. We have
seen his glory, the glory of the One and Only, who came from the Father,
full of grace and truth. John testifies concerning him. He cries out, saying,
"This was he of whom I said, 'He who comes after me has surpassed me
because he was before me."' From the fullness of his grace we have all
received one blessing after another. For the law was given through Moses;
grace and truth came through Jesus Christ. No one has ever seen God, but
God the One and Only, who is at the Father's side, has made him known.
(John 1:1-18)

9

In addition to simultaneously identifying Christ with God and distinguishing Christ from
Him, this passage also testifies to His role in creation, revelation, and redemption.
Edmund Fortman writes:
The Prologue tells a great deal about the Word. It indicates His eternal
pre-existence, 'In the beginning was the Word'; His personal distinction
from the Father, 'the Word was with God,' 'the only Son who is in the
bosom of the Father'; His divinity or divine nature, 'the Word was God';
His creative function, 'all things were made through him'; His incarnation,
'and the Word became flesh and dwelt among us'; and His revelatory
function, 'No one has ever seen God; the only Son, who is in the bosom of
the Father, he has made him known. ' 4
With regard to the deity of Christ, His pre-existence, His role in creation, and His relation
to the Father, the following passages are also significant:
Your attitude should be the same as that of Christ Jesus: Who, being in
very nature God, did not consider equality with God something to be
grasped, but made himself nothing, taking the very nature of a servant,
being made in human likeness. And being found in appearance as a man,
he humbled himself and became obedient to death-even death on a cross!
Therefore God exalted him to the highest place and gave him the name
that is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow,
in heaven and on earth and under the earth, and every tongue confess that
Jesus Christ is Lord to the glory of God the Father. (Phil2:5-11)
He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn over all creation. For by
him all things were created: things in heaven and on earth, visible and
invisible, whether thrones or powers or rulers or authorities; all things
were created by him and for him. He is before all things, and in him all
things hold together. And he is the head of the body, the church; he is the
beginning and the firstborn from among the dead, so that in everything he
might have the supremacy. For God was pleased to have all his fullness
dwell in him, and through him to reconcile to himself all things, whether
things on earth or things in heaven, by making peace through his blood,
shed on the cross. (Col1:15-20)
In the past God spoke to our forefathers through the prophets at many
times and in various ways, but in these last days he has spoken to us by his
Son, whom he appointed heir of all things, and through whom he made the
universe. The Son is the radiance of God's glory and the exact
4

Edmund J. Fortman, The Triune God: A Historical Study of the Doctrine of the Trinity (Philadelphia:
Westminster, 1972), 25.
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representation ofhis being, sustaining all things by his powerful word.
After he had provided purification for sins, he sat down at the right hand
ofthe Majesty in heaven. (Heb 1:1-3)
With regard to the deity of the Holy Spirit, two passages from John's Gospel are
significant in establishing His divine origin, His distinction from the Father and the Son,
and His procession from the Father and the Son:
"If you love me, you will obey what I command. And I will ask the Father,
and he will give you another Counselor to be with you forever-the Spirit
of truth. The world cannot accept him, because it neither sees him nor
knows him. But you know him, for he lives with you and will be in you. I
will not leave you as orphans; I will come to you. Before long, the world
will not see me anymore, but you will see me. Because I live, you also will
live. On that day you will realize that I am in my Father, and you are in
me, and I am in you. Whoever has my commands and obeys them, he is
the one who loves me. He who loves me will be loved by my Father, and I
too will love him and show myself to him." Then Judas (not Judas
Iscariot) said, "But, Lord, why do you intend to show yourself to us and
not to the world?" Jesus replied, "If anyone loves me, he will obey my
teaching. My Father will love him, and we will come to him and make our
home with him. He who does not love me will not obey my teaching.
These words you hear are not my own; they belong to the Father who sent
me. All this I have spoken while still with you. But the Counselor, the
Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, will teach you all
things and will remind you of everything I have said to you ... " (John 14:
15-26)
"Now I am going to him who sent me, yet none of you asks me, 'Where
are you going?' Because I have said these things, you are filled with grief.
But I tell you the truth: It is for your good that I am going away. Unless I
go away, the Counselor will not come to you; but ifl go, I will send him
to you. When he comes, he will convict the world of guilt in regard to sin
and righteousness and judgment: in regard to sin, because men do not
believe in me; in regard to righteousness, because I am going to the
Father, where you can see me no longer; and in regard to judgment,
because the prince of this world now stands condemned. I have much
more to say to you, more than you can now bear. But when he, the Spirit
of truth, comes, he will guide you into all truth. He will not speak on his
own; he will speak only what he hears, and he will tell you what is yet to
come. He will bring glory to me by taking from what is mine and making
it known to you. All that belongs to the Father is mine. That is why I said
the Spirit will take from what is mine and make it known to you. (John 16:
5-15)

11

With regard to the Trinitarian significance of these passages, B.B. Warfield writes:
... It would be impossible to speak more distinctly of three who were yet
one. The Father, Son and Spirit are constantly distinguished from one
another-the Son makes request of the Father, and the Father in response
to this request gives an Advocate, "another" than the Son, who is sent in
the Son's name. And yet the oneness of these three is so kept in sight that
the coming of this "another Advocate" is spoken of without
embarrassment as the coming ofthe Son Himself(vs. 18-21), and indeed
as the coming of the Father and the Son (ver. 23). There is a sense, then, in
which, when Christ goes away, the Spirit comes in His stead; there is also
a sense in which, when the Spirit comes, Christ comes in Him; and with
Christ's coming the Father comes too. There is a distinction between the
Persons brought into view; and with it an identity among them; for both of
which allowance must be made. 5
... Here the Spirit is sent by the Son, and comes in order to complete and
apply the Son's work, receiving His whole commission from the
Son-not, however, in derogation of the Father, because when we speak
ofthe things of the Son, that is to speak of the things of the Father. 6
With regard to the deity of the Holy Spirit, additional evidence stems from His
role in the conception (Luke 1:35) and resurrection (Rom. 8:11) of Christ, His
intercession on behalf of the saints (Rom 8 :26), His searching of the deep things of God
( 1 Cor. 2:1 0), and His role in the inspiration of scripture (2 Pet. 1:21 ). Moreover, in view
of the fact that the Spirit's initial hovering over the waters at creation and the tongues of
fire at Pentecost are both manifestations of the same Shekinah phenomenon, the
attribution of Pentecost to the activity of the Holy Spirit (Acts 2:4) establishes the Spirit's
role in creation retroactively. This is especially true in light of the fact that the Johannine
prologue identifies Christ as the creative Word.
On the basis of this Biblical data, the elements of the later doctrine of the Trinity
are seen to be present. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are each seen to be God and yet
5

Benjamin Breekinridge Warfield, Biblical Doctrines, 10 vols., The Works of Benjamin B. Warfield, vol.
2 (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1991), 151.
6
Ibid., 152.
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to be different from one another. These differences manifest themselves in the fact that
the Father sends the Son, and the two together send the Holy Spirit. Later theology will
state that the Father is Himself ingenerate and that He generates the Son. Moreover, the
Father and the Son will be said to spirate (i.e. breathe) the Holy Spirit.
On a more technical level, the doctrine of the Trinity will later be summarized by
the 5-4-3-2-1 rule. It will be said that in God's being, there are 5 basic notions:

ingenerateness (Father), paternity (Father),filiation (Son), active spiration (Father and
Son), and procession or passive spiration (Holy Spirit). Of these 5 basic notions, it will
be said that 4 are relations of opposition: paternity,filiation, active spiration, and

procession or passive spiration. 3 of these relations will be said to be person constituting:
paternity (Father),filiation (Son), and procession or passive spiration (Holy Spirit).
Moreover, since the Father is Himself ingenerate, 2 of these persons will be said to be
constituted by relations of origin: generation (Son) and procession or passive spiration
(Holy Spirit). And finally, all of these notions, relations, and persons will be said to
pertain to a single essence constituting 1 divine being. As regards God's internal being,

generation and procession will be referred to generically as the two processions. With
regard to the economy of God's external operations, these same two relations will be
referred to as the missions ofthe Son and the Holy Spirit.
From this discussion it may be clearly seen how the later doctrine will emerge
smoothly from the Biblical data and also incorporate many technical elements not strictly
demanded by these data themselves. For instance, the concepts of substance and person
will be introduced to guard the oneness and threeness of God. Additionally, the concepts
of generation and procession will be introduced in an attempt to distinguish the internal
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activities of the Son and the Holy Spirit. As will be shown below, these additions will be
made to clarity and safeguard orthodox belief in the church's struggle against heresy.
While the New Testament does not supply such technical formulations, it does
coordinate the three persons within triadic formulae which provide additional evidence
for the emergence of the Trinitarian problem within the New Testament itself.
May the grace ofthe Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, and the
fellowship of the Holy Spirit be with you all. (2 Cor. 13: 14)
There are different kinds of gifts, but the same Spirit. There are different
kinds of service, but the same Lord. There are different kinds of working,
but the same God works all ofthem in all men. (1 Cor. 12:4-6)
Peter, an apostle of Jesus Christ, to God's elect, strangers in the world,
scattered throughout Pontus, Galatia, Cappadocia, Asia and Bithynia, who
have been chosen according to the foreknowledge of God the Father,
through the sanctifYing work of the Spirit, for obedience to Jesus Christ
and sprinkling by his blood... (1 Pet. 1:1, 2)
Therefore go and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name
of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to
obey everything I have commanded you. And surely I am with you
always, to the very end ofthe age. (Matt. 28:19, 20)
As these verses show, the experience of God's work through Christ and in the power of
the Spirit left a strong triadic impression upon the apostles, even apart from systematic
reflection. With regard to the last of these verses, however, scholars have debated
whether the words are authentic to Matthew's Gospel and especially to Jesus Himself.
Regardless of how these questions are answered, there can be no doubt that these verses
reflect a Trinitarian tradition which arose rapidly within the church because it bore a
direct connection to Jesus' teaching and example.
In these verses, the three persons are shown to share a single name, a fact which is
pregnant with covenantal implications. First, since God exists as a triune community, a
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single name (reference) implies that God is an internally covenanted being. 7 In fact, God
is covenant Himself. Second, since the Biblical concept of naming is descriptive as well

as referential, the threefoldness of this name describes the covenantal being of God,
making the name itself covenantal. Third, due to the greater fullness of New Testament
revelation, Yahweh, the mysterious name of the covenant making God, thus emerges as
itself a covenantal reality. Finally, since baptism replaces circumcision as the covenant
sign, the command of Jesus is thus to bring people into the covenant of the God who is
Himself covenant. While it is true that these implications are only latent in the text and
have yet to be fully worked out, the fact remains that the Trinitarian problem emerges
within the New Testament and with it the related problem of covenant ontology.

PROGRESS THROUGH DOCTRINAL CONFLICT:
STOIC AND PLATONIC TRAJECTORIES
As mentioned above, the Trinitarian implications of the New Testament were
explicated in the church's confrontation with religious, philosophical, and heretical
movements. Such movements can be categorized as polytheistic, dualistic, or monistic,
depending upon their tendency to emphasize the many, the two, or the one. 8 Because
Christianity retained the monotheistic faith of Judaism, polytheism was never a serious
threat. The trick was to integrate this monotheistic faith together with the divinity of
Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit without succumbing to dualism and monism in the
process. 9 The difficulty, however, was that clarifying its Trinitarian faith and setting it
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over against the various heretical movements required the church to use the philosophical
idiom of the Greco-Roman culture. In this regard, the two viable alternatives were a
Stoicizing Platonism and a Platonizing Stoicism. 10 However, since Platonism and
Stoicism were themselves based upon the respective ontologies of dualism and monism,
the church was forced to use the very philosophies against which it was contending to
express its own doctrine. While the church was largely successful in transforming this
philosophical language to carry Biblical meanings, it was not able to completely escape
the alien conceptual frameworks presupposed by these philosophical traditions. Thus, in
the church's approach to Trinitarian theology, two basic approaches emerged in which
Platonism and Stoicism set the respective parameters. Moreover, since these two
approaches have determined the respective frameworks for Eastern and Western
Trinitarian theology, they have left a lasting mark to this very day.

THE STOIC TRAJECTORY

The Stoic trajectory commences with the Apologists and continues through
Irenaeus and Tertullian, eventually setting the parameters for Augustine's work, even
though Augustine philosophy was Neo-Platonist. With regard to the Apologists, Justin
Martyr 11 '

12

was a pagan philosopher who was converted to Christianity around 130 A.D.

and was martyred around 165. In his attempt to make Christianity understandable to
Greco-Roman culture and to defend it against the charge of worshipping a man (i.e.
against atheism), Justin set forth an approach which would come to be known as Logos
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Christology. Using the Stoic categories of immanent word (logos endiathetos) and
emitted or expressed word (logos prophorikos), Justin argued that the Word was eternally
immanent within the Father, yet also distinct so that the two could communicate
eternally. For the sake of creation, however, the Father emitted His Word at a point in
time, yet in such a way that there was no division of substance between them. Since the

Word became the Son only at this point of emission, Justin's Logos Christology involved
a two-stage theory of the logos. Although Justin believed in the Holy Spirit due to his
allegiance to the church's rule of faith, he did not integrate the Holy Spirit into his Logos
Christology. Thus, while Justin's system provided for a Father and His Word that were
consubstantial and eternally distinct, its weakness lay in the temporal emission of the
Word, the two-stage theory of the logos, and its inability to incorporate the Holy Spirit.
Irenaeus 13 '

14

was a bishop in Lyons, France toward the end of the

2nd

Century.

While operating within the basic framework of the Logos Christology, Irenaeus rejected
the two-stage theory of the logos, referring to the Word as Son even before His temporal
emission. Moreover, he included the Holy Spirit within the Godhead Himself. Irenaeus
was contending with Gnostic dualists who argued that God could only create the world
indirectly through a chain of intermediaries since God's ineffable oneness could not bear
contact with material plurality. In contrast, Irenaeus argued that God created directly
through His Son and His Spirit who were eternally immanent within His being and then
emitted in time as His "two hands". This external emission of the Son and Spirit was held
to occur without division of substance and to reveal the eternal distinctions latent within
God's being. Irenaeus referred to these external operations through the word "economy".
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Thus, like Justin and the Logos Christology generally, Irenaeus' theology has the
weakness of the temporal emission of the Word and the Holy Spirit. It represents an
advance over Justin's system, however, in that it rejected the two-stage theory of the
logos, integrated the Holy Spirit within its system, and referred to God's external
operations as an economy. As a result of this last point, Irenaeus' version of Logos
Christology would come to be known as economic Trinitarianism.
Tertullian 15 • 16 was a theologian who was born and lived in Carthage in Northern
Africa. He had legal training and was heavily steeped in Stoic philosophy. Like Irenaeus
Tertullian also opposed dualism, arguing that God created the world directly. However,
due to fears that the Logos Christology was dividing the Godhead and heading toward
tritheism, there arose a monarchian reaction in the Western church against which
Tertullian also had to contend. One version of this monarchianism referred to Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit as merely different names applied to the same God at different
times. A more sophisticated version known as Sabellianism referred to the Father, Son,
and Holy Spirit as merely different external operations or external modes of the same
God. As a result of these several movements, Tertullian found himself in an intellectual
vice in which he had to defend the traditional faith against both dualism and monistic
monarchianism, all the while using the philosophical tools of monistic Stoicism. A tall
order indeed! Tertullian rose to this challenge by simultaneously accentuating the
substantial unity of the Godhead and the distinctions of the persons. In so doing he
introduced the technical words, "substance," "person," and "trinitas" into Trinitarian
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theology. Since he thereby established the framework within which Western Trinitarian
theology would develop, he became known as the father of Latin theology.
According to Tertullian's conception, a single Godhead is disposed into the
economy of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit for the purposes of creation and redemption.
However, since this disposition occurs without division of substance, the personal
distinctions revealed in the economy are held to antedate the economy and thus to pertain
to the Godhead itself. So understood, Tertullian's theology retains the weakness of the
temporal emission characteristic of Logos Christology. Moreover, since he held that the
Word only becomes the Son at the point of emission, his theology marks a regression to a
two-stage theory of the logos. Aside from these defects, however, it maintains Irenaeus'
concept of the economy and represents a great advance in that it introduces the
conceptual framework for Western Trinitarian theology.

THE PLATONIC TRAJECTORY
While Tertullian was developing Western theology within the framework of his
Stoic categories, an Alexandrian theologian named Origen 17'

18

was transposing

Trinitarian theology into a Platonic key. Alexandria had long been a hotbed of Platonic
speculation, and two centuries prior to Origen, an Alexandrian Jew named Philo had
sought to express the Jewish faith within Platonic categories as well. Origen sought to do
the same for Christianity, using the categories of Middle Platonism.
Classical Platonism was dualist. The forms constituted a spiritual world of static
being which stood over against the material world of temporal becoming. Chief among
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these forms was the Good or the One which drew the rest of the forms into a unity.
Middle Platonism sought to modify this scheme by substituting Aristotle's supreme Mind
for the Good or the One. This difference gave Middle Platonism a more theological cast
since the supreme Mind produced the forms and unified them by its thinking. For NeoPlatonism, by contrast, an ineffable One produced the supreme Mind which in tum
produced the World Soul in a descending chain of causation. In comparison to classical
Platonism, Middle and Neo-Platonism were both emanationist. Since Neo-Platonism was
developed by Origen's contemporary Plotinus, it had not yet become popular in Origen's
lifetime. Thus, Origen thought within the categories of Middle, and not Neo-Platonism.
In this regard, Origen believed that God could not be God without being a creator.

Consequently, since God was eternal, he necessarily created eternally and therefore
eternally generated His Son as His mediator and instrument of creation. Thus, in contrast
to the Stoic distinction between an immanent and an emitted Word, which characterized
Logos Christo logy, Origen argued that the Son is eternally generated and thus eternally
expressed. In a similar manner the Holy Spirit is eternally derived from the Father
through the Son. With regard to the scope of their respective activities, the Father affects
the entire creation; the Son affects rational creatures only, and the Holy Spirit affects only
those who are regenerate. So understood, Origen' s doctrine of the Trinity is emanationist
and hierarchical. While the three persons share a common origin (the Father being the
origin of Himself as well as the others), it is uncertain from Origen' s writings whether
their union is merely one of origin, process, and will alone or also one of substance. If
there is any substantial unity, however, it would seem to be progressively attenuated due
to the reduction in the scope of activity as one moves down the chain of emanations. On
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either interpretation Origen's theology reveals a strongly pluralist strain in that he refers
to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as distinct subsistences (hypostases). In comparison to
the Logos Christology, Origen's theology had the advantage of referring to the Son and
the Holy Spirit as being eternally, rather than temporally expressed. It had the
disadvantage, however, of failing to guard the substantial unity of the persons.

THE APPARENT CONVERGENCE AND SUBSEQUENT DIVERGENCE
OF THE TWO TRAJECTORIES
For orthodox Trinitarianism to develop, it would be necessary to combine the
eternal generation ofOrigen's system with the substantial unity ofLogos Christology. An
occasion for such a synthesis was provided by the heretic Arius. 19'

20

Arius translated

Origen's eternal subordinationism into the temporal sphere by confusing two terms which
are nearly identical in Greek: agennetos (ingenerate) and agenetos (without beginning).
Origen had stated that the Son was eternally generate of the Father and thus without a
temporal beginning. By contrast, Arius argued that ingenerateness is essential to
Godhood since generateness necessarily implies a temporal beginning. Consequently,
since the Son was by definition generate from the Father, He was therefore a creature
with a temporal beginning. "There was when he was not" became a catch phrase of Arian
theology. While Arius held Jesus Christ to be the chief of God's creatures and His
instrument for the rest of creation, he also believed that God was as incomprehensible to
the Son as the Son was to humanity in general.
Since Arius' theology implied creature worship, Arius was condemned by a
council and sent into exile by bishop Alexander of Alexandria. In exile, however, Arius
19
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managed to attract supporters to his cause and stir up controversy. When Constantine
gained control over the entire empire, he sought to unify the empire through Christianity
and thus moved to suppress this controversy. Accordingly, he summoned an ecumenical
council which met at Nicea in 325 at which Arius' views were condemned. The Council
ofNicea issued a creed which was to be the standard of orthodoxy:
We believe in one God, the Father All Governing (pantokratora), creator
(poieten) of all things visible and invisible.
And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, begotten ofthe Father as
only begotten, that is, from the essence (reality) of the Father (ek tes
ousias tau patros), God from God, Light from Light, true God from true
God, begotten not created (poiethenta), of the same essence (reality) as the
Father (homoousion to patri), through whom all things came into being,
both in heaven and in earth; Who for us men and for our salvation came
down and was incarnate, becoming human (enanthropesanta). He suffered
and the third day he rose, and ascended into the heavens. And he will
come to judge both the living and the dead.
And (we believe) in the Holy Spirit.
But, those who say, Once he was not, or he was not before his generation,
or he came to be out of nothing, or who assert that he, the Son of God, is a
different hypostasis or ousia, or that he is a creature, or changeable, or
mutable, the Catholic and Apostolic Church anathematizes them. 21
While the Council ofNicea seemed to close the door to Arianism, subsequent
history would reveal that a diversity of views could operate within its framework. The
council had said that Christ was homoousios (of one substance) with the Father, but left
the tenn ousios (substance or essence) undefined. As seen from the creed's anathemas,
the council regarded ousios and hypostasis as synonyms. At best, however, the two words
had different connotations and different denotations at worst.
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Ousia was originally a Platonic term signifying essence whereas hypostasis was a
Stoic term signifying substance.

22

Consequently, while both terms were used to denote

unity within their respective systems, the connotation of ousia was generic and abstract
while that of hypostasis was specific and concrete. Thus, on the level of connotation, it
was left undecided whether the council had intended to say that the Son had the same
generic nature as the Father (ousia) or the same concrete substance (hypostasis).
However, apart from this connotative difference between systems, hypostasis could also
function within the Platonic system to signify concrete particularity or individual
subsistence. Thus, in addition to the connotative differences between Platonic ousia and
Stoic hypostasis, there were also denotative differences between the Platonic and Stoic
meanings of hypostasis itself. As a result, Eastern theologians could use hypostasis to
denote the individual persons, as Origen had done, and would therefore naturally interpret
the Western view of a single hypostasis or substance as a Sabellian denial of the personal
distinctions. Likewise, Western theologians would use hypostasis or substance to denote
the unity of the divine nature, and would then interpret the Eastern view of three

hypostases as an Arian denial of the divine unity.
The reason for this ambiguity was that the Council ofNicea had been called to
address the more limited problem of the deity of Christ and not the more general problem
of the unity of the divine nature. As a result, it did not define its terms with this latter end
in view. Additionally, the council had said nothing about the deity of the Holy Spirit,
since this subject too was outside its immediate scope. As a result of this neglect, 56
years of theological and political fighting ensued until an orthodox solution to the
Trinitarian problem was finally imposed by the Council of Constantinople in 381.
22
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While the creed ofNicea held firm during Constantine's lifetime, theological
differences clearly emerged after his death in 337. These differences may be
characterized in terms oftwo major groups which further divide into a total of five
subgroups. The Anti-Nicene party included Arians on their left, homoiousions (those who
thought that the Father and the Son were oflike nature) on their right, and an ill defined
moderate group in the middle. The Nicene party was smaller and included mostly the
homoousions (those who thought that the Father and the Son were of the same substance)

with a few Sabellians on their extreme right. When Constantine died, the empire was
divided among his sons. Between 337 and 350 the Arian Constantius ruled in the East
and the homoousion Constanz ruled in the West. When Constantius gained control over
the entire empire in 350, it was a political victory for the Arians. However, their
theological extremism sent shock waves through the rest of the Anti-Nicene party, first
driving the moderates into the homoiousion camp, and then driving this combined group
close to the homoousions in the Nicene party. Diplomatic efforts between the two groups
eventually allowed them to come together, isolating the Arians and the Sabellians on the
extreme left and right and preparing the way for the orthodox victory at Constantinople.
The theologians most instrumental in bringing the two groups together were Athanasius
and the three Cappadocian Fathers, Basil ofCaesarea, Gregory ofNazianzen, and Basil's
younger brother, Gregory of Nyssa.
Athanasius 23 ' 24 came from the homoousian group and had been a key figure at the
Council ofNicea. Athanasius believed that the Father and Son share one concrete
substance but that the two are also eternally distinct since the Son is continually
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generated from the Father through an eternal process. According to Athanasius, both the
Father and the Son are eternal because the Father cannot be the Father without the Son
and vice versa. His opposition to Arianism stemmed from his belief that God had to
become man in Christ in order to divinize man. Moreover, since the Holy Spirit was also
intimately involved in man's salvation, he was also necessarily divine. In this regard,
Scripture showed that the Holy Spirit belonged to God and came from God, and that His
operations were intimately involved with those of Christ. Thus, Athanasius considered
the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit to be equally divine. They shared a common divine
substance and yet were distinct from one another. However, since Athanasius regarded
ousia and hypostasis as synonyms for divine unity, he lacked the technical vocabulary to
express God's simultaneous oneness and threeness.
This technical vocabulary would come from the Cappadocian Fathers 25 '

26

and

would provide the key to the orthodox settlement. Coming out of the homoiousion party,
they operated within a Platonic framework which characterized God as a single ousia,
manifesting itself in three hypostases. Previously dialog had been hamstrung by
connotative differences between the Platonic use of ousia and the Stoic use of hypostasis
as well as by denotative differences between the Platonic and Stoic uses of hypostasis.
The Cappadocians clarified matters by fixing the tenninology in such a way that different
terms were used to denote God's oneness and His threeness. To explain the relation
between these terms, the Cappadocians held that ousia relates to hypostasis in the manner
of a universal to its particulars. In terms of this analogy, the divine persons were held to
possess a common divine nature in the same way as human beings possess a common
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human nature. However, since human nature is abstract, this analogy had tritheistic
implications. The Cappadocians saw the deficiency of this analogy and argued that it was
limited since the three persons share a nature which is simple, indivisible, and concrete.
With regard to their theology of the Holy Spirit, the Cappadocians were not only
instrumental in arguing for His deity but also in developing the doctrine of His Trinitarian
relations. With regard to His deity, Basil argued from:
(a) the testimony of Scripture to the Spirit's greatness and dignity, and to
the power and vastness of His operation; (b) His association with the
Father and Son in whatever They accomplish, especially in the work of
sanctification and deification; and (c) His personal relation to both Father
and Son. 27
With regard to His intra-Trinitarian relations, the Cappadocians sought to differentiate
His mode of origin from that of the Son. Whereas the Son was generated, Basil said that
the Holy Spirit was breathed. Gregory ofNazianzen said simply that the spirit proceeds
from the Father, and Gregory of Nyssa said that the Spirit proceeds from the Father
through the Son and so is produced indirectly by the Father, not directly like the Son. At
the Council of Constantinople, Gregory ofNazianzen's view ofprocession from the
Father would prevail, and the Cappadocian settlement of 1 ousia and 3 hypostases would
provide the fonnula that would permanently define catholic orthodoxy. It would also
establish the high water mark for Trinitarian theology in the Eastern Church:
We believe in one God, the Father All Governing (pantokratora), creator
(poieten) of heaven and earth, of all things visible and invisible;
And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, begotten
from the Father before all time (pro panton ton aionon), Light from Light,
true God from true God, begotten not created (poiethenta), of the same
essence (reality) as the Father (homoousion to patri), through Whom all
things came into being, Who for us men and because of our salvation
came down from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Spirit and the
27
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Virgin Mary and became human (enanthropesanta). He was crucified for
us under Pontius Pilate, and suffered and was buried, and rose on the third
day, according to the Scriptures, and ascended to heaven, and sits on the
right hand of the Father, and will come again with glory to judge the living
and the dead. His Kingdom shall have no end (telos).
And in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and life-giver, Who proceeds from the
Father, Who is worshiped and glorified together with the Father and Son,
Who spoke through the prophets; and in one, holy, catholic and apostolic
Church. We confess one baptism for the remission of sins. We look
forward to the resurrection of the dead and the life of the world to come.
Amen. 28
While this creed would become the standard of orthodoxy in both the Eastern and
Western churches, subsequent developments in Western theology would lead to a
different interpretation of its contents. In the Western Church this line of development29
runs through Hilary, Ambrose, and C. Marius Victorinus, reaching its culmination in
Augustine. Hilary was a compatriot of Athanasius and thus in agreement with him
theologically. Along with Athanasius, he was instrumental in the diplomatic efforts
which allowed the homoousions and the homoiousions to join together. Ambrose
articulated an identical theology, holding that the three persons have a common
substance, divinity, will, and operation. With Victorinus, however, new ideas begin to
enter the theological stream.
Victminus was a converted Neo-Platonic philosopher. He held that God's essence
is concrete and eternally active (esse = moveri) so that the eternal generation of the Son
and the procession of the Holy Spirit could produce no change in the divine being. As
envisioned by Victorinus, this internal activity is a triadic process of unfolding and
refolding. In the unfolding process the Father as pure being projects the Son as the form
that limits Him and makes Him comprehensible. Here, the Father relates to the Son as
28
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potency to act. In the refolding process the Holy Spirit becomes the copula overcoming
the distinction between the Father and the Son through an act of intelligence. Thus, in
Victorinus' system Father, Son, and Holy Spirit could relate to one another as substance,
form, and concept as well as essence, life, and intelligence. Because humanity was
created in the image of God, Victorinus held to an analogy between the Trinity and the
human soul. As will be seen below, some ofVictorinus' ideas were to influence the
thought of Augustine.
Augustine30'

31

was a bishop of Hippo in North Africa who had been influenced

by Neo-Platonism and who built upon the theology of Ambrose and Victorinus.
According to Augustine, the Trinity is a mystery which can only be known by revelation,
not reason. Consequently, since reason cannot prove the doctrine of the Trinity, it fulfills
a subordinate role of explicating Trinitarian doctrine in an act of "faith seeking
understanding."
In his Trinitarian explication, Augustine begins with the simple and indivisible
essence of God, rather than with the person of the Father. (He preferred the word essence
to substance because he felt that the latter connoted a subject with attributes.) Because
the divine essence is fully expressed in each person, each person is equal to each of the
others and to the Godhead as a whole, a fact which eliminated subordination. Due to their
common essence, the persons are not isolated individuals, but rather interpenetrate one
another exhaustively. Moreover, since the unity of essence implies a unity of will, the
three persons have a common external operation. Thus, each of the persons is involved in
the work of creation, redemption, and sanctification, yet in such a way that the unique
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role of each person is not smothered. For instance, since the Father initiates all divine
activity, His role uniquely stands out in creation. As the mediator of divine activity, the
Son stands out in redemption, and Spirit stands out in sanctification since He brings
God's work to completion. Consequently, while all of the persons are involved in each
type of action, creation, redemption, and sanctification may be particularly assigned to
the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This assignment is referred to as appropriation.
With regard to the persons themselves, Augustine held that their distinctions are
grounded in their relations of origin. The Father begets the Son, and the two together
bestow the Holy Spirit upon one another as their common gift, love, or communion.
Augustine did not feel that the term person was descriptively adequate but felt that he had
to use it both for tradition's sake and to avoid the alternative of having nothing to say. He
preferred to refer to the persons as subsistent relations. With regard to the relations of
origin, Augustine found it difficult to distinguish generation from procession. The
obvious difference, as he saw it, was that the Son originated from the Father alone,
whereas the Spirit originated from the Father and the Son. In this origination, Augustine
held that the Holy Spirit had the same relation to the Son as he had to the Father. Thus,
the Holy Spirit was held to proceed from the Father and the Son as from a common
principle, just as creation had originated from a common operation of the entire Trinity.
On the basis of his teaching of this double procession of the Holy Spirit, the Western
Church would eventually add the.filoque clause to the Nicene Creed, thereby
precipitating the schism between the Orthodox East and the Catholic West. Yet,
Augustine's actual position did not need to antagonize the East. After all, he held the
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Father to be the primordial source of the Holy Spirit because in generating the Son the
Father Himself gave Him the power to bestow the Spirit.
Like Victorinus Augustine too believed that the Trinity was reflected in the
human soul because humanity had been created in the image of God. Thus, within the
human soul a Trinity was evident in the mind, its self knowledge, and its self love.
Another illustration advanced by Augustine was memory (the mind's unconscious
knowledge of itself), understanding (the mind's conscious understanding of itself), and
will (the mind's love of itself). As Augustine saw it, each of these models involved three
coordinate faculties within a single personality whose mutual inter-relations were
analogous to those of the divine persons.
Nevertheless, Augustine saw his illustrations as limited because the human mind
was only a faint image of the Triune God. First, whereas the divine persons were
coterminous with the divine essence, the human faculties were not coterminous with the
human personality. Because of this difference, the human faculties operated
independently of one another, rather than sharing a common will and action, like the
divine persons did. Finally, whereas the human image involved three independent
faculties of a single person, the Trinity involved three persons of a single essence who
were in consequence of this fact highly united. Thus, Augustine was aware that his
analogies had modalistic implications and so sought to correct their implications by
emphasizing the concreteness of the divine persons. Augustine's psychological model of
the Trinity would rise to great heights in the middle ages through the theology of Thomas
Aquinas. Moreover, his Trinitarian theology would assume creedal form in the Western
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church in a creed developed anonymously by a later author and falsely attributed to
Athanasius. The so-called Athanasian Creed is quite long and reads in part:
Whoever will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the
catholic faith.
Which faith except every one do keep whole and undefiled, without doubt
he shall perish everlastingly.
And the catholic faith is this, that we worship one God in Trinity and
Trinity in Unity.
Neither confounding the Persons nor dividing the Substance.
For there is one Person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of
the Holy Ghost.
But the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and ofthe Holy Ghost is all
one: the glory equal, the majesty coeternal.
Such as the Father is, such is the Son, and such is the Holy Ghost.
The Father uncreate, the Son uncreate, and the Holy Ghost uncreate.
The Father incomprehensible, the Son incomprehensible, and the Holy
Ghost incomprehensible.
The Father eternal., the Son eternal, and the Holy Ghost eternal.
As there are not three Uncreated nor three Incomprehensibles, but one
Uncreated and one Incomprehensible.
So likewise the Father is almighty, the Son almighty, and the Holy Ghost
almighty.
And yet they are not three Almighties, but one Almighty.
So the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God.
And yet they are not three Gods, but one God.
So likewise the Father is Lord, the Son Lord and the Holy Ghost Lord.
And yet they are not three Lords, but one Lord.
For like as we are compelled by the Christian verity to acknowledge every
Person by Himself to be God and Lord.
So we are forbidden by the catholic religion to say, There be three Gods or
three Lords.
The Father is made of none, neither created nor begotten.
The Son is of the Father alone, not made nor created, but begotten.
The Holy Ghost is of the Father and of the Son, neither made nor created
nor begotten, but proceeding.
So there is one Father, not three Fathers; one Son, not three Sons; and one
Holy Ghost, not three Holy Ghosts.
And in this Trinity none is before or after another; none is greater or less
than another;
But the whole three Persons are co-eternal together and coequal, so that in
all things, as is aforesaid, the Unity in Tiinity and the Trinity in Unity is to
be worshipped.
He therefore, that will be saved must think thus of the Trinity ... 32
32
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ORTHODOXY TRIUMPHANT: THE ONE AND THE THREE
Looking back over the centuries of development, it can be seen that Western and
Eastern theology developed along different trajectories which have here been labeled

Stoic and Platonic. Within the Stoic paradigm the West begins with the God who is one
and then tries to solve the riddle of His threeness. By contrast the East operates within the
Platonic paradigm and thus begins with God's threeness before tackling the mystery of
His oneness. The reason for these differing approaches can be explained in terms of the
differing tenninology used and the different cultural-linguistic frameworks within which
these terms are reckoned.
The terminology that prevailed in the West was originally set by Tertullian within
a Stoic framework. In the East the final terminology was determined by the Cappadocian
settlement after a long struggle, and this terminology was both determined by, and
interpreted within a Platonic framework. The differences in the tenninology and their
linguistic frameworks are illustrated in Table 1.
Table 1. Competing Trinitarian Terminologies and Linguistic Frameworks
EAST (PLATONIC)

WEST (STOIC)

WEST (STOIC)

GREEK

GREEK

LATIN

ABSTRACT

1 ousia

3 prosopa

3 personae

CONCRETE

3 hypostases

1 hypostasis

1 substantia

In Table 1 the Western Stoic framework has been repeated twice in order to give
its equivalent terminology in both Greek and Latin. This has been done to show that
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hypostasis and substantia are exact etymological equivalents which mean to stand under
and thus denote concrete, underlying reality. However, whereas in Stoicism a concrete

unity stands under diversifying abstract forms (Tertullian held the personal distinctions to
be formal), Platonism places concrete diversity under unifying abstract forms. In other
words, Stoicism holds to a concrete universal with abstract particulars, and Platonism
holds to concrete particulars with an abstract universal. Of course, a Platonic realist
would want to reverse this judgment, but as a practical matter the form of the One or the
Good will not achieve the concreteness of the material diversity of daily life.
Based on this table, the twofold struggle between East and West becomes visually
apparent. First, participants within different frameworks who were thinking in terms of
the etymological equivalence of hypostasis and substantia would see one another as
denying unity (the East) or diversity (the West) within the Godhead. However, once the
difference in language had been accounted for, and it was recognized that ousia and

substantia were the corresponding tenns for unity, the connotative difference between
these terms would provide another challenge, for ousia denoted an abstract unity,
whereas substantia was more concrete. Given this last difference, the West tended more
naturally toward a homoousion interpretation, whereas a homoiousion interpretation was
favored in the East. So understood, both sides sought to build upon what they took to be
concrete reality. However, since they were operating within different cultural-linguistic
frameworks, they talked past one another.
One way to approach this difference is to say that each side was controlled by a
different metaphor. Saussure 33 held that word meaning is not determined by etymology,
reference, or subjective factors, but rather by its place within a cultural-linguistic system.
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Along similar lines Thomas Kuhn34 argued that in science the meaning of theoretical
terms and experimental data is paradigm dependent. At still smaller scales of life,
Wittgenstein35 said that word usage was dependent upon language games, and Lakoff and
Johnson 36 have argued that these language games are often dominated by metaphors
which people hold unconsciously. Thus, metaphors control the use of language so that
people operating in terms of different metaphors will fail to understand one another. This
is particularly true when the metaphors operate unconsciously.
For instance, the metaphor of "a wall of separation between church and state" is
frequently used to interpret the First Ammendment to the U.S. Constitution. Yet, not only
do the words, "wall of separation between church and state," not occur within the text of
the First Amendment, they are also contrary to its meaning. Nevertheless, because a
compact metaphor is more powerful than the text itself, this metaphor overrules the text,
controlling the meaning of its language, and thus governing its interpretation.
With respect to Trinitarian theology, the East and West have been controlled by
different metaphors which not only governed their formative doctrinal periods but which
have also governed their respective approaches to this very day. Thus, in their analogy of
a universal and its particulars, the Cappadocians began with an analogy emphasizing a
concrete diversity and an abstract unity. To avoid tritheism they had to reject the abstract
implications of their analogy and "manually" assert a concrete unity. By contrast, in his
psychological model, Augustine began with an analogy emphasizing a concrete unity and
an abstract diversity. To avoid modalism he had to reject the abstract implications ofhis
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analogy and "manually" assert the concrete particularity of the divine persons. From this
discussion two conclusions may be fairly drawn. First, it is unfair to refer to the
Cappadocians as latent tritheists and to Augustine as a latent modalist since they all
sought to correct the deficiencies of their analogies. On the other hand, it is absolutely
fair to level these charges against the systems within which they were operating and the
metaphors governing these systems, since "manual" intervention was required to override
the tritheistic and modalis tic implications of the systems themselves.
The problem, then, is that the East operates in terms of concrete particulars and an
abstract universal, whereas the West operates in terms of a concrete universal with
abstract particulars. What is needed, therefore, is a system which emphasizes both a
concrete universal and concrete particulars. However, to arrive at such a system, one
would have to solve the one-and-many problem which has eluded the human intellect for
millennia and which can only be solved by starting with Trinitarian categories in which
unity and diversity are equally ultimate and mutually conditioning. Thus, rather than
stuffing the Trinity into the straight jacket of human philosophical systems, perhaps the
reverse process of articulating philosophy within Trinitarian categories should be
attempted. As will be shown later, Trinitarian theology provides a covenantal ontology
which is personal, relational, and concrete. In so doing it may well provide a new
metaphor which will first transcend and then eliminate East-West theological differences.

SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TRINITARIANISM
IN THE MIDDLE AGES
While Trinitarian theology reached its mature development in the East with the
Council of Constantinople, its development in the West continued through the middle
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ages. In this regard, two models of the Trinity were evident. The social model of Richard
of St. Victor envisioned the Trinity as a society of love. This model was influential with
the Franciscans and exerted a strong influence on Bonaventure. The second model was
the psychological model of Augustine which reached its full development in the theology
of Thomas Aquinas, a contemporary of Bonaventure. Additionally, Trinitarian doctrine
developed as a result of the work the Fourth Lateran Council (1215), the Second Council
ofLyons (1279), and the Council of Florence (1438-1445). From the perspective of
Trinitarian theology, the main contributions of these councils were to develop and
solidify the teaching ofthejilioque (the double procession of the Holy Spirit) and the
nature of the relation of the persons to the divine essence.
According to Denis Edwards, 37 Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173) lived in an era
marked by a keen interest in friendship and romantic love and therefore used the concepts
of love and friendship to express a social Trinitarianism. Beginning with the concept of
God as supreme goodness and love, he argued that a second person must also exist since
perfect goodness and love overflows the self to embrace the other. Richard called this
process dilection. Moreover, since perfect love implies a self giving that is both complete
and reciprocal (reciprocal dilection), he argued that both the lover and the beloved must
be fully divine for their love to be perfectly mutual. Finally, arguing that perfect love
would seek to share the joy of this relationship with another, the lover and the beloved
would seek to include a third. Richard referred to this final process as condilection. Now,
since no novel aspect could be added to the original relationship by including a fourth
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person, Richard argued that there must be three, and only three, persons in the Godhead.
Because Richard's model was based on dynamic relationships rather than an abstract
substance, it had the potential to connect with popular piety due to its concreteness.
Building upon Richard's theology and that of Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure38
became the second great theologian of the Franciscan order, his teacher Alexander being
the first. Using Alexander's principle that goodness is self diffusive, 39 Bonaventure
argued that maximal goodness corresponded to maximal self diffusion, and thus to a self
diffusion that was both natural and willed (essential and voluntary). Accordingly, there
should be two processions within the divine essence resulting from God's nature and will,
respectively. The first ofthese was called generation and led to the production of the Son,
while the second was called procession and led to the production of the Holy Spirit. Thus,
in a manner similar to Richard, the Trinity was seen as a society of love built upon the
diffusive goodness of God. A passage from his Itinerarium Mentis in Deum is cited by
Fortman:
Should you then be able to see with the eyes of your mind this pure
goodness, you can also see that its supreme communicability necessarily
postulates the Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Since goodness is
supreme in them, so must communicability be; since communicability is
supreme, so must consubstantiality be; since consubstantiality is supreme,
so must likeness be, which necessitates supreme coequality and this in tum
supreme coetemity; while all the above attributes together necessitate
supreme mutual indwelling, with each person existing necessmily in the
others by supreme circumincession and each acting with the others in utter
indivision of substance, power, and operation in this most blessed Trinity .
. . . Here indeed is supreme communicability together with individuality of
persons; supreme consubstantiality with hypostatic plurality; supreme
likeness with distinct personality; supreme coequality with orderly origin;
supreme coetemity with emanation; supreme indwelling with emission.
Who would not be lifted up in wonder on beholding such marvels? Yet if
we raise our eyes to the supremely excellent goodness, we can understand
38
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with complete certainty that all this is to be found in the most blessed
Trinity.40
In contrast to the social model ofRichard and Bonaventure, Thomas Aquinas 41 • 42
refined the psychological model of Augustine. Thomas begins with the essence of God
which he characterizes as pure act: be-ing, knowing, and willing (here the hyphen has
been added to being to emphasize its original participial nature as an act of existence).
Since the essence of God is ever active, the knowing and willing of the essence produce
two eternal processions known as generation and procession, respectively. Each
procession, in tum, produces a pair of opposed relations which subsist within the divine
essence: paternity (generation) and filiation (being generated), spiration (breathing) and

procession or passive spiration (being breathed). Since three of these relations are not
only opposed but also distinct, they are person constituting. Thus, paternity,filiation, and

procession constitute the persons of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Here it can
be seen that since the relations constitute rather than merely distinguish the persons, the
relations are the persons rather than something that exists in a space between them. Thus,
for Thomas the persons reduce to subsistent relations within the divine essence which in
tum derive from the incessant activity of this essence itself. As subsistent, they are
logically but not ontologically distinct from the divine essence (esse in), and as relations,
they are both logically and ontologically distinct from one another (esse ad).
As can be seen, Thomas' system is highly rarefied in comparison to the social
Trinitarianism of Richard and Bonaventure. Whereas Bonaventure attributed the two
processions to nature and will, Thomas attributed them to knowledge and will. Thus, for
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Bonaventure Jesus was Word because Son while for Thomas Jesus was Son because
Word. That generation should be based upon knowledge followed for Thomas from the
fact that an expressed Word resembled its originating Idea in the same way that an
engendered Son resembled His originating Father. Thus, the two processes were
analogous to one another as "likeness-producing operations" or, as later theologians
would say, "formally assimilative operations," whatever that means. By contrast, the
procession by will or love was an "impulse-producing operation" of a unitive nature. So
understood, generation was based upon projection and therefore involved a standing
apart, whereas procession was based upon a mutual attraction which united the two
parties in their difference. Since Thomas' approach gained ascendancy over the social
Trinitarianism of Richard and Bonaventure, Trinitarian theology became an abstract
intellectual affair, increasingly detached from the piety of the church. As argued
forcefully by Karl Rahner, the eclipse of Trinitarian theology in the modern age may be
traced to this scholastic abstruseness. 43
In addition to the theologies of Richard, Bonaventure, and Aquinas, there were
three major councils in the middle ages whose activities contributed to the development
ofTrinitarian doctrine. The Fourth Lateran Council (1215) is noteworthy for addressing
two issues: the relation of the essence to the persons, and the jilioque. Some years before
the council, Joachim of Flora had accused Peter Lombard of advocating a quaternity in
the Godhead since he distinguished between the three persons and the divine essence. In
contrast to this accusation, it was clear to the council that the omission of the divine
essence would imply only a collective unity of persons and hence tritheism. Thus, the
council sought to clarify how it is that a distinction between the essence and the persons
43
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does not imply a quaternity. With regard to thejilioque, the council affinned that the
Holy Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son:
We, therefore, with the approval of the sacred council, believe and confess
with Peter Lombard that there is one supreme reality, incomprehensible
and ineffable, which is truly Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; at once the three
persons taken together and each of them singly; and so in God there is
only a Trinity and not a quaternity, because each of the three persons is
that reality, that is the divine substance, essence or nature: which alone is
the principle of all things and beside it no other can be found. And that
reality is not generating, nor generated, nor proceeding, but it is the Father
who generates, the Son who is generated, and the Holy Spirit who
proceeds: so that there are distinctions in the persons, unity in the nature. 44
It is clear therefore that in being born the Son received the substance of the
Father without any diminution, and so the Father and the Son have the
same substance; and thus the same reality is the Father and the Son and the
Holy Spirit who proceeds from both. 45
The Second Council of Lyons (1274) was convoked in part to reunite the Latins
and the Greeks. Hence a central issue for this council was the jilioque. In addressing this
issue Lyons II went beyond Lateran IV in clarifying that the Holy Spirit proceeds from
the Father and the Son as from a single principle:
...with faithful and devout profession we confess that the Holy Spirit
proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son, not as from two principles
but as from one, not by two spirations but by one ... But because there are
some men who through ignorance of this unshatterable truth have fallen
into various errors, we desire to close the road to these errors and so with
the approval of the holy council we condemn and reprobate those who
presume to deny that the Holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father
and the Son or those who rashly dare to assert that the Holy Spirit
proceeds from the Father and the Son as from two principles and not as
from one. 46
Finally, the Council of Florence (1438-1445) was also called to affect union with
the Greeks and so the jilioque was once again a focal point. In discussions the Latins and
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the Greeks came to a consensus that the procession of the Spirit from the Father and Son
was equivalent to statements by the Greek Fathers that the Spirit proceeds from the
Father through the Son. Florence went beyond Lyons II in clarifYing this equivalence, in
indicating that the jilioque had therefore been lawfully added to clarifY the meaning of
the creed (not as an innovation), and in declaring that the Holy Spirit receives both His
essence and His subsistent personality in His procession from the Father and the Son:
In the name of the Holy Trinity of the Father and Son and Holy Spirit,
with the approbation of this holy general Council of Florence we define
that this truth of faith be believed and accepted by all Christians, and that
all likewise profess that the Holy Spirit is eternally from the Father and the
Son, and has His essence and his subsistent being from the Father and Son
simultaneously, and proceeds from both eternally as from one principle
and one spiration; we declare that what the holy Doctors and Fathers say,
namely, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son,
tends to this meaning, that by this is signified that the Son is also
according to the Greeks the cause, and according to the Latins the
principle ofthe subsistence of the Holy Spirit, as is the Father also. And
since all things which are the Father's, the Father has given to the Son in
generating Him-except to be Father-so the Son has eternally from the
Father that the Holy Spirit should proceed from the Son ... In addition we
define that the explicitation of those words Filioque has been lawfully and
reasonably added to the Creed for the sake of declaring the truth and
because of imminent necessity. 47
In addition to the Greeks, a delegation of Coptic Christians came from Egypt
seeking union with Rome. After long meetings with several Cardinals, a bull was
promulgated which the Copts accepted in the name of their Patriarch. While this Decree

for the Jacobites is not officially part of the definition of Florence, it is ofhenneneutical
significance in its clarification of the thinking involved. In regard to the filioque, the
decree stated that the Father and Son form one principle with respect to the procession of
the Holy Spirit, just as the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit fonn a single principle with
respect to creation. Additionally, the decree said that the perichoresis of the persons was
47
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based upon their unity of essence. Finally, it was stated that in God's being all is one
where a relation of opposition does not intervene. Thus, unlike the oppositional relation
between the persons, which makes them both conceptually and actually distinct, the
relation between the essence and the persons is merely logical, not oppositional, and
therefore involves a conceptual distinction alone. Consequently, since the essence does
not exist apart from the persons (i.e. is not opposed to them), God is a Trinity, not a
quaternity:
The holy Roman Church, founded by the decree of our Lord and Savior
firmly believes, professes and teaches: There is one true God, allpowerful, unchangeable, and eternal, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, one in
essence but three in persons. The Father is not begotten, the Son is
begotten of the Father, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the
Son ... These three persons are one God, not three gods, for the three
persons have one substance, one essence, one nature, one divinity, one
immensity, one eternity. And everything is one where opposition of
relation does not intervene. Because of this unity the Father is entirely in
the Son and entirely in the Holy Spirit; the Son is entirely in the Father
and entirely in the Holy Spirit; the Holy Spirit is entirely in the Father and
entirely in the Son. None of the persons precedes in eternity or exceeds in
magnitude or surpasses in power any of the others ... Whatever the Father
is or has He has not from another but from Himself, and He is principle
without principle. Whatever the Son is or has, He has from the Father and
He is principle from principle. Whatever the Holy Spirit is or has, He has
at once from the Father and from the Son. Yet the Father and the Son are
not two principles of the Holy Spirit, but one principle, just as the Father
and the Son and the Holy Spirit are not three principles of creation but one
. . 1e. 48
pnnctp

THE RESURGANCE OF THE TRINITY IN MODERN THEOLOGY
As indicated previously, the doctrine of the Trinity has suffered from several
centuries of neglect and has only returned to center stage in the 20th Century. As outlined
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by Stanley Grenz, 49 the reasons for this period of neglect are several. First, as indicated
above, the abstruseness of scholastic theology isolated Trinitarian doctrine from popular
piety. Second, while the Reformers accepted Trinitarian theology, their focus was on
soteriology, not the doctrine of God. Third, the Refonners' thoroughgoing Biblicism and
opposition to ecclesiastical abuse had the unintended affect of causing some to devalue
central doctrines clarified by the dogmatic tradition of the church. Fourth, religious
warfare in the wake of the Reformation, prompted the rise of Enlightenment rationalism
and hence the demise of any doctrine that could not adjudicate itself before the bar of
autonomous reason. Finally, through the restriction of rational knowledge to the
phenomenal realm, the basis for even this rational religion was destroyed by Immanuel
Kant. During the 19th Century, there were some Trinitarian stirrings as Schleiermacher
and Hegel attempted to explicate the doctrine in terms of Romantic and Idealistic
philosophy, respectively. The real awakening, however, would begin in the 20th Century
with the revelational theology of Karl Barth.
Karl Barth's theology was a reaction to the liberalism of his era which had over
emphasized the immanence of God and identified His kingdom with secular society. In
the wake of World War I, however, this liberal optimism had been shattered, and Barth
reacted against it by stressing God's absolute transcendence. Because God was "wholly
other," human beings could not reason their way upward to God, but were dependent
upon God's downward revelation to them in Christ. For Barth, therefore, God's
revelation was historical, but history was not itselfrevelational. With regard to God's
revelation, Barth asserted that it had an implicit Trinitarian structure since it was
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dependent upon the Father who sent it (the revealer), Christ who was its content (the
revelation), and the Holy Spirit who made it effectual (the revealedness):
... applying out ternary of revealer, revelation and being revealed, we can
also say quite confidently that there is a source, an authorship, a ground of
revelation, a revealer of himself just as distinct from revelation itself as
revelation implies absolutely something new in relation to the mystery of
the revealer which is set aside in revelation as such. As a second in
distinction from the first there is thus revelation itself as the event of
making manifest what was previously hidden. And as the result of the first
two there is then a third, a being revealed, the reality of which is the
purpose of the revealer and therefore at the same time the point or goal of
the revelation. 50
Because of revelation's Trinitarian structure, Barth placed the Trinity at the front
of his Church Dogmatics, arguing that all Christian theology must be Trinitarian in both
method and content. However, since Barth's historical skepticism undermined his
confidence in the Bible, he derived the Trinity through an analysis of the concept of
revelation itself (as illustrated above), rather than through a synthesis of the historical
data of Scripture. The result of deriving the Trinity by a conceptual division of God's one
revelation was to lead Barth, despite his deeper intent, in a modalist direction. An
additional factor pushing him in this same direction was the fact that he was operating
with a 19th Century concept of person as a self contained, social atom. Since he therefore
feared that reference to three persons in God would constitute tritheism, he referred to
God as a single person existing in three modes of being (seinsweise). 51
These same internal tensions surfaced in the work ofKarl Rahner. In his book The

Trinity, Rahner sought to promote a Trinitarian renewal. He began by deploring the

°

5

Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, trans. G. W. Bromiley, 2nd. ed.,
vol. Ill (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1975), 363.
51
Ted Peters, God as Trinity: Relationalizy and Temporality in Divine Life, 1st ed. (Louisville, Ky.:
Westminster/J. Knox Press, 1993), 94.

44

neglect of Trinitarian theology in his day, arguing that at the level of daily life, Christians
were practical monotheists:
All of these considerations should not lead us to overlook the fact that,
despite their orthodox confession of the Trinity, Christians are, in their
practical life, almost mere "monotheists." We must be willing to admit
that, should the doctrine of the Trinity have to be dropped as false, the
2
major part of religious literature could well remain virtually unchanged. 5
Rahner blamed this state of affairs on the abstruseness of Trinitarian theology, its lack of
connection to vital spirituality, and its relative separation from other Christian doctrines.
To correct these problems, he argued that Trinitarian doctrine should begin with salvation
history and then reason upward to God's being rather than the reverse.
Compared to Barth's theology, Rahner's prescription of reasoning from the
economic to the immanent Trinity showed a greater confidence in historical revelation.
He crystallized this approach in an axiom which was subsequently labeled Rahner 's rule:
"The 'economic' Trinity is the 'immanent' Trinity, and the 'immanent' Trinity is the
'economic' Trinity." 53 Despite his greater openness to historical revelation, however,
Rahner also shared a methodological approach similar to Barth's in which he sought to
derive the Trinity analytically from God's self communication to humanity:
In the dimension of salvation history, this distinction is truly "real." The
origin of God's self-communication, its "existence" as it radically
expresses and utters itself, the self communication's welcoming
acceptance brought about by himself, are not indistinctly "the same thing"
signified by different words. That is: as understood by the experience of
faith, based on the witness of Scripture, the Father, the Word, and the
Spirit (however deficient all these words may and must be) point to a true
distinction, to a double mediation within this self-communication. 54
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In addition to this analytical approach to the Trinity, Rahner was also captivated
by an atomistic concept of the person55 and therefore sought to interpret the traditional
reference to divine persons in a way that avoided tritheism. Thus, he defined person as a
"distinct manner of subsisting"56 and referred to God as a single consciousness subsisting
in a threefold way. 57 As seen from this description, the confluence of an atomistic
concept of the person and an analytical approach to revelation drove Rahner in a modalist
direction, despite his deeper intentions.
As seen in the theologies of both Barth and Rahner, their deeper Trinitarian
instincts were hamstrung by an atomistic view of the human person. However, with the
advent of the postmodem era, this particular stumbling block has been removed since the
emerging postmodem view of interdependent personality affords new opportunities for
constructive theology. If persons are who they are by virtue of their positions in a
network of relations, then community and personhood, unity and diversity, become
correlative to one another. On a relational view of the person, therefore, the Trinitarian
persons can be referred to as such without the fear of falling into tritheism. 58
One example of this relational approach stems from the Trinitarian ecclesiology
of Orthodox theologian John D. Zizioulas. Zizioulas defines personhood as a twofold
mode of existence involving both hypostasis (individuality) and ekstasis (relational
drive). 59 In ekstasis the individual seeks to reach out beyond the self to affect communion
with other selves. The consequence is that on both the divine and ecclesial (i.e. human)

55

Ibid., 43, 44, 56, 57, I08.
Ibid., II 0.
57
Ibid., 107.
58
Peters, 35, 36.
59
John Zizioulas, Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church, Contemporary Greek
Theologians; (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1985), 106.

56

46

levels, being takes on a communal nature in which community and individuality become
interdependent correlative terms:
In this way the discussion of the being of God leads patristic
thought to the following theses, which are fundamentally bound up with
ecclesiology as well as ontology:
(a) There is no true being without communion. Nothing exists as
an "individual," conceivable in itself. Communion is an ontological
category.
(b) Communion which does not come from a "hypostasis," that is,
a concrete and free person, and which does not lead to "hypostases," that
is concrete and free persons, is not an "image" of the being of God. The
person cannot exist without communion; but every form of communion
which denies or suppresses the person is inadmissible. 60
While Zizioulas' program has many attractive elements, it has two major
deficiencies. First, in regard to the immanent Trinity, the Trinitarian communion is free,
not necessary, and derived from the monarchy of the Father through the freedom of His
will. But if personality is interdependent, how can the Father freely will the others into
being when both His personality and thus His free will presuppose their antecedent
existence? Second, with regard to the economic Trinity, Zizioulas fails to integrate
historical development with his Trinitarian theology. According to Zizioulas, ecclesial
personhood is the result of the coming together (synaxis) of the church in the power of
the Spirit during the Eucharist. Since this action prefigures the eschatological kingdom,
ecclesial personhood is an eschatological reality "which has its roots in the future and its
branches in the present."61 However, since this eschatological reality passes with the
completion of the Eucharist, history appears as a flux of profane time punctuated by
momentary intrusions of sacred time which enter from the future. Such a view fails to
connect with the salvation historical implications of the Trinitarian narrative.
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If history is undervalued in Zizioulas' theology, the reverse is the case for Jiirgen
Moltmann. In his program Moltmann seeks to combine the substantial, relational, and
historical views of personality which he traces to Boethius, Augustine, and Hegel,
respectively. 62 With regard to the substantial and relational aspect of the problem,
Moltmann locates God's unity not in the divine essence, but in the perichoretic
interpenetration of the persons:
The Father, the Son and the Spirit are by no means merely
distinguished from one another by their character as Persons; they are just
as much united with one another and in one another, since personal
character and social character are only two aspects of the same thing. The
concept of person must therefore in itself contain the concept of
unitedness or at-oneness, just as, conversely, the concept of God's atoneness must in itself contain the concept of the three Persons. This means
that the concept of God's unity cannot in the Trinitarian sense be fitted
into the homogeneity of the one divine substance, or into the identity of
the absolute subject either; and least of all into one of the three Persons of
the Trinity. It must be perceived in the perichoresis of the divine Persons.
If the unity of God is not perceived in the at-oneness of the triune God,
and therefore as a perichoretic unity, then Arianism and Sabellianism
remain inescapable threats to Christian theology. 63
With regard to the temporal aspect of the problem, Moltmann emphasizes that
each of the divine persons are not only related to one another, but also to a changing
world and are therefore changing themselves. Consequently, the perichoretic union of
persons is constantly adjusting to the changes of each of the divine persons with the
consequence that the Trinity itself undergoes historical development. The result is to
submerge the Trinity in time so that the immanent Trinity emerges from the economic
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Trinity only with the eschatological dawning of the Kingdom. Thus, the title of
Moltmann's book is The Trinity and the Kingdom:
If it is the quintessence of doxology, then the doctrine of the
immanent Trinity is part of eschatology as well. The economic Trinity
completes and perfects itself to immanent Trinity when the history and
experience of salvation are completed and perfected. When everything is
'in God', and 'God is all in all', then the economic Trinity is raised into
and transcended in the immanent Trinity. What remains is the eternal
praise of the triune God in his glory. 64
While Zizioulas and Moltmann reflect opposite extremes in relating the Trinity to
historical development, Wolfhart Pannenberg sets forth a relational approach which gives
place to historical development without subjecting God's being to a process ofbecoming.
With regard to the relationality of persons, Pannenberg's view does justice to both the
perichoretic interactions of the persons and the unity of the divine essence:
The divine persons, then, are concretions of the divine reality as
Spirit. They are individual aspects of the dynamic field of the eternal
Godhead. This means that they do not exist for themselves but in ec-static
relation to the overarching field of deity which manifests itself in each of
them and in their interrelations. But in this respect their reference to the
divine essence that overarches each personality is mediated by the
relations to the two other persons. The Son has a share in the eternal deity,
and is the Son, only with reference to the Father: the Father has his
identity as the Father, and is (Father) God, only with reference to the Son;
the Father and Son have their unity, and therefore their divine essence,
only through their relation to the Spirit; and the Spirit is a distinct
hypostasis only by his relation to the distinction and fellowship of the
Father and the Son in their differentiation. For the Spirit has full personal
independence, not as proceeding from the Father, as radiating from his
divine essence, but only in his distinction from the Father and the Son in
their differentiation. 65
With regard to history, Pannenberg's position is again balanced. From one
perspective, he argues that in creating the world God has risked his deity which now
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depends upon the victory of His kingdom in time. 66 Yet, from another perspective, this
eschatological victory is certain, and will simply give retroactive confirmation to the
deity of God which remains from eternity to eternity:
Refuted herewith is the idea of a divine becoming in history, as
though the trinitarian God were the result of history and achieved reality
only with its eschatological consummation. In our historical experience it
might seem as if the deity of God whom Jesus proclaimed is definitively
demonstrated only with the eschatological consummation. It might also
seem as if materially the deity of God is inconceivable without the
consummation of his kingdom, and that it is thus dependent upon the
eschatological coming of the kingdom. But the eschatological
consummation is only the locus of the decision that the trinitarian God is
always the true God from eternity to eternity. 67
In comparing Pannenberg's eschatology to that ofMoltmann, it seems that for
Pannenberg the eternal God is active in time whereas for Moltmann God is Himself
temporal. Consequently, whereas for Moltmann the immanent Trinity emerges from the
economic Trinity eschatologically, for Pannenberg the economic Trinity is finally
subsumed into the immanent Trinity who "is always true God from eternity to eternity."

CORNELIUS VAN TIL AND THE EMERGENCE OF COVENANT ONTOLOGY
The resurgence of Trinitarian theology sketched above has not characterized
evangelical circles until recently. One exception to this generalization was the Trinitarian
theology of the late Refonned apologist, Cornelius Van Til. Van Til received his
doctorate in philosophy from Princeton University in 1927, specializing in idealistic
philosophy. Believing that theology required continual restatement in the language of the
day, Van Til used idealist fonns of expression as vehicles for Christian content. For
instance, he referred to Christianity as the only philosophical system capable of handling
66
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the "one-and-many" problem because the Trinity alone provided a "concrete universal."
Because Van Til was an apologist rather than a systematic theologian, however, his
Trinitarian insights arose in relation to specific philosophical problems and so are
scattered throughout his works. Consequently, while they are philosophically deep and
penetrating, they are not systematically organized and related to one another. What
follows is an attempt to draw integrated conclusions from a synthesis of three of Van
Til's major Trinitarian insights.
For Van Til God is a se because He is an internally interdependent (i.e. internally
covenanted) being. As Van Til's writings show, this interdependence manifests itself in
three types of relationships: essence-person, person-person, and person-essence. These
relationships may be visualized as completing a circuit as shown in Figure 1 below.
With regard to these relationships, the essence-person relationship will be referred
to as the ontological-ethical relation. The reason for this designation is that the full
expression of the infinite, personal essence in each of the three persons guarantees their
personal infinitude and hence their perichoretic interaction which is covenantal and thus
ethical. The person-person relationships will be referred to as the ethical-epistemological
relation because the covenantal (ethical) interaction of the persons defines their identities
epistemologically. Finally, the person-essence relationship will be referred to as the

epistemological-ontological relation because the reciprocal definition of the persons
resulting from their covenantal interaction ensures that God is internally rather than
externally defined. As a result, God is both a se and personal because He is intemally
defined in a covenantal manner and not correlative to a finite, impersonal world.
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Figure 1. Circuit of Intra-Trinitarian Relationships
(Explicatio-Implicatio-Complicatio)
The implication of this discussion is that the ontological, ethical, and

epistemological aspects of God's being and activity form a circuit of interdependence (a
relation of relationships) as shown in Figure 1. Because each of these relationships is
internally dependent upon each of the others and upon nothing external to God's being,
God is a se. The character of these relationships may be illumined by a trilogy of Latin
terms: explicatio, implicatio, and complicatio. 68 In this regard, the divine essence unfolds
itself into each of the three persons (explicatio ); the three persons also interweave
themselves together (implicatio) in perichoresis, and finally the three persons also fold
themselves together into the divine essence (complicatio). Before expounding these
68
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relationships, it should be remembered that the distinction between the essence and
persons intended within this analytical model is conceptual only, not oppositional. In
other words, the distinction is not intended to imply a quatemity.

THE ONTOLOGICAL-ETHICAL RELATION (ESSENCE-PERSON)
As mentioned above, the full expression of God's essence in each ofthe persons
implies that all three are omnipresent and therefore coextensive with one another. Thus,
the infinitude of God's essence enables the ethical or covenantal interaction between the
person,s. by establishing the ontological possibility of perichoresis. However, since divine

persons cannot derive from an abstract, impersonal essence, the divine essence must itself
be personal to enable this possibility. As a result of this latter insight, Van Til opted for a
paradoxical fonnulation of God as both a tri-conscious and a one-conscious being.
According to Lane Tipton, this paradoxical formulation was driven by his apologetic
desire to directly confront modernity's demand for air tight, logical consistency. 69 Van
Til therefore grounded the three Trinitarian persons in a personal divine essence:
It is sometimes asserted that we can prove to men that we are not
asserting anything that they ought to consider irrational, inasmuch as we
say that God is one in essence and three in person. We therefore claim that
we have not asserted unity and trinity of exactly the same thing.
Yet this is not the whole truth of the matter. We do assert that God,
that is, the whole Godhead, is one person ... we have noted how
theologians insist that each of the persons of the Godhead is co-tenninous
with the being of the Godhead ... We need both the absolute cotennineity
of each attribute and each person with the whole being of God, and the
genuine significance of the distinctions of the attributes and the persons.
"Each person," says Bavinck, "is equal to the whole essence of God and
cotenninous with both other persons and with all three" ... Over against
all other beings, that is, over against created beings, we must therefore
hold that God's being presents an absolute numerical identity. And even
69
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within the ontological Trinity we must maintain that God is numerically
one. He is one person. When we say that we believe in a personal God, we
do not merely mean that we believe in a God to whom the adjective
"personality" may be attached. God is not an essence that has personality;
He is absolute personality. 70
... We speak of the essence of God in contrast to the three persons of the
Godhead. We speak of God as a person; yet we speak also of three persons
in the Godhead. As we say that each of the attributes of God is to be
identified with the being of God, while yet we are justified in making a
distinction between them, so we say that each of the persons of the Trinity
is exhaustive of divinity itself, while yet there is a genuine distinction
between the persons. Unity and plurality are equally ultimate in the
Godhead. The persons of the Godhead are mutually exhaustive of one
another, and therefore of the essence of the Godhead. God is a oneconscious being, and yet he is also a tri-conscious being. 71

THE ETHICAL-EPISTEMOLOGICAL RELATION (PERSON-PERSON)
In this relation the emphasis falls upon the way that God internally defines
Himself through perichoretic interaction. According to Van Til, the divine persons have a
completely personal relationship without residue and are therefore mutually and
exhaustively representational of one another. In fact, this mutual representation is so
integral that God's being may be said to be constructed "upon the representational plan."
From these statements it follows that God is internally self defined because His internal
interaction allows Him to compare and contrast within His own being. Moreover, since
"the idea of exhaustive personal relationship is the idea of the covenant,"72 Van Til sees
God's internal self-definition to derive from a perichoretic interaction which is
covenantal in nature. Here Van Til was undoubtedly influenced by the Dutch Calvinism
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of Abraham Kuyper who had formulated covenantal Trinitarianism decades earlier. 73
Van Til writes:
... It were quite legitimate and true to say that the foundation of all

personal activity among men must be based upon the personality of one
ultimate person, namely, the person of God, if only it be understood that
this ultimate personality of God is a triune personality. In the Trinity there
is completely personal relationship without residue. And for that reason it
may be said that man's actions are all personal too. Man's surroundings
are shot through with personality because all things are related to the
infinitely personal God. But when we have said that the surroundings of
man are really completely personalized, we have also established the fact
of the representational principle. All of man's acts must be
representational of the acts of God. Even the persons of the Trinity are
mutually representational. They are exhaustively representational of one
another. Because he is a creature, man must, in his thinking, his feeling
and his willing, be representative of God ... Since the whole being of God,
if we may in all reverence say so, is built upon the representational plan, it
was impossible for God to create except upon the representational plan. 74

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL-ONTOLOGICAL RELATION (PERSON-ESSENCE)
In this final relation the emphasis falls upon the way in which God's internal self
definition guards His aseity and personality, and hence the infinite personality of the
divine essence. The key point here is that because God is internally self defined, He does
not need to define Himself externally and thereby become correlative and dependent
upon a finite impersonal world. Additionally, since God's internal interaction is
covenantal and therefore personal, such interaction not only guards the infinitude of the
divine essence, but also establishes its personal character. This epistemologicalontological relation therefore completes the circuit shown in Figure 1 by yielding the
original starting point, an essence that is both absolute and personal:
73
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We may express this thought philosophically by saying that for us the
eternal one and many form a self-complete unity. God is absolute
personality and therefore absolute individuality. He exists necessarily. He
has no non-being over against himself in comparison with which he
defines himself; he is internally self-defined.
Using the language of the One-and-Many question we contend that
in God the one and the many are equally ultimate. Unity in God is no more
fundamental than diversity, and diversity in God is no more fundamental
than unity. The persons of the Trinity are mutually exhaustive of one
another. The Son and the Spirit are ontologically on a par with the Father.
.. In God's being there are no particulars not related to the universal, and
there is nothing universal that is not fully expressed in the particulars. 75
In regard to this epistemological-ontological relation, Van Til's contribution
appears to be both unique and revolutionary. As the present historical survey has shown,
previous theologians have concentrated upon the essence-person, and person-person
relations, but not upon the person-essence relation. By explicating this latter relation, Van
Til has "closed the loop" to produce a covenant ontology that is personal, relational, and
concrete. Because God's substance is personal, and the persons are substantial, God
emerges as a concrete universal in which unity and diversity are equally ultimate. As a
result, covenant ontology may provide a fruitful perspective for East-West ecumenical
dialog because it transcends their respective philosophical positions by incorporating
them both into a common loop.
Moreover, since Figure 1 shows God's aseity to be both the result and the cause
of His internal self relatedness, it follows that within God's being the absolute is the
relative, and the relative is the absolute. Because this paradoxical insight resonates with
postmodern epistemology, it will be applied again and again to different problems in the
chapters that follow. For this reason this last citation from Van Til will be repeated ad
nauseum in the chapters below. As mentioned above, this particular insight is both unique
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to Van Til and revolutionary in its implications. As the following chapters will show, it is
especially this insight which makes such a conservative Presbyterian so highly relevant to
the postmodern context.

CONCLUSION
The present chapter has sought to trace the doctrine of the Trinity from its Biblical
origins through its historical development to its present day significance. In this regard, it
was first shown that Eastern and Western Trinitarian theology originally developed
within the differing frameworks of Platonism and Stoicism, causing them to emphasize
personal diversity and substantial unity, respectively. It was then shown that Western
Trinitarian theology peaked during the Middle Ages and subsequently declined due its
inability to connect with popular piety. Next, the 201h Century resurgence of Trinitarian
theology was documented through an analysis of some of the key theologians involved.
Finally, Van Til's covenantal Trinitarianism was set forth to show its highly personal,
relational, and concrete nature. Because of these qualities, it has the potential to facilitate
East-West dialog, to connect with popular piety, and to meet the postmodern hunger that
is driving the Trinitarian resurgence. In each of these cases, it is interesting that the
philosophical remedy derives from the Biblical concept of covenantal personalism. As
the subsequent chapters will show, the fruitfulness of this perspective for postmodern
contextualization derives from the interdependence which it posits between absoluteness
and relativity.
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CHAPTER3
MULTIPERSPECTIVALISM AS A TRINITARIAN GRAMMAR:
THE ROLE OF PERICHORESIS

I noted above that a theology that seeks to be responsive to, and to take seriously,
postmodem sensitivities after the demise of foundationalism views itself as a
conversation. More specifically, theological construction--the attempt to delineate what
ought to be the belief-mosaic of the Christian church--may be characterized as an
ongoing conversation that the participants in the faith community share as to the meaning
of the cultural symbols through which Christians express their understanding of the world
they inhabit. These symbols include sacred texts, language, rituals, and practices. This
constructive theological conversation requires the interplay, or perichoretic dance, of
three sources of insight. ..
The demise of foundationalism accompanying the postmodem situation opens the
way for an evangelical theological method that views constructive theology as an
ongoing conversation involving the interplay of Scripture, tradition, and culture.
Stanley Grenz, Renewing the Center

As seen from the citation above, 1 Stanley Grenz sets forth a non-foundational
theological method which involves the perichoretic interplay of three sources of insight.
Because theology is a socially embodied, historically extended task in which the church
continually interprets the Bible and applies it to its cultural context, the three sources of
Grenz's theological method are the Bible, the dogmatic tradition of the church, and the
embedding cultural context. According to Grenz, these three aspects of theological
methodology should interpenetrate one another perichoretically in a three way
conversation that Grenz elsewhere refers to as "trialog. "2 So understood, systematic
theology is the result of a trialectic engagement between Biblical exegesis, dogmatic
history, and missiology.
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It is precisely this theological method that is being pursued in the present book.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the objective of this book is to inter-relate Trinitarian
theology with the principle loci ofpostmodern philosophy as identified by Nancey
Murphy: non-foundational epistemology, socially constructive linguistics, and holistic
relational ontology. Having discussed the Biblical basis and the historical development of
Trinitarian theology in Chapter 2, attention will now shift to cultural application for the
balance of the text. However, to apply Trinitarian theology to these various loci, a means
is needed to translate Trinitarian theology into a form that applies more directly to
philosophical problems and categories. In providing such an approach, the present
chapter will form a bridge to the heart of the argument in Chapters 4-6.
As it turns out, John Frame has provided such an approach in his book, Doctrine

of the Knowledge ofGod. 3 This approach is known alternately as multiperspectivalism or
triperspectivalism. According to Frame, epistemology is a branch of ethics 4 since both
fields evaluate types of action (i.e. knowing is a form of .doing) in terms of an interplay of
three distinct perspectives: existential, situational, and normative. 5 For instance, ethics
evaluates human action according to the purity of the motives (existential perspective),
the utility of the ends within a given context (situational perspective), and the lawfulness
ofthe means employed (nonnative perspective). Similarly, epistemology evaluates the
criteria by which a human subject (existential perspective) knows an object in its external
context (situational perspective) in accordance with the laws of thought (nonnative
perspective).

3

Frame.
Ibid., 63, 73, 74, 108, 109.
5
Ibid., 74, 75.

4

59

In both of these cases, Frame argues that the three perspectives, though distinct,
are ultimately inseparable6 since they interpenetrate perichoretically with one another.
Because the perspectives therefore cohere, there is a common truth of which they are the
perspectives. Yet because this one truth requires a diversity of perspectives, it is complex,
rather than simple. So understood, multiperspectivalism offers a true third way between
modem reductionism which tries to reduce problems to the simplicity of a single
perspective (i.e. subjectivism, empiricism, and rationalism) and postmodern
perspectivalism which is nihilistic and therefore denies truth to every perspective.
Multiperspectivalism is thus able to chart a course between these extremes because it is a
Trinitarian method which captures the diversity-in-unity of complex truth. Moreover,
because it offers a common flexible framework for distinct fields (i.e. ethics and
epistemology), it is more precisely referred to as a Trinitarian grammar. Before
developing the applications of multiperspectivalism, however, it is necessary to ground it
in a Trinitarian ontology in order to fully explicate its Trinitarian nature. To this end it
will be necessary to turn to the Trinitarian theology of Cornelius Van Til.

MULTIPERSPECTIVALISM AND THE ONTOLOGICAL TRINITY

Because it is a perichoretic method, multiperspectivalism derives from the
Trinitarian perichoresis itself. In this regard, the divine persons mutually exhaust one
another because they are on an ontological par? Moreover, since each of the persons is
equal to the whole of the divine essence, each of the persons is not only cotenninous with
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each of the others but also with all three taken together. 8' 9 Consequently, because each
person knows each of the others from the inside, the subject and object of knowledge are
coterminous within the Godhead. Moreover, since each person is also coterminous with
all three together, the subject and object of knowledge are coterminous with the divine
society as a whole. Thus, the subject and object of knowledge are not only coterminous
with one another but also with the social norm. Within God's being, therefore, the
existential, situational, and normative perspectives exhaustively interpenetrate one
another. Consistent with this social analogy, Van Til views the divine knowledge as
taking place eternally within a circuit of mutually exhaustive personalities:
To this we should add that the Trinity, as taught in the Scriptures,
gives the most basic description possible of God as the principium essendi
of knowledge for man ... When God existed alone, there was no time
universe, and there were no new facts arising. The only knowledge
activity that existed was completed in the circuit of the mutually
exhaustive personalities of the triune God. 10
By integrating the subjective, objective, and normative perspectives within God's
being, perichoresis also makes human knowledge possible because it guards the aseity or
independence of God. After all, if subject, object, and norm were not exhaustively
correlative within God's being, then God would be correlative to the world as subject to
object and thus part of a larger whole which would constitute the nonnative connection
between the two. However, because God is exhaustively correlative within His own
being, He can compare and contrast within Himself with the result that He is internally
self defined and thus independent of the world. Consequently, it is precisely the
exhaustive interpenetration of the existential (subjective), situational (objective), and
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normative (social) perspectives within God's being that establishes God's aseity and
therewith His ability to guarantee the coherence of these same three perspectives in
human thought and action:
... We may express this thought philosophically by saying that for us the
eternal one and many form a self-complete unity. God is absolute
personality and therefore absolute individuality. He exists necessarily. He
has no non-being over against himself in comparison with which he
defines himself; he is internally self-defined.
Using the language of the One-and-Many question we contend that
in God the one and the many are equally ultimate. Unity in God is no more
fundamental than diversity, and diversity in God is no more fundamental
than unity. The persons of the Trinity are mutually exhaustive of one
another. The Son and the Spirit are ontologically on a par with the Father.
. . . In God's being there are no particulars not related to the universal, and
there is nothing universal that is not fully expressed in the particulars. 11
... It is of the greatest moment to make clear that the ultimate subject of
our predication is not the Universe, Reality, or Being in general in which
God is the universal, and historical facts are the particulars. If such were
the case, God and the universe would be correlative to one another. And it
is precisely in order to set off the Christian position against such
correlativism that the equal ultimacy of the one and the many within the
Godhead, prior to and independent of its relation to the created universe,
must be presupposed. As Christians, we hold that in this universe we deal
with a derivative one and many, which can be brought into fruitful relation
with one another because, back of both, we have in God the original One
and Many. If we are to have coherence in our experience, there must be a
correspondence of our experience to the eternally coherent experience of
God. Human knowledge ultimately rests upon the internal coherence
within the Godhead; our knowledge rests upon the ontological Trinity as
.
. .
12
Its presuppositiOn.

As seen from the last citation above, human thought coheres to the extent that it
corresponds to the absolute coherence of God's thought. As the one in whom subject,
object, and norm cohere exhaustively, God can infallibly create a world in which
derivative subjects, objects, and nonns also cohere. Unlike God, however, human
subjects do not comprehend themselves, their external world, or the mediating norms
11
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exhaustively. As a result, the perichoresis between the existential, situational, and
normative perspectives of human knowledge is partial, not complete. Moreover, since
each aspect depends upon a prior coherence within God's being, the coherence in human
knowledge is mediated (i.e., correspondence to God's coherence) rather than direct.
Human knowledge is thus a covenantal phenomenon because its interrelations are rooted
in the God who is Himself covenant:
It may even be said that Calvin's covenant idea is Theism come to
its own. The covenant idea is nothing but the expression of the
representational principle consistently applied to all reality. The
foundation of the representational principle among men is the fact that the
Trinity exists in the form of a mutually exhaustive representation of the
three Persons that constitute it. The emphasis should be placed upon the
idea of exhaustion . ..
It was upon this foundation of a truly Trinitarian concept that
Calvin built his conception of covenant theology. If the Persons of the
Trinity are representationally exhaustive of one another, human thought is
cast on representational lines too. There would in that case be no other
than a completely personalistic atmosphere in which human personality
could function. Accordingly, when man faced any fact whatsoever, he
would ipso facto be face to face with God. It is metaphysically as well as
religiously true that man must live and cannot but live coram deo always.
Even the meeting of one finite personality with another finite personality
would not be truly personal if there were an impersonal atmosphere
surrounding either or both of these personalities. What makes their
meeting completely personal is the fact that the personality of each and of
both is surrounded by the personality of God. Hence all personal
relationship between finite persons must be mediated through the central
13
personality of God.

THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF MULTIPERSPECTIVALISM
The above discussion of Van Til's theology is somewhat anachronistic in that the
three perspectives, though implicit in his writings, were never fully explicated by him.
For instance, with regard to human knowledge, Van Til argued that the subject-object
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problem was solved because the subject and object of knowledge were coterminous
within God's being. 14'

15 16
•

However, since Van Til's explanation omitted any discussion

of the normative perspective, his thinking on this topic remained bimodal rather than
triperspectival. Nevertheless, Van Til had a penchant for 3-fold formulations. He
described ethics as an evaluation of the motive (existential perspective), standard
(normative perspective), and goal (situational perspective) of human behavior. 17• 18 He
described God's redemptive activity in terms of objective acts in history (situational
perspective), the supernatural Word revelation which defined the meaning of these acts
(normative perspective), and the subjective application of these truths in regeneration
(existential perspective ). 19 Finally, with regard to revelation itself, Van Til held that
God's supernatural Word revelation (nonnative perspective) was necessarily
supplemented by His natural revelation both within the human conscience (existential
perspective) and in the surrounding world (situational perspective). 20'

21

In fact, Van Til

even set forth a 9-fold view of revelation in which the revelation of God (nonnative
perspective), humanity (existential perspective), and the world (situational perspective)
could each derive from three different revelational sources: God (normative perspective),
humanity (existential perspective), and the world (situational perspective). 22 Yet, in all of
Van Til's discussion of these 3-fold phenomena, the three perspectives, evident within
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the parentheses above, remained beneath the surface of his discussion. Accordingly, it
fell to Van Til's former student John M. Frame to draw these implications out and then
draw them together into a multiperspectival methodology.
After graduating from Westminster Theological Seminary, Frame went on to
graduate studies at Yale. There he came under the influence of two important people:
George Lindbeck, the father ofpostliberalism, and Paul Holmer (Frame's advisor), the
man responsible for the Wittgensteinian influence that came to characterize "Yale
theology." In addition to Van Til, therefore, Frame was reading a lot ofWittgenstein as
well as the post-critical philosophers of science, Thomas Kuhn and Michael Polanyi.
Moreover, in a manner similar to Van Til's 3-fold formulations, George Lindbeck was
developing his 3-fold typology ofliberal, conservative, and postliberal theologies which
he would later classify as experiential-expressive (existential perspective), cognitivepropositional (situational perspective), and cultural-linguistic (normative perspective),
respectively. 23 As related by John Frame in a private communication, it was the
confluence of these various factors that eventually resulted in multiperspectivalism:
The ideas occurred to me around 1969 or 1970. I was teaching Doctrine of
God based on a transcendence/immanence scheme, but it occurred to me
that "transcendence" needed further explanation, a distinction between
God's control and his authority. That led to more studies of God's
lordship, and the control-authority-presence scheme. At the same time, I
was teaching ethics, based on Van Til's goal/motive/standard
distinction. Eventually, I saw that goal/motive/standard could be
correlated with control/presence/authority, and I was off.
Some other things that inclined me in this sort of direction, not
necessarily in this order:
1. Van Til's emphasis on the Trinity.
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2. Van Til's threefold system of natural revelation in his Intro to
Systematic Theology.
3. A college course in metaphysics from Dennis O'Brien that showed how
otherwise different philosophical positions can be seen as perspectives
on one another.
4. A grad course with George Lindbeck on "Comparative Dogmatics" that

offered a similar approach to theology.
5. Van Til's way ofrelativizing disputes about theological
encyclopedia: e.g. you don't need to make apologetics "prior" to
systematics or vice versa, because they each presuppose the other. VT
was big on reciprocal relationships among biblical doctrines. (See my
"Van Til, the Theologian.")
6. Thomas Kuhn, Michael Polanyi, Wittgenstein, even perhaps a dollop of
Nietzsche (but no more than that) .... 24
As can be seen from Frame's account above, multiperspectivalism represents a
blend of Westminster Theological Seminary and the "Yale School." As such, it embodies
traditional Trinitarian orthodoxy in the form of a postliberal theological grammar. It is
precisely this combination of factors that makes it an attractive method for
contextualizing Trinitarian theology in a postmodern world. Moreover, since the purpose
of a linguistic grammar is to facilitate speech-acts, multiperspectivalism, as a theological
grammar, is designed to facilitate theology-acts (i.e., the application ofthe faith). In this
regard, this methodology coheres with Frame's conviction that meaning is pragmatic (i.e.
meaning = use) and therefore that theology is an application of the Word.

25

Thus, just as

language is a tool for social construction, multiperspectivalism is a tool for theological
construction in the social worlds of church and culture. As acknowledged by Frame,
these views reflect a Biblically moderated influence of Ludwig Wittgenstein. 26
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THE MEANING-APPLICATION OF MULTIPERSPECTIVALISM

As mentioned above, multiperspectivalism is a Trinitarian grammar. According
to Frame, the situational, normative, and existential perspectives reflect God's control in
creation, His authority as mediated by His Word, and His presence in sanctification. 27
Accordingly, the situational, nonnative, and existential perspectives can be related to the
respective persons of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, although Frame is hesitant to make
such identifications. (Here the identification of the divine persons with particular
perspectives is similar to the doctrine of appropriation in which the Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit are appropriated to the respective works of creation, redemption, and
sanctification, even though it is known that each person is active in each task.)
Furthermore, just as the divine persons interpenetrate perichoretically, so do the three
perspectives. Thus, the three perspectives are inseparable and logically implicate one
another. None has priority over the others, and the existence of each entails the existence
of the other two. As a result, they constitute three perspectives on the whole of
knowledge and on one another. In fact it is precisely to underscore this inseparability that
Frame refers to them as perspectives rather than parts:
... These distinctions, then, generate three "perspectives" on knowledge.
When we think about knowledge as a knowledge of the world, we are
examining it under the "situational" perspective. Knowledge as selfknowledge constitutes the "existential" perspective. And knowledge as a
knowledge oflaw or criterion constitutes the "nonnative" perspective.
These perspectives are not distinct "parts" of knowledge. They are
"perspectives"; each describes the whole of knowledge in a certain way.
The existential perspective describes all knowledge as self-knowledge, the
situational perspective as knowledge of the world, and the nonnative
perspective as knowledge of law. 28
27
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... Ultimately, the three perspectives differ only in emphasis or focus.
Each includes the other two, and so the three all cover the same territory;
they have the same content.
Thus I maintain that the three perspectives are equally ultimate,
equally important. Each depends on the others, so that without the others,
it could not be intelligible. 29
Because the three perspectives cohere with one another, they represent a common
truth. Yet since this truth requires multiple perspectives for its expression, it is complex,
rather than simple. In this regard, multiperspectivalism offers a true third way between
the simple truth of modernistic reductionism and the nihilistic perspectivalism of
Continental postmodernity. With regard to the former, Nancey Murphy has argued that
modern epistemology, linguistics, and ontology were each characterized by an atomistic
reductionism. 30 At the other extreme Continental postmodernity deriving from Nietzsche
and poststructuralism seeks to deconstruct reason, observation, and even the self. In
contrast to both of these alternatives, multiperspectivalism is a connective, holistic, and
complex methodology that is reconstructive rather than deconstructive. As such, it shares
a strong affinity with Anglo-American postmodernity as represented by Nancey
Murphy. 31 Indeed, this affinity is not surprising since apart from the influence of Van Til,
the two views share a common intellectual pedigree: Austin, Kuhn, Lindbeck, Polanyi,
Quine, Wittgenstein, etc. Because of this strong affinity, multiperspectivalism constitutes
the logical tool with which to apply Van Til's Trinitarian theology to the philosophical
targets identified above by Nancey Murphy. This application will be the burden of
Chapters 4-6.
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With regard to epistemology Murphy argues that in the transition to the
postmodem age, the governing metaphor has changed from a building to that of a web or
a net. 32 In terms of the old image, philosophers searched for indubitable foundations upon
which the edifice of knowledge could be constructed. Beginning with Quine, however,
the image of a net has come to predominate. Since the new image emphasizes
connectivity rather than foundations, postmodem epistemology is referred to as non-

foundational epistemology.
In this regard, multiperspectivalism may be characterized as non-foundational in
the sense that nothing in the created order may serve as epistemological bedrock. Since
none of the perspectives has foundational priority over the others, they exhibit an
interdependent coherence as shown below in Figure 2a. However, while none of the
perspectives is foundational to the others, their coherence results from the fact that they
share a transcendent foundation in the Triune God. Yet since the divine persons are
exhaustively interdependent and correlative to one another, no person is foundational to
the other two. Thus, in the words of Colin Gunton, the Trinity is the "non-foundational

foundation "33 of humanity's non-foundational knowledge.
Apart from the Trinity, however, human thought will try to absolutize one of the
perspectives and make it foundational to the other two. When this happens, the coherence
of the perspectives gives way to the warring camps of empiricism, rationalism, and
subjectivism as shown in Figure 2b. However, since none of these perspectives is capable
of grounding the epistemological enterprise, the resulting skepticism may well produce a
32
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nihilistic reaction that denies the validity of all the perspectives simultaneously. This is
precisely what has happened with Continental postmodemity. The examination of these
issues will be the burden of Chapter 4.
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Rationalism

EPISTEMOLOGY

EPISTEMOLOGY

Perception

Subjectivism

a. multiperspec!ivalism

Empiricism

b. reduclionism

Figure 2. Multiperspectivalism vs. Epistemological Reductionism (Foundationalism)
With regard to linguistics Murphy again describes the modem-postmodem
transition in tenns of a change in the governing metaphor. The old image of language as a

mirror or a picture has given way to the new image of language as a tool. 34 In terms of
the old image, linguists tried to justify language by the correspondence of words or
sentences to the objective world. Because this referential or propositional theory could
not account for emotional or ethical statements, it necessitated the development of an

expressive theory of language to account for everyday speech. In terms of the new image,
however, language is a tool to accomplish projects in the social world. Thus, the new
emphasis falls upon the use of language rather than reference or expression alone.
Having been influenced by Austin and Wittgenstein, John Frame is sympathetic to
the view that the meaning of language is detennined by its use in the social world.
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Indeed, his multiperspectivalism has been offered as a flexible grammar to facilitate
theological construction in the social worlds of church and culture. With respect to the
details of the language problem, Frame adopts the triadic framework of pragmatics,

semantics, and syntactics, 35 initially put forth by Charles Morris. 36 In terms of this
framework, pragmatics emphasizes the expressive or existential aspects of speech;
semantics represents the referential or situational aspects of speech, and syntactics
concerns itself with the coherence or normative aspects of speech.
Because human speech-acts are grounded in the Triune God, they are established
by a divine speech-act in which expression, reference, and coherence are exhaustively
correlative. As a result, the pragmatic, semantic, and syntactic perspectives of human
speech-acts cohere as shown below in Figure 3a. And since language is central to
knowledge itself, it follows that God's knowledge is socially constructive; human

knowledge is socially reconstructive. However, apart from the Triune God, this unity of
perspectives gives way to the competing emphases of expressivism, referentialism, and
structuralism as shown in Figure 3b. Moreover, since neither of these perspectives can
account for language alone, a skepticism may well result, producing a backlash in which
all the perspectives are held to be equally meaningless. The examination of these issues
will be the objective of Chapter 5.
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Figure 3. Multiperspectivalism vs. Linguistic Reductionism

With regard to metaphysics Nancey Murphy has not described the philosophical
transition in tenns of a change in the governing metaphors. While indicating that the
modem mind was captivated by the picture of microscopic billiard balls (i.e. the billiard
ball universe), 37 she gives no governing metaphor for the postmodem age. Perhaps this is
because the theories of relativity, quantum mechanics, and chaos, which give rise to the
new cosmology, are difficult if not impossible to visualize. Nevertheless, she does
describe the difference. Because the modem age was characterized by atomism and
detenninism, a reductionism prevailed in which an attempt was made to reduce all
sciences to the mechanical interaction of atoms (i.e. sociology >psychology > biology>
chemistry> physics). By contrast, since the new scientific perspective considers relation,
pattern, and organization to be as important as matter, it has a built in resistance to such
reductionism. In emergence theory (complexity science), for instance, the interaction of
patis gives rise to emergent wholes which cannot be reduced to the sum of their parts.
Moreover, these wholes not only exist in relative independence of their parts but also
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exert a reciprocal effect that causes the parts to behave differently than they would in a
different context. For instance, chemical reactions behave differently in the human body
than they do in a test tube. Thus, far from being reductionistic the new ontology
accompanying the new science posits a reciprocal influence between parts and wholes.
While John Frame has not devoted much attention to metaphysical triads,
multiperspectivalism presupposes a complex world in which parts and wholes exert a
reciprocal influence on one another. In particular, it presupposes that self, world, and
relation exist as real entities which interpenetrate one another perichoretically as shown
below in Figure 4a. After all, in God's world the real is the relational, and the relational

is the real. However, when the Triune God is denied, this hannony gives way to sparring
matches between the adherents of idealism, materialism, and logicism as shown in Figure
4b. Here idealism and materialism signify the positions that all is thought or matter,
respectively, and logicism has been invented to represent the position that all is law. This
latter position is intended to represent that of Einstein, Spinoza, and the Stoics for whom
mind and matter are both absorbed into a world of impersonal fate.

Self

Relation

Logicism

ONTOLOGY

ONTOLOGY
World

Materialism

Idealism

a. multipcnpectiralism

b. reductionism

Figure 4. Multiperspectivalism vs. Ontological Reductionism
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These issues will be discussed further in Chapter 6. However, since Frame has
devoted little attention to the development of a triadic ontology, Chapter 6 will reverse
the procedure employed in Chapters 4 and 5. Rather than using a metaphysical triad in
the examination of the new ontology, the new ontology will be used to ground a
metaphysical triad. Such a reversal of procedure is consistent with a non-foundational
epistemology in which arguments can precede in several directions, depending upon the
circumstances (see Chapter 4).

CONCLUSION: THE ROLE OF FRAME'S TRINITARIAN GRAMMAR
WITHIN GRENZ'S TRINITARIAN METHOD

This chapter began with a discussion of Grenz's 3-fold theological method in
which systematic theology emerges as a 3-way conversation between Biblical exegesis,
doctrinal history, and the missional engagement of culture. It was in connection with this
last task that multiperspectivalism was invoked as a Trinitarian grammar capable of
translating the Trinitarian faith into the idiom ofpostmodern culture. Thus, Grenz's 3fold theological method provides the occasion for Frame's 3-fold grammar in the
execution of its cultural task. Since both the method and its enabling grammar share a
fundamental threeness, however, the question arises as to whether this commonality is
merely coincidental or reflective of a deep lying connection between the two.
In this regard, observe that a major difference between the method and the
grammar is one of scale. The method applies to the church as a whole whereas the
grammar has so far only been considered at the level of individuals. However, if the
tenns of the grammar are scaled up to the level of the church, then a comparison could be
more easily made. At the scale of the church, the nonnative perspective would derive
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from Biblical exegesis, the existential perspective would concern the life internal to the
church, and the situational perspective would therefore concern the external cultural
context in which the church was embedded. Moreover, according to John Frame, the
existential perspective would then include the dogmatic history of the church, and the
situational perspective would provide the missional context:
The "maturity" spoken of here is not the maturity of each
individual, though that is implied, but the maturity of the corporate body
as it grows up into Christ, its Head. It is best, then, to see the knowledge,
also, as something shared by the whole body, though of course the
knowledge of individuals is not irrelevant to that.
Thus it appears that there is a kind of"knowledge" possessed by
the church, as well as a knowledge possessed by individuals ... Scripture
seems to present corporate knowledge primarily as a kind of
superindividual subjectivity that grows and develops as the individual
does, to which the individual is related not primarily as subject to object
but as member to body. 38
Our concept of theology as application will help us fonn a better
view of theological progress. Theology progresses as it learns to apply
God's Word to each situation it encounters, and we have seen evidence of
that throughout church history. The great strides in theological
understanding come about when the church creatively and faithfully
responds to difficult situations on the basis of Scripture. 39
As can be seen from these citations, the existential, situational, and nonnative
perspectives at the scale of the church correspond to doctrinal history, cultural context,
and Biblical exegesis in Grenz's method. Thus, Grenz's method is recovered by scaling
Frame's grammar up to the level of the church. As a result, the theological method is seen
to be a special case of a more general Trinitarian grammar applied to a particular set of
problems at a particular scale of reality. Given this fact, the use ofmultiperspectivalism
in conjunction with Grenz's methodology is inherently correct, not fortuitous.
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CHAPTER4
BEYOND IMPERSONAL FOUNDATIONALISM:
TOWARD A NON-FOUNDATIONAL TRINITARIAN EPISTEMOLOGY

A nonfoundational understanding of scripture and tradition locates
ultimate authority only in the action of the triune God. If we must speak of
a "foundation" of Christian faith at all, then, we must speak of neither
scripture nor tradition in and of themselves, but only of the triune God
who is disclosed in polyphonic fashion through scripture, the church, and
even the world, albeit always normatively through scripture.
Stanley Grenz and John Franke, Beyond Foundationalism

Among the various strains of postmodemism, a common feature is the rejection of
epistemological foundationalism. Simply stated, foundationalism is the view that
knowledge resembles a building and is thus built one dimensionally upward from
indubitable foundations and is therefore reducible to these foundations in tum. Because
modem epistemology was foundationalist, it was both linear and reductionistic.
In this regard, it was shown in Chapter 3 that the three basic epistemological
perspectives led to three types of foundationalism in the modem era. Subjectivism
(existential perspective) made the knowing subject basic to knowledge and therefore
reduced knowledge to psychology. Objective empiricism (situational perspective) made
discrete objects basic, producing an atomistic reductionism. Finally, rationalism
(normative perspective) made reason basic so that knowledge was identified with rule
based manipulation. Building upward from these foundations, it was widely assumed that
the progress of knowledge would usher in a utopia of enlightenment, abundance, and
world peace. Thus, in addition to foundationalism, the modem era was also characterized
by a metananative of progress which in tum served to justify foundationalism itself. As a
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result, the postmodem rejection of foundationalism is accompanied by a rejection of
metanarrative as well.
In opposition to foundationalism, postmodemism sees the subjective, objective,
and normative aspects of knowledge as interrelated and socially constructed. Due to this
strong interdependence, knowledge is thought to be more like a web than a building. In
fact, it is precisely because human beings are embedded in this web of knowledge (like
flies) that they cannot extricate themselves from it to determine its foundations. Thus, in
contrast to the linear movement characteristic of foundationalism, knowledge within the
web occurs by way of a to and fro movement known as the hermeneutical circle. In the
absence of any fixed reference point, however, there is no confidence that the
hermeneutical circle ever converges to the truth.
In contrast to both modem foundationalism and postmodem relativism, however,
multiperspectivalism offers a true third way. Because the existential, situational, and
normative perspectives of knowledge are interdependent, truth is neither reductive, nor
relative, but rather complex. In this regard, multiperspectivalism is substantially identical
to the polyphonic approach of Stanley Grenz cited above. 1 Moreover, because human
knowledge is always provisional, multiperspectivalism implies that the three perspectives
of human knowledge continually adjust to one another in the mode of a hermeneutical
circle. Yet, since God's exhaustive plan secures the possibility ofhuman knowledge, this
process of cyclical adjustment is viewed as converging to the truth. Thus, in sharing an
emphasis on web-like knowledge and the henneneutical circle, multiperspectivalism
shares formal points of contact with postmodemity, despite material differences. For this
reason it provides a means of contextualizing Trinitarian theology within Nancey
1
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Murphy's first philosophical locus, non-foundational epistemology. To proceed with this
task, it is first necessary to tum to the theology of Cornelius Van Til.

THE METAPHYSICS OF KNOWLEDGE:
THE TRINITY AS A "NON-FOUNDATIONAL FOUNDATION"

As argued in Chapters 2 and 3, Van Til sees the Trinity as foundational for human
knowledge precisely because God's being is characterized by an equal ultimacy of unity
and diversity and is thus non-foundational in se. Because each person is coterminous with
the divine essence, the infinity of the divine essence is communicated to each of the
persons. As a result of this infinitude, the persons exhaustively interpenetrate one another
so that each person is coterminous with each of the others and with all three together.
However, while the infinitude of the divine essence thus establishes the Trinitarian
perichoresis, this perichoresis, in tum, establishes the infinitude of the divine essence.
After all, by virtue of perichoresis the persons of the Trinity are exhaustively correlative
with one another so that God is internally self-defined. And since God can therefore
compare and contrast within Himself, He does not compromise His aseity by defining
Himself as correlative to a finite world of flux. Thus, God provides the absolute
foundation for human knowledge precisely because He is internally interdependent and
hence non-foundational in se. Using Colin Gunton's expression, God is therefore the
"non-foundationalfoundation "2 of human knowledge. 3 Van Til writes:

2

Gunton, 134. Gunton's exact words are "non-foundationalist foundations."
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the basis of human knowledge, systematic and mystical theology should converge. Furthem1ore, by rooting
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foundationalist approaches ofEastem and Western Trinitarianism which seek to root God's being in the
3
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... We may express this thought philosophically by saying that for us the
eternal one and many form a self-complete unity. God is absolute
personality and therefore absolute individuality. He exists necessarily. He
has no non-being over against himself in comparison with which he
defines himself; he is internally self-defined.
Using the language of the One-and-Many question we contend that
in God the one and the many are equally ultimate. Unity in God is no more
fundamental than diversity, and diversity in God is no more fundamental
than unity. The persons of the Trinity are mutually exhaustive of one
another. The Son and the Spirit are ontologically on a par with the Father.
... In God's being there are no particulars not related to the universal, and
4
there is nothing universal that is not fully expressed in the particulars.
As seen from this citation, God's triunity establishes His aseity and therewith His
omniscience and omnipotence. Because God is omniscient, He knows Himself
exhaustively by nature and knows creation exhaustively by virtue of His plan for it.
Moreover, since He is also omnipotent, He can infallibly execute His plan to produce a
creation that is exhaustively ordered and inte1related. Finally, since the eternal one and
many are equally ultimate and mutually conditioning, the created one and many are
equally derivative and interdependent. Thus, subjects, objects, and laws are equally basic
and interrelated within creation and therefore bear no foundational relationship with
respect to one another. In other words, human knowledge is non-foundational precisely

because God is Himself its "non-foundational foundation. "Van Til writes:
Applying this to the question of man's knowledge of facts, it may
be said that for the human mind to know any fact truly, it must presuppose
the existence of God and his plan for the universe. If we wish to know the
facts of this world, we must relate these facts to laws. That is, in every
knowledge transaction, we must bring the particulars of our experience
into relation with universals ... But the most comprehensive interpretation
that we can give of the facts by connecting the particulars and the
universals that together constitute the universe leaves our knowledge at
loose ends, unless we may presuppose God back of this world ... As
Christians, we hold that in this universe we deal with a derivative one and
person of the Father or in the divine essence, respectively. Rather, as argued in Chapter 2, God is absolute
because He is relative, and He is relative because He is absolute.
4
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many, which can be brought into fruitful relation with one another
because, back of both, we have in God, the original One and Many. If we
are to have coherence in our experience, there must be a correspondence
of our experience to the eternally coherent experience of God. Human
knowledge ultimately rests upon the internal coherence within the
Godhead; our knowledge rests upon the ontological Trinity as its
presupposition. 5
While the subjective, objective, and normative aspects of human knowledge
ultimately cohere with one another, such coherence is not always obvious from the
human perspective. Because human beings are finite analogs of God, human knowledge
is a finite analog of God's infinite knowledge. Consequently, while God's knowledge of
Himself and the world is comprehensive, human knowledge, though true, is never
comprehensive. Thus, God and the world remain incomprehensible to humanity, despite
their apprehensibility. After all, as a finite analog of God's thought, human thought lacks
exhaustive coherence precisely because it lacks exhaustive correspondence to God's
exhaustive coherence. As a result of its analogical status, human knowledge is therefore
characterized by seeming paradox (i.e. paradox for humanity, but not for God):
We see then that our knowledge of the universe must be true since
we are creatures of God who has made both us and the universe. Then too
our knowledge of the universe cannot be comprehensive because our
knowledge of God cannot be comprehensive.
A word must here be said about the question of antinomies. It will
readily be inferred what as Christians we mean by antinomies. They are
involved in the fact that human knowledge can never be completely
comprehensive knowledge. Every knowledge transaction has in it
somewhere a reference point to God. Now since God is not fully
comprehensible to us we are bound to come into what seems to be
contradiction in all our knowledge. Our knowledge is analogical and
therefore must be paradoxical. We say that if there is to be any true
knowledge at all there must be in God an absolute system of knowledge.
We therefore insist that everything must be related to that absolute system
of God. Yet we ourselves cannot fully understand that system. 6
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Through his emphasis on seeming paradox, Van Til offers a third way between
the modem exclusion of paradox and its postmodem embrace. Moreover, in advancing a
Trinitarian epistemology, Van Til extends his notion of paradox to the very roots of
knowledge itself. After all, since the Trinity is the "non-foundational foundation" of

humanity's non-foundational knowledge, such knowledge is rooted in a seemingly
paradoxical equality of unity and diversity. Indeed, because human knowledge is
analogical, it is not only confronted by paradox but grounded in paradox as well.

MULTIPERSPECTIVALISM VS. EPISTEMOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONALISM

As mentioned in Chapter 3, a consequence of Trinitarian epistemology is the
equal ultimacy of subjects, objects, and laws and thus the interpenetration of the
existential (subjective), situational (objective), and nonnative (conventional) perspectives
of human knowledge. Because these perspectives are equally derivative and
interdependent, none can be absolutized and made foundational to the others. Rather the

three perspectives of human knowledge together share a "non-foundational foundation"
in the Triune God for whom the existential, situational, and normative perspectives of
knowledge are exhaustively coterminous. For this reason Trinitarian epistemology
embodies multiperspectivalism as shown below in Figure Sa.
Because multiperspectivalism involves an interpenetration of three distinct
perspectives, it is both polycentric and relational. In this regard, it is distinct from both
the monocentric epistemology of modem foundationalism and the decentered
epistemology of postmodem relativism. While postmodem epistemology is symbolized
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by a net or a web, modern epistemology is symbolized as a building. 7 Consistent with
this latter picture modern philosophers sought indubitable foundations for the edifice of
knowledge. Moreover, in contrast to the complex truth of multiperspectivalism,
foundationalism gave rise to a simple, reductive, and monocentric notion of truth. Thus,
the foundationalist impulse was both the cause and the result of the modern desire to
approach epistemology in abstraction from metaphysics, thereby denying relationality.
As a result, modern thought became mired in the egocentric predicament, an inability to
transcend epistemic subjectivity. To highlight these characteristics the present section
will recount the story of modern philosophy as a prelude to a subsequent analysis. The
comparison between multiperspectivalism and postmodern epistemology will be reserved
for the following section. As will become increasingly evident in the discussion below,
the story of modern philosophy is the story of competing foundationalisms as shown in
Figure 5b. The story of modern philosophy begins with Descartes.

Affect

Reason

Rationalism

EPlSTE'vlOLOGY

EPISTE.\r!OLOGY

Perception

Subjectivism

a. multiperspectivalism

Empiricism
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Figure 5. Multiperspectivalism vs. Epistemological Reductionism
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Descartes lived during a period of intense religious warfare, and therefore sought
a rational foundation that could transcend religious differences and reunify society.
Breaking with the scholastic tradition, he sought to doubt everything imaginable and to
build his philosophy only upon that which remained. Through his method of doubt, he
became convinced that he could not doubt the fact that he existed as a doubter: "cogito
ergo sum (I think therefore I am)." He therefore attempted to ground his philosophy upon
a firm starting point in the mind and then to reason outward, first to God and thence to
the surrounding world. Given his subjective starting point, Descartes may fairly be called
a subjectivist. However, since he also believed in "clear and distinct ideas" capable of
reaching the mind from without (i.e. ideas of God), he may also be called a rationalist and
an a priorist. Because this latter classification has also stuck, Descartes, Spinoza, and
Leibniz are commonly grouped together as the Continental Rationalists.
While Descartes began within the human mind, empiricism initially began from
without. According to John Locke, the objects ofthe outer world have a real existence
which detennines the ideas of human thought through sense impressions. The objective
empiricism of Locke, however, gave way first to the idealism of Berkeley and then to the
subjective empiricism of David Hume. Berkeley believed that objects existed only when
they were perceived, and Hume argued that sense impressions were mental phenomena
alone since the organism only had access to the output of these sensations, not their input
(i.e. supposed objects). Because the sense impressions were discrete, all laws connecting
these impressions were inferred rather than observed. For instance, when one billiard ball
strikes another, cause and effect can only be inferred from the collision because the actual
observations relate only to contiguity in space and time. Moreover, since the mind itself
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is never observed, the mind also dissolves into a sea of discreet sensations which lack
coherence among themselves. The result ofHume's philosophy was therefore to produce
an extreme skepticism by dissolving the external world, physical laws, and even the mind
itself into atomic sensations. It also represented a regression to a Cartesian subjectivism
in contrast to the objective empiricism of Locke. This oscillation between an objective
and a subjective empiricism would come to characterize the empirical movement.
Kant attempted to counter Hume's skepticism by bringing the a priori reason of
Descartes into conversation with the a posteriori sense impressions of Hume. According
to Kant, the mind is active in supplying both the individual fonns (concepts) through
which perceptions are grasped and the syntactic connections linking the forms together:
"Concepts without percepts are empty; percepts without concepts are blind." Because the
world is therefore perceived through mental concepts supplied a priori, the phenomenal
world of perception differs from the noumenal world of real existence. Moreover,
because these perceptions are linked through an a priori syntactic structure, the
phenomenal world is logically ordered, despite the fact that the noumenal world provides
the input in the form of discrete sense impressions. Because this syntactic structure is
also supplied by the mind a priori, Kant's methodology is called synthetic a priori

reasoning. It is also referred to as transcendental reasoning because it attempts to
delineate the transcendental conditions that must be satisfied a priori for knowledge to
be possible. While Kant tried to retain an element of realism through his noumenal world,
his philosophy clearly tended in a subjectivist direction and established a subjectivist
trajectory that became even more pronounced in some of his followers. Because he
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believed that the a priori structures of the mind are the same for people of all times and
places, his subjectivism could fairly be called a universal subjectivism (see Chapter 5).
While Kantianism persisted as a school of thought through the 19th and 20th
Centuries, three additional schools were Kantian offshoots: Romanticism, Idealism, and
Positivism. Romanticism tried to make contact with Kant's noumenal world through
intuition, rather than reason. According to the Romantics, both the human subject and the
objective world were alike products of the World Soul who was trying to come to
expression through human action in the world. To reach the noumenal world, it was
therefore necessary to descend within the self and thereby unite with the World Soul.
Thus, while the phenomenal-noumenal divide could not be transcended by reason, the
noumenal world could be reached indirectly through feeling, intuition, or the will.
Idealism pursued a similar path using reason, rather than intuition, as the unifying
factor. According to Hegel, the World Spirit is seeking to come to complete self
consciousness within human history through a dialectical process. This dialectical
process resembles human thought in which an opposition between thesis and antithesis is
transcended in a greater synthesis. Since subject and object are simply opposing moments
in the same dialectical process, the end result of history will be the absorption ofboth
subject and object into a complete rational system in which their opposition is
transcended. Thus, the phenomenal-noumenal distinction is merely provisional since
ultimately and therefore eschatologically "the real is the rational, and the rational is the
real." While Hegel's system is typically classified as a species of rationalism, it could just
as well be described as subjectivist because it is a mere projection of the thought process
onto the plane of history.
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The third group of Kant's successors was the positivists. Positivism retained
Kant's phenomenalism while rejecting his a priori conceptual and syntactic structures.
As a result, the phenomena were regarded as prior to thought, rather than the reverse.
Moreover, because these phenomena were also discrete, positivism resembled the
subjective empiricism of David Hume. According to August Compte, the founder of
positivism, history had progressed from religion to metaphysics and finally to positivism,
within which scientific laws were regarded as mere correlations of phenomena, having no
metaphysical extension to things themselves. In the late 19th Century, these views became
entrenched in Vienna through the work of the physicist Ernst Mach.
During the 19th Century, empiricism remained strong in Britain. In the late 19th
and early 20th Centuries, it was blended with new techniques of logical analysis to yield a
movement known as Logical Atomism or analytic philosophy. Within this philosophy
complex propositions were logically analyzed into their atomic components which could
then be individually verified through their correspondence with reality. Logical Atomism
thus embodied an objective empiricism of the Lockean type. Through Ludwig
Wittgenstein this philosophy was transplanted to his native Vienna and combined with
positivism to yield a movement known as logical positivism which was virtually identical
to Logical Atomism except that it embodied a subjective empiricism of the Humean type.
Also at the tum of the century, a new philosophical movement was given birth
through the field of structural linguistics. As described in greater detail in Chapter 5, the
Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure advanced the revolutionary thesis that language was
a product of neither subjective expression nor objective reference, but was rather a
linguistic structure of the social system. However, because language is central to thought,
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Saussure's thesis implied that epistemology was governed by social norms, a fact which
brought sociology and anthropology into conversation with philosophy. As should be
evident from this description, structuralism embodied a normative view of knowledge.
Since structuralism marks the beginning of the "linguistic tum," however, it marks the
beginning of the end of the modem period.
As seen from this brief overview of the modem period, modem philosophy is a
story of competing foundationalisms. While none of these views was purely subjective,
objective, or normative, such emphases were clearly evident. The subjectivist tendency
was pronounced in Cartesian rationalism, Humean empiricism, Kantian idealism,
Romantic aestheticism, Comptean positivism, and Logical Positivism. The objective
element predominated in Lockean empiricism and Logical Atomism. Normative views
were represented in Continental Rationalism (Spinoza and Leibniz), Hegelian idealism,
and structural linguistics. From this comparison it can be seen the modem period was
characterized not only by foundationalism, but also by a predominance of the subjectivist
view. As mentioned above, these twin characteristics are both the results and the causes
of the modem tendency to approach epistemology in abstraction from metaphysics,
thereby denying relationality. After all, once a subjective starting point is taken in
abstraction from the surrounding world, it becomes impossible to reconnect thought with
the world through purely epistemological (i.e. subjective) considerations. Thus, modem
philosophy became subject to the egocentric predicament and then exhausted itself in
trying to solve the subject-object problem. The repeated failure to solve this problem
eventually caused philosophers to seek epistemological bedrock in the "linguistic tum."
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Viewing the modem age retrospectively during the early to mid 20th Century, Van
Til could see its three centuries of development panoramically. Having studied idealistic
philosophy at Princeton during the 1920s, Van Til saw that Kant had brought the
egocentric predicament to complete self consciousness in his philosophy. Moreover,
since Kant had penetrated to the central core of modernity, Van Til believed that Kant

wasformally correct in his transcendental analysis of knowledge. The central issue
clearly was one of determining the transcendental conditions that made knowledge a

priori possible. Nevertheless, while agreeing with Kant's fonnal analysis, Van Til
disagreed with his material content. Rather than a priori structures of the human mind,
the only transcendental condition capable of securing knowledge was the existence of the
Triune God in whom subject and object are coterminous.
While Van Til failed to include the norm ofknowledge in his analysis, this
deficiency was corrected by John Frame. As argued previously, Trinitarian perichoresis
produces an interpenetration of the existential, situational, and normative perspectives of
knowledge, an interpenetration which is original within God's being and derivative
within human thought. Thus, in place of the monocentric view of foundationalist
reductionism, multiperspectivalism posits a polycentric view of perichoretic relationality.
In terms of multiperspectivalism both the foundationalism and the egocentric
predicament of the Enlightenment are to be expected from a movement that cut its ties
with tradition and sought to build a house of knowledge apart from the Triune God. Van
Til writes:
... All aspects being equally created, no one aspect of reality may be
regarded as more ultimate than another. Thus the created one and many
may in this respect be said to be equal to one another; they are equally
derived and equally dependent upon God who sustains them both. The
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particulars or facts of the universe do and must act in accord with
universals or laws. Thus there is order in the created universe. On the
other hand, the laws may not and can never reduce the particulars to
abstract particulars or reduce their individuality in any manner .... 8

MULTIPERSPECTIVALISM VS. THE WEB OF KNOWLEDGE

As indicated above, the metaphor of a web of knowledge has replaced that of a
building as modem foundationalism has given way to postmodem relationality. While the
image of a net avoids the problems of foundationalism, it has problems of its own. The
present section will therefore try to delineate these problems and respond to them within
the framework ofmultiperspectivalism. With regard to its origins, Nancey Murphy traces
the web metaphor to the writings ofW. V. 0. Quine. 9 Quine writes:
The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most
casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic
physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric
which impinges on experience only along the edges. Or, to change the
figure, total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are
experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field. Truth values have to be
redistributed over some of our statements. Re-evaluation of some
statements entails re-evalutation of others, because of their logical
interconnections-the logical laws being in tum simply certain further
statements of the system, certain further elements of the field. Having reevaluated one statement we must re-evaluate some others, which may be
statements logically connected with the first or may be the statements of
logical connections themselves. But the total field is so underdetennined
by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of
choice as to what statements to re-evaluate in the light of any single
contrary experience. No particular experiences are linked with any
particular statements in the interior of the field, except indirectly through
considerations of equilibrium affecting the field as a whole. 10
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As seen from this citation, Quine's view ofknowledge is non-foundationalist.
Reasoning does not proceed one dimensionally upward from an indubitable foundation
but rather can proceed in several directions through the web. As a result, there is
reciprocity between theory and data. On the one hand, the theory is data based since
anomalous "experience at the periphery occasions readjustments" within the web. On the
other hand, data are also theory laden since these readjustments are "underdetermined"
and are frankly made to absorb the data into the web. 11
While avoiding foundationalist reductionism, Quine's approach has its own set of
problems. In referring to the web as a "man-made fabric" including the laws of "pure
mathematics and logic," Quine simultaneously elevates human subjectivity and destroys
the normativity of logic and mathematics. Moreover, while Quine does grant a role to
"experience at the periphery," such experience leaves the web of knowledge
"underdetermined." As a result, "there is much latitude" in choosing how to reconstruct
the web "in the light of any single contrary experience."
Accordingly, Quine's web is plagued by three practical problems. First, in the
absence of binding nonns and with only a slight role given to experience at the periphery,
it would seem that the process of "web spinning" was largely subjective. Second, given
the underdetermination of this "web spinning" by experience, it would also seem that
several competing webs could account for the same experience, thereby raising the
problem of relativity. Finally, since a web is an extended network of links and nodal
points, the image of a web itself is problematic in connoting a situation which is
decentered. Since nodes are compressed to dimensionless points, they are nothing in
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themselves and thus derive their identity from adjacent nodes which in tum derive their
identity from nodes still farther a field, and so on. The result is that the relationships (i.e.
links) absorb the relata (i.e. nodes) and thus become meaningless due to vacuity.
With regard to the first issue, Quine's position is highly subjective because it
suffers from the lack of normative and objective constraints. Granted that some norms
(language) are socially constructed, other norms like logic and mathematics constitute
preexisting constraints which are discovered, not invented by humanity. Moreover,
according to the new cosmology (see Chapter 6), the world is also objectively
interrelated. In contrast to Quine's picture, therefore, human knowledge involves the
perspectival interpenetration of three different types of webs so that the human subject
interweaves the normative and objective webs into the web of knowledge. Since the
interweaving of these three webs constitutes the single web of reality, knowledge is
continuous with reality in a multiperspectival framework. This profound coherence
results from the fact that the Triune God is Himself an exhaustive web of coherence,
standing above the created web as its "non-foundational foundation. " Thus, human
knowledge grows against the backdrop of God's exhaustive coherence. Van Til writes:
The whole meaning of any fact is exhausted by its position in and relation
to the plan of God. This implies that every fact is related to every other
fact. God's plan is a unit. And it is this unity of the plan of God, founded
as it is in the very being of God, that [sic] gives the unity that we look for
between all the finite facts. If one should maintain that one fact can be
fully understood without reference to all other facts, he is as much
antitheistic as when he should maintain that one fact can be understood
without reference to God. 12
Something of this was brought out when we said that God's
knowledge of himself and God's knowledge of the facts of the universe
must be the standard of our knowledge. God is completely self-conscious
and therefore knows himself and all things analytically. There is in God's
12
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thought complete coherence. Keeping this in mind, we may say that if we
are to have coherence in our thinking it will have to be a coherence that
corresponds to God's coherence. Accordingly, our coherence will never be
completely inclusive in the way that God's coherence is completely
inclusive. Our coherence will be no more than an analogy of the coherence
of God. Yet because it is based upon God's coherence it will be true
knowledge. 13
In addition to subjectivity, Quine's web also raises the specter of relativity. Ifthe
web of knowledge truly is "underdetermined" by experience, then several competing
webs could be spun in order to explain the same "experience." Moreover, since the
criteria of proof would then be internal to the webs themselves, there would be no
metacriterion standing above the several webs to which adherents of different webs could
appeal in the adjudication of their competing truth claims. While such a situation arises in
a small way between adherents of different scientific paradigms, the issue of circular
reasoning becomes particularly acute in the debate between different world views.
This problem was anticipated by Van Til nearly 80 years ago. Van Til argued that
at the level of a religious world view, there was no way to avoid circular reasoning
because the world view itself determined the presuppositions, the conclusion, and the
standards of proof. Since differing standards of proof eliminated the possibility of direct
argumentation, Van Til proposed an indirect method by which one would enter into the
opponent's circle in order to reduce it to absurdity. In this regard, one would show that
the competing system is incapable of establishing its own central values on the basis of
its own resources in accordance with its own internal standards of proof. Then one would
ask the opponent to enter the Christian circle to see that Christianity is capable of
maintaining its core values on the basis of Christian resources using Christian standards
of proof. This method of indirect argument is called argument by presupposition. Its goal
13
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is to show that a competing system not only fails on its own terms but also must
presuppose Christianity and live parasitically upon it in order to function at all. Thus,
according to Van Til, Christian relationality need not imply relativity:
The method of reasoning by presupposition may be said to be
indirect rather than direct. The issue between believers and non-believers
in Christian theism cannot be settled by a direct appeal to "facts" or
"laws" whose nature and significance is already agreed upon by both
parties to the debate. The question is rather as to what is the final
reference-point required to make the "facts" and "laws" intelligible. The
question is as to what the "facts" and "laws" really are. Are they what the
non-Christian methodology assumes that they are? Are they what the
Christian theistic methodology presupposes they are?
The answer to this question cannot be finally settled by any direct
discussion of "facts." It must, in the last analysis, be settled indirectly. The
Christian apologist must place himself upon the position of his opponent,
assuming the correctness of his method merely for argument's sake, in
order to show him that on such a position the "facts" are not facts and the
"laws" are not laws. He must also ask the non-Christian to place himself
upon the Christian position for argument's sake in order that he may be
shown that only upon such a basis do "facts" and "laws" appear
intelligible.
To admit one's own presuppositions and to point out the
presuppositions of others is therefore to maintain that all reasoning is, in
the nature of the case, circular reasoning. The starting point, the method,
and the conclusion are always involved in one another. 14
Having examined the problems of subjectivity and relativity, it remains to address
the third problem mentioned above, namely the appropriateness of the web metaphor to
capture a relational view of knowledge. In this regard, the question of choosing a good
metaphor is no trifling matter since metaphors often govern human thought. 15 Indeed, as
argued above, modem thought was itself stifled by the prevailing image of knowledge as
a building. Now the problem with the web metaphor is that the nodes are compressed to
dimensionless points so that they are nothing in themselves and thus derive their identity
from adjacent nodes which in tum derive their identity from nodes still farther a field, and
14
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so on. The connotation of the web metaphor is thus one of decenteredness in which
relationships absorb relata and thereby become meaningless. In contrast to the atomistic
reductionism of modernity, therefore, the web image runs the opposite risk of complete
vacuity. Moreover, since the knowing subject becomes embedded (absorbed) like a fly in
this web, all sense of orientation is lost in a seemingly infinite sea of nodes and links. To
paraphrase a popular saying, "one cannot see the web for the nodes." The resulting
epistemic disorientation has been nicely captured by Van Til:
An illustration may indicate more clearly what is meant. Suppose
we think of a man made of water in an infinitely extended and bottomless
ocean of water. Desiring to get out of the water, he makes a ladder of
water. He sets this ladder upon the water and against the water and then
attempts to climb out of the water. 16

Multiperspectivalism avoids the deficiencies of the web picture because it is
polycentric, rather than decentered. Because it is polycentric, relationships and relata are
equally ultimate and mutually conditioning. Thus, multiperspectivalism posits a relational
holism which is not vacuous. Since the three perspectives each retain their distinct centers
while including the whole, human knowledge is characterized by checks and balances
between objective correspondence, normative coherence, and a subjective intuition.
Moreover, since the Triune God stands above the whole as its "non-foundational

foundation, " the interrelation of distinct centers takes place within an overall vertical
orientation.

THE HERMENEUTICAL CIRCLE
As indicated above, the image of a web of knowledge implies reciprocity between
theory and data. Since anomalous "experience at the periphery occasions readjustments"
16
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within the web, the theory is data based. However, since the web is "underdetermined"
by this data, the data is also theory laden because there is then great latitude in how one
incorporates this data into the web. Because of this reciprocity, the web is characterized
by a to and fro movement between theory and data which differs from the linear motion
of foundationalist strategies of the inductive (empiricism) or deductive (rationalism) type.
Rather than linear movements of induction or deduction alone, web-like knowledge
demands a cyclic alternation of inductive and deductive phases in which the whole and
the parts are provisionally constructed from one another. This process of interdependent,
cyclical iteration is known as the hermeneutical circle. The reciprocity implied by such a
circle is especially pronounced in Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of science.
According to Kuhn, the defining structural unit of science is the paradigm. A
paradigm is a theoretical matrix within which data are defined and which is itself
supported by the data. Thus, scientific theories involve a henneneutical circle in which
the theories are data based, and data are theory laden. Due to this circularity, Kuhn holds
that shifts in the dominant paradigm also change the "facts" of observation:
Those theories, of course, do "fit the facts," but only by transforming
previously accessible information into facts that, for the preceding
paradigm, had not existed at all. And that means that theories too do not
evolve piecemeal to fit facts that were there all the time. Rather, they
emerge together with the facts they fit from a revolutionary reformulation
of the preceding scientific tradition, a tradition within which the
knowledge-mediated relationship between the scientist and nature was not
. the same. 17
qmte
Because paradigms have radical epistemological implications, paradigm shifts
produce discontinuous changes within a scientific tradition. According to Kuhn, scientific
progress consists of relatively long periods of continuous growth, punctuated by the
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discontinuous breaks of scientific revolutions. During normal science, progress is
quantitative and continuous because a dominant paradigm holds sway. Scientific

revolutions, however, produce qualitative breaks (discontinuities) in the tradition.
Consequently, because paradigms define the facts as well as the theory, a paradigm shift
causes the pre and post revolutionary phases of a tradition to differ in kind, and therefore
to be theoretically and factually incommensurable with one another. 18 As a result,
scientific progress becomes hard to define. Presumably, the new paradigm integrates
more data with greater economy, but because it is incommensurable with the older
tradition, it cannot be said to bring one closer to the truth:
These last paragraphs point the directions in which I believe a
more refined solution of the problem of progress in the sciences must be
sought. Perhaps they indicate that scientific progress is not quite what we
had taken it to be. But they simultaneously show that a sort of progress
will inevitably characterize the scientific enterprise so long as such an
enterprise survives. In the sciences there need not be progress of another
sort. We may, to be more precise, have to relinquish the notion, explicit or
implicit, that changes of paradigm carry scientists and those who learn
from them closer and closer to the truth. 19
In contrast to Kuhn, Van Til offers a more positive view. As indicated above, Van
Til believes that human knowledge is analogical of God's knowledge, and that human
knowledge therefore grows against the background of total coherence. The manner in
which this takes place is through a variation of the henneneutical circle which Van Til
calls the "method of implication." Because unity and diversity are interdependent within
a Trinitarian epistemology, the method of implication is characterized by cyclical
iterations of alternating inductive and deductive phases. Through these iterations human
beings "implicate" themselves ever more deeply into God's truth through a spiraling
18
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process which advances forward even as it twists. In changing the metaphor from a circle
to a spiral, Van Til brings the imagery into alignment with his conviction that human
knowledge grows in depth and breadth through this process:
The method of implication as outlined above is circular reasoning. Or we
may call it spiral reasoning. We must go round and round a thing to see
more of its dimensions and to know more about it, in general, unless we
are larger than that which we are investigating. Unless we are larger than
God we cannot reason about him any other way, than by a transcendental
. 1ar argument. 20
or ctrcu
But for us the time series brings forth that which is new for us.
Accordingly, we have to synthesize the new facts with the old facts. Then
when we have done that we must proceed once more to see what the new
facts thus related to the old facts together reveal about God and reality in
general. In this respect the process of knowledge is a growth into the truth.
For this reason we have spoken of the Christian theistic method as the
method of implication into the truth of God. It is reasoning in a spiral
fashion rather than in a linear fashion. Accordingly, we have said that we
can use the old tenns deduction and induction if only we remember that
they must be thought of as elements in this one process of implication into
the truth of God. If we begin the course of spiral reasoning at any point in
the finite universe, as we must because that is the proximate starting point
of all reasoning, we can call the method of implication into the truth of
God a transcendental method. That is, we must seek to determine what
presuppositions are necessary to any object of knowledge in order that it
may be intelligible to us. 21
As should be evident from these citations, the axis of Van Til's spiral is horizontal
to signify progression in time. The bottom of each loop represents creation, and the top
represents God. The image therefore evokes a continuous circular motion of inductive
ascent and deductive descent which advances forward through time. Moreover, because
the higher level (God) provides the a priori conditions for knowledge of the lower level
(creation), the method is also called "transcendental."
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As should be readily apparent from this discussion, the respective circularities of
Kuhn and Van Til differ in their concepts of progress. While both approaches posit
reciprocity between induction and deduction, Van Til offers an ever widening spiral,
whereas Kuhn offers at most an infinite series of incommensurable circles. This
divergence may be traced to material differences and to differences in scale. While they
both use a transcendental method, Van Til presupposes a transcendent Person, and not a
finite paradigm. Because of this difference, Van Til's circles are as wide as existence
itself, whereas Kuhn's are no broader than a particular scientific tradition. Thus, despite
their revolutionary implications, Kuhn's paradigm shifts are localized and therefore do
not prevent the progress of knowledge as a whole. Furthermore, for Van Til, God is the
all knowing creator who not only establishes the criteria of intelligibility but also
guarantees the continuity and progress of the scientific metanarrative. By contrast, since
Kuhn's circles do not include God, he can offer no basis for scientific knowledge and
hence no assurance of scientific progress. In fact, this is an issue that Kuhn prefers to
avoid:
It is not only the scientific community that must be special. The world of
which that community is a part must also possess quite special
characteristics, and we are no closer than we were at the start to knowing
what these must be. That problem-What must the world be like in order
that man may know it?-was not, however, created by this essay. On the
contrary, it is as old as science itself, and it remains unanswered. But it
need not be answered in this place.22
In contrast to Kuhn, Van Til sees humanity's spiraling activity as a growth
into a pre-established truth. Using the language ofmultiperspectivalism, the
existential, situational, and nonnative perspectives of knowledge give rise to this
circular activity since they constantly adjust to one another in the integration of
22
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new data. For God, however, the three perspectives suffer no such adjustments
because His knowledge is already exhaustive. In fact, it is precisely this constancy
of God's perspectives that provides the epistemological center toward which the
cyclical adjustment of human perspectives converges. After all, God has not only
established the criteria for intelligibility, but also the means and end of the
humanity's cultural project. Thus, human knowledge is ultimately progressive
because the hermeneutical circle is sustained by an eternal circle of perichoretic
exhaustion:
To this we should add that the Trinity, as taught in the Scriptures,
gives the most basic description possible of God as the principium essendi
of knowledge for man. The whole problem of knowledge has constantly
been that of bringing the one and the many together. .. When God existed
alone, there was no time universe, and there were no new facts arising.
The only knowledge activity that existed was completed in the circuit of
the mutually exhaustive personalities of the triune God. It is only with
respect to man that we can speak of a relation of the a priori and the a
posteriori elements ofknowledge. Such a distinction cannot exist in God.
The plurality of the Godhead cannot be compared with the arising of new
facts as we see it in the created universe. The plurality of God is as eternal
23
as the unity of God.
... we are happy to accept the charge of circular reasoning. Our reasoning
frankly depends upon the revelation of God, whose "reasoning" is within
the internal-eternal circularity ofthe three persons of the Trinity. It is only
if we frankly depend for the validity of our reasoning upon this internal
circular reasoning in the triune God that we can escape trying in vain to
reason in circles in a vacuum of pure contingency. 24

CONCLUSION
The burden of this chapter has been to set forth the epistemological implications
of the Trinity as the "non-foundational foundation" of human knowledge. Because the
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persons of the Trinity are exhaustively correlative of one another and interdependent,
God is non-foundational in regard to His own being. Moreover, since the Triune God has
created a world in which unity and diversity are equally derivative, this non-foundational

God is Himself the foundation of humanity's non-foundational knowledge.
As a result of this metaphysical conception, several epistemological consequences
follow. First, since subjects, objects, and laws have an equal ontological status within the
created order; the existential, situational, and normative perspectives of human
knowledge are interdependent and irreducible. Thus, multiperspectivalism embodies a
polycentric relationality that opposes both the monocentricity of modem foundationalism
as well as the decenteredness of postmodem relativism. Second, since foundationalism is
thereby excluded, human knowledge proceeds by way of a henneneutical circle rather
than a linear movement. Finally, since all aspects of created reality are interrelated by the
plan of God, human knowledge is a progressive growth into a pre-established truth. Thus,
God not only establishes the conditions of intelligibility but also the means and the end of
humanity's scientific metanarrative. As this narrative progresses, the hermeneutical circle
converges to the truth because it is created by, sustained by, and attracted into an eternal
circle of Trinitarian perichoresis. Thus, from beginning to end and at all points in
between, the Trinity is the "non-foundational foundation" of humanity's non-

foundational knowledge.
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CHAPTERS
THE NAMED GOD AND THE QUESTION OF LANGUAGE:
TOWARD A TRINITARIAN SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

It is in this respect that the act of God naming God emerges as a triune or
Trinitarian act. Present in this act of naming are Namer, Named, and Name. Moreover, all
three are constituted by the act. The second of the three is constituted as the one who is
Named by the Namer, of course. But the first is likewise constituted as the Namer of the
Named, who receives back the bestowed Name. And insofar as the Name is bound up
with the very essence of its bearer, the third emerges as the Name shared by the Namer
and the Named. Exchanging substantive for dynamic language leads to the conclusion
that the act involves Naming, Being Named, and Name Sharing.
What is presented in the New Testament as an event involving Jesus, his heavenly
Father, and the divine Spirit suggests a transcendent, eternal dynamic of naming within
the life of the triune God. Stating the dynamic in classical Trinitarian tenns, the eternal
Father of the Son bestows the divine name, which is his own, eternally on the Son of the
Father, who eternally returns to the Father what he has received. And this Name shared
by the Namer and the Named is concretized as the person of the Holy Spirit.
Stanley Grenz, The Named God and the Question of Being

Of the many factors giving rise to the postmodern outlook, a major influence is an
epistemological view known as social constructivism which arises from reflections on
language. According to this view, knowledge is constructed, not referential, and thus nonobjective. Moreover, since the concepts used in the construction ofknowledge are
socially, not individually derived, such knowledge is not truly subjective either. Rather,
since both the subject and the object of knowledge are defined in terms of socially
detennined categories, both are social constructs which therefore emerge from, and
dissolve into the cultural-linguistic system of one's social group. So understood, social
constructivism stands as a tertium quid in relation to the subject-object epistemology of
the modern period and is thus thoroughly postmodern.
As indicated above, social constructivism emerged from the linguistic turn in 20th
Century philosophy. Early in that century, the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure

101

began a movement known as structuralism which treated language as a social system.
Moreover, by mid-century, Wittgenstein had abandoned the referential view oflanguage
and had begun to view speech in terms of socially determined language-games. While
these two approaches were clearly different, their common denominator was a social
view of language, a fact which made epistemology socially and culturally relative. After
all, since language is central to knowledge, a social view of language necessarily implied
a social epistemology. Moreover, since the subject and object of knowledge were thus
linguistically defined, the effect of this social epistemology was to reduce the subject and
object of knowledge to the status of social constructs. So understood, the effect of social
constructivism was to overcome the subject-object split by dissolving both entities into
the social system. In its more extreme forms, this view attacked the very possibility of
knowledge, not only by making knowledge culturally relative and thus non-universal, but
also by attacking the very possibility of objectivity and subjectivity themselves.
To respond to this situation from a Christian perspective, it is necessary to affinn
the valid insights of social constructivism without sacrificing the objectivity and the
subjectivity of knowledge. As should be evident from the citation above, 1 the solution to
this dilemma lies within the doctrine ofthe Trinity. As a self-naming God, God's being is
socially constructed through language. Fmthermore, since the Namer, the Named, and the
Name are coterminous with the essence of God and with one another, God's being is
characterized by perfect subjectivity, objectivity, and social normativity. As a result,
God's socially constructed knowledge of Himself is at the same time perfectly objective
and subjective. And since the creation is an objective result of God's social construction,

1
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the same conclusions hold for God's knowledge of creation first of all and thence for
humanity's derivative and finite knowledge. God's knowledge is socially constructive;

human knowledge is socially reconstructive.
By holding forth the possibility of socially constructed, objective and subjective
knowledge, Trinitarian theology offers a third way between postrnodem social relativism
on the one hand and modem objectivism and subjectivism on the other. Yet, because
Trinitarian theology has formal points of contact with social constructivism, it will be
possible to contextualize Trinitarian theology within the second philosophical locus
identified by Nancey Murphy, socially constructive linguistics. To this end it will first be
helpful to consider the Trinitarian theology of Cornelius Van Til.

THE TRINITY AND THE METAPHYSICS OF LANGUAGE
Since social constructivism derives from the social dimension of language, it
follows that a subjectively and objectively valid social constructivism requires a
subjectively and objectively valid language. Thus, the importance of the Trinity for
human knowledge lies in the inter-subjective and objective social ground that the Trinity
provides for language itself. In other words, not only is God's being socially constructed
as a result of the intra-Trinitarian language; this intra-Trinitarian language is itself
subjectively and objectively grounded in God's social being. After all, by virtue of
perichoresis the three persons of the Trinity are cotenninous with the divine essence and
with one another. There is thus a reciprocity between God's being and His internal action.
Van Til writes:
We may express this thought philosophically by saying that for us the
eternal one and many form a self-complete unity. God is absolute
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personality and therefore absolute individuality. He exists necessarily. He
has no non-being over against himself in comparison with which he
defines himself; he is internally self-defined.
Using the language of the One-and-Many question we contend that
in God the one and the many are equally ultimate. Unity in God is no more
fundamental than diversity, and diversity in God is no more fundamental
than unity. The persons of the Trinity are mutually exhaustive of one
another. The Son and the Spirit are ontologically on a par with the Father.
.. .In God's being there are no particulars not related to the universal and
there is nothing universal that is not fully expressed in the particulars. 2
As implied by this passage, the infinity of the divine essence is communicated to
each of the persons, establishing the possibility ofperichoresis (i.e. mutual exhaustion).
Moreover, as a result of perichoresis, there is a complete interpenetration of each person
with one another and with the divine society as a whole. Since the subjective, objective,
and normative (i.e. social-conventional, etc.) perspectives of knowledge therefore
interpenetrate exhaustively, the infinity of the divine essence establishes the possibility of
eternal, intra-Trinitarian communication through the mediation of infinite,
perichoretically interacting persons. Thus, God's being constitutes the very possibility of
intra-Trinitarian cmmnunication.
On the other hand, it is equally true that this intra-Trinitarian communication
establishes God's being as noted by Grenz above. This result follows from the fact that
God's internal self communication allows him to compare and contrast within His own
being. Because He is therefore internally self defined, He does not compromise His aseity
by defining Himself relative to external reality, but rather bestows existence on external
reality and defines it in terms of Himself. Thus, not only does God's being ground the
intra-Trinitarian communication, this communication, in tum, grounds God's being.
Because the three persons define one another through interactive communication, God's

2
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being is established from within rather than from without. Thus, the intra-Trinitarian
communication guards the aseity of God and hence the infinity of the divine essence.
Another way of putting the matter is to say that God's being is socially
constructed through covenantal love. A covenant implies a structured, personal
relationship which involves subjective, objective, and normative (i.e. social-conventional)
factors. So understood, love is the subjective side of covenant, and covenant is the
structural (i.e. social-conventional) side oflove, both of which sides presuppose
objectivity as their field of operation. Consequently, since God's being demonstrates a
perfect hannony between subjectivity, objectivity, and nonnativity (social
conventionality), it follows that God is an internally covenanted being, characterized by
structured relationships and modes of interaction.
The significance of this fact for human knowledge and language is that
subjectivism, objectivism, and normativity (i.e. social conventionality) constitute the
three approaches in which humanity has sought (and failed to obtain) an indubitable
foundation for knowledge and language. That all these attempts have failed is not
surprising when one considers the fact that knowledge and speech both involve subjects
making assertions about objects in accordance with social conventions or norms.
However, apart from a covenantal, Trinitarian ontology, in which unity and diversity (or
distinction and relation) are equally ultimate, there remains no basis upon which to assert
the equal ultimacy of these three aspects. Thus, the only proper foundation ofknowledge
and language is the triune God, a God who is socially constructed through covenant and
therefore objective in His existence, and subjective in His personal depth. In other words,
God's knowledge is socially constructive; human knowledge is socially reconstructive.

105

Before applying these insights to the problems of human language and knowledge,
however, it is first necessary to consider the rise of social constructivism in greater detail.

THE LINGUISTIC TURN
AND THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM
As shown in Chapter 4, Enlightenment epistemology was characterized by an
oscillation between objective and subjective views as various philosophers sought a
foundation for knowledge. In fact, it was the repeated failure to solve the subject-object
problem and thereby establish an epistemological foundation that eventually gave rise to
the linguistic turn. In this regard, Descartes' subjective rationalism was answered by
Locke's objective empiricism only to give way to the subjective and skeptical empiricism
of David Hume. Immanuel Kant tried to bring the two streams together by holding that
rational concepts influence empirical percepts and that such concepts arise from
universal, a priori structures of the human mind.
In the wake of the Kantian synthesis, however, the two strands again unraveled.
The Romanticists and Idealists developed the subjective (whether emotional or rational)
side of Kant while the Positivists developed a phenomenological empiricism. An
approach to the philosophy of language known as hermeneutics grew out of these various
movements, fonning a trajectory that began with Friedrich Schleiennacher and continued
into the 201h Century through the work ofDilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. 3'
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In Britain, by contrast, the traditional empirical approach continued through the
philosophy of Mill and then became wedded to new techniques of logical analysis
through the work Moore and Russell. The result was a philosophical movement known
alternately as analytic philosophy or logical atomism. Moreover, through the writings of
Russell's graduate student, Ludwig Wittgenstein, this logical-empirical approach was
merged with positivism in Vienna to form a new movement known as logical positivism.
Out of these various movements, a referential theory of language developed which sought
to base language upon correspondence to either the external world or sense impressions.
Throughout its history, this logical-empirical approach tended to oscillate between a
Lockean objectivism (Logical Atomism) and a Humean subjectivism (Logical
Positivism).
Finally, with regard to 19th Century linguistics itself, the discovery that many of
the languages of Europe were related to Sanskrit and thus part of a more general IndoEuropean family gave rise to a comparative linguistic approach that sought to trace the
evolution of languages over time. 6• 7 Because of its strong focus on etymologies,
however, this approach was atomistic as well as diachronic.
With respect to all of these ideas, the approach of the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de
Saussure was revolutionary. Instead of adopting a diachronic approach that traced the
evolution of languages over time, Saussure employed a ::,ynchronic approach that studied
language as an interrelated system at a given time. In this regard, Saussure distinguished
between the acts of speech which he called parole and the system of language standing
behind acts of speech which he called langue. Because his focus was on the speech
6
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system rather than concrete speech acts, he rejected both an objective and a subjective
approach to language. Thus, words were neither names for concrete things nor names for
subjective ideas. Words could not be based on ideas because words were themselves
necessary for the formation ofideas. 8 Additionally, words were not based on objects
because they were part of a language system standing behind (and thus enabling)
referential speech. Rather, words (or signs as Saussure called them) were a conjunction of
a mental concept and a mental sound-image:
The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept
and a sound-image. The latter is not the material sound, a purely physical
thing, but the psychological imprint of the sound, the impression that it
makes on our senses. The sound-image is sensory, and ifl happen to call it
"material," it is only in that sense, and by way of opposing it to the other
term of the association, the concept, which is generally more abstract. 9
A unique consequence follows from Saussure's definition ofthe sign. Ifwords are
based on a conjunction of concepts (rather than things) with mental sound-images (rather
than actual sounds), and if words are not based on ideas either, then word meaning can
only derive from interrelationships within a linguistic system. Hence, Saussure's
approach was termed structuralism to denote the fact that meaning follows from the
structure of a linguistic system rather than objective reference, subjective ideas, or
etymologies:
Language is a system of interdependent tenns in which the value
of each tenn results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others ...
If words stood for pre-existing concepts, they would all have exact
equivalents in meaning from one language to the next; but this is not true ..
. When they are said to correspond to concepts, it is understood that the
concepts are purely differential and defined not by their positive content
but negatively by their relations with the other terms of the system. Their
most precise characteristic is in being what the others are not. ..
Everything that has been said up to this point boils down to this: in
8
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language there are only differences. Even more important: a difference
generally implies positive tenns between which the difference is set up;
but in language there are only differences without positive terms. 10
Based on Saussure's description, words have no positive content of their own.
Since their meaning is determined solely by differential relations to other words, their
value is imputed rather than intrinsic. Thus, linguistic signs are arbitrary since their
values follow from the roles they play within a linguistic system. However, if the value of
these arbitrary signs is regulated by the linguistic system, rather than by objective or
subjective references, then it follows that linguistics is a social phenomenon because in
the absence of fixed reference points, only the community can fix linguistic value:
The arbitrary nature of the sign explains in turn why the social fact
alone can create a linguistic system. The community is necessary if values
that owe their existence solely to usage and general acceptance are to be
set up; by himself the individual is incapable of fixing a single value. 11
Given the centrality of language to knowledge, the effect of Saussure' s
structuralism was to make epistemology itself a social phenomenon and thus to bring
sociology and anthropology into conversation with philosophy through their common
linguistic interface. While the radical nature of this move was not recognized
immediately, Saussure's linguistics eventually led to structuralist approaches in
anthropology and the eventual deconstruction of subjectivity and objectivity themselves
by the French poststructuralists, Lyotard, Foucault, and Derrida.
At the same time that Saussure was developing structural linguistics, an opposed
philosophy of language was growing in England. G. E. Moore was developing his

analytic philosophy which sought to break down complex propositions (molecular
propositions) into their propositional components (atomic propositions) which could, in
10
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tum, be individually compared to the external world. Once the truth values of the atomic
propositions had been obtained, the truth values of the molecular propositions could be
determined through logic. Stimulated both by Moore's analytic efforts and Frege's logic,
Bertrand Russell developed an epistemology known as logical atomism. The goal of
logical atomism was to apply logical analysis to language in order to render propositions
that could be empirically assessed through comparison to the external world. Consistent
with this program, Russell's graduate student, Ludwig Wittgenstein, initially advocated a
picture theory of language in which language was said to picture (or mirror) the world.
Wittgenstein transplanted these views to his native Vienna where they were merged with
positivism to yield a related movement known as logical positivism. Whereas logical
atomism had sought to verify statements by their correspondence to the external world,
logical positivism sought to assess truth solely by correspondence to sensation.
Accordingly, logical positivism developed a verifiability criterion in which all statements
not subject to empirical verification were rejected as unscientific and hence metaphysical.
The common thread running through all of these movements was an empirical
epistemology coupled with logical analysis and a referential theory of language.
Midway through the 201h Century, however, Wittgenstein abandoned these
empirical views and opted for a linguistic approach with social overtones. Whereas
Saussure had concentrated on the linguistic system (langue) rather than concrete speech
acts (parole), Wittgenstein adopted a praxis oriented approach in which the speaker was
embedded in life. In contrast to his previous views which allowed only for empirically
verifiable statements, Wittgenstein now allowed for a variety of statements whose truth
was measured not by external correspondence but rather by their utility in various life
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situations. Accordingly, he approached the philosophy of language as a series of

language-games which he referred to as life-forms. Truth was therefore measured by the
utility of a statement within a particular language-game with different types of statements
being appropriate (and therefore true) for different language-games:
But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question,
and command?-There are countless kinds: countless different kinds of
use of what we call "symbols", "words", "sentences". And this
multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of
language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and
others become obsolete and get forgotten. (We can get a rough picture of
this from the changes in mathematics.)
Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence
the fact that the speaking oflanguage is part of an activity, or of a lifeform.
Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following
examples and in others: giving orders, and obeying them; describing the
appearance of an object, or giving its measurements; constructing an
object from a description (a drawing); reporting an event; speculating
about the event; forming and testing a hypothesis; presenting the results of
an experiment in tables and diagrams; making up a story, and reading it;
play-acting; singing catches; guessing riddles; making a joke; telling it;
solving a problem in practical arithmetic; translating from one language
into another; requesting, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.
It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language
and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and
sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language. 12
Wittgenstein never defined precisely what he meant by language-games because it
would have violated his own philosophy to do so. Since Wittgenstein believed that people
are embedded in language, there could be no privileged access to reality outside of
language from which to define language-games objectively. In other words, the attempt
to define language games would simply have been to play a language-game of a different
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sort. 13 Nevertheless, while Wittgenstein did not define his concept more fully, its social
overtones are evident from his notion of praxis within a form of life:
After long reflection on such matters, Wittgenstein came to the
conclusion that there could be no underlying logical structure to the world
to which our minds must adhere, or vice versa. In the last analysis, the
propositions of logic appear to us to be valid simply because of the
processes of our education and upbringing. The propositions of logic
reflect the rules of language, and these are known to us by our use of
language in everyday life and linguistic experience. It is also through the
use oflanguage that we come to know, tacitly, which sentences in
language are well-formed and meaningful, having a proper logical
structure, and which are improperly constructed gibberish. Since
Wittgenstein expressed these ideas even in relation to logic, let alone
scientific hypotheses and theories, he was in fact putting forward views
that were forerunners of those held by modem sociology-of-knowledge
theorists, whose ideas I shall refer to again in Chapter 9. That is,
Wittgenstein was giving expression in Philosophical Investigations to the
view that meaning, and thereby knowledge, reside in the last analysis in
social practices, particularly with respect to language.
The work of the later Wittgenstein was also influential in leading
to the important 'concepts-influence-percepts' thesis that is now widely
accepted by philosophers of science. 14
From this discussion the social implications ofWittgenstein's later philosophy
clearly emerge. While Wittgenstein's approach was clearly different than Saussure's, 15
both positions eventually brought sociology and anthropology into conversation with
philosophy, thereby contributing to Anglo-American and Continental postmodemity,
respectively. Like Immanuel Kant both of the above positions imply that concepts
influence percepts. However, whereas Kant had sought to base these concepts in
universal a-priori structures of the human mind, the postmodem twist has been to locate
these concepts in the social group. Thus, in place of Kant's universal individualism (all
13

Jean Fran9ois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoffrey Bennington
and Brian Massumi, Theory and History of Literature; V. 10 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1984), 88, n. 33.
14
David Oldroyd, The Arch ofKnowledge: An lntroductOJy Study of the Histmy of the Philosophy and
Methodology of Science (New York and London: Methuen, 1986), 229, 230.
15
For a brief comparison of the similarities and ditTerences between the respective approaches of Saussure
and Wittgenstein see Thiselton, 428-431.

112

individuals are universally alike), the new perspective is one of communal pluralism (all
communities are different) which is often called multiculturalism. Since the culture here
provides the categories through which one defines oneself and the surrounding world, the
effect of this view is not only to make epistemology culturally relative but also to
dissolve the subject and object of knowledge into the social group:
The conviction that each person is embedded in a particular human
community leads to a corporate understanding of truth. Postmoderns
believe that not only our specific beliefs but also our understanding of
truth itself is rooted in the community in which we participate. They reject
the Enlightenment quest for universal, supracultural, timeless truth in
favor of searching out truth as the expression of a specific community.
They believe that truth consists in the ground rules that facilitate personal
well-being in community and the well-being of the community as a whole.
In this sense, then, postmodern truth is relative to the community
in which a person participates. And since there are many human
communities, there are necessarily many different truths. Most
postmoderns make the leap of believing that this plurality of truths can
exist alongside one another. The postmodern consciousness, therefore,
entails a radical kind of relativism and pluralism.
Of course, relativism and pluralism are not new. But the
postmodern variety differs from the older forms. The relativistic pluralism
of late modernity was highly individualistic; it elevated personal taste and
personal choice as the be-ali and end-all. Its maxims were "To each
his/her own" and "Everyone has a right to his/her own opinion."
The postmodern consciousness, in contrast, focuses on the group.
Postmoderns live in self-contained social groups, each of which has its
own language, beliefs, and values. As a result, postmodern relativistic
pluralism seeks to give place to the "local" nature of truth. Beliefs are held
to be true within the context of the communities that espouse them. 16
If truth is relative to one's culture or social group, then truth itself fractures along
cultural lines, and there remains no universal truth for all times and places. And while it
may seem that such a view would affect only the more obvious cultural phenomena like
ethics and religion, the social epistemology stemming from the linguistic turn has even
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brought scientific truth into question. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 17
Thomas Kuhn argued that science is governed by paradigms which determine how
scientists view reality (see Chapter 4) and which are themselves socially inculcated
within the scientific community through the process of scientific education. Since
scientific theories are therefore socially constructed and non-objective, scientific progress
merely involves a series of shifts from one socially constructed paradigm to another and
thus does not bring science any closer to the truth. Now since Kuhn acknowledged his
debt to B. L. Whorf's Language, Thought, and Reality in the preface to his work, 18 it is
evident that social constructivism entered Kuhn's philosophy of science through the
philosophy of language. Building upon Kuhn's work, these views were even more
radically employed by David Bloor in the "Strong Program" of the sociology of scientific
knowledge. Thus, as seen through the lens of philosophy of science, the effect of the
linguistic tum has been to bring knowledge itself into question. That is to say, the

postmodern turn has itself piggybacked on the linguistic turn:
... The story begins with the crisis of logical positivism/empiricism in the
1950s sparked by Quine's rebellion. The decisive turning point was the
publication of Kuhn's Structure ofScient~fic Revolutions in 1962.
Problems Quine and Kuhn discerned in theorizing empirical science
seemed to require "semantic ascent" into philosophy of language for
resolution. Here the "causal theory of reference" of Hilary Putnam and
others assumed salience. But reflections upon the general "linguistic tum"
led some prophets (e.g., Richard Rorty) to proclaim the "end of
epistemology." The linguistic tum prompted two further impulses: the
"historicization of reason" and the "social construction ofknowledge."
That is, to grasp science it was felt necessary, first, to situate it in
historical process, and second, to situate it in social context. The first
impulse led to what came to be called the "mani.age" of the history of
science with the philosophy of science, and the second to what came to be
called the "sociology of scientific knowledge" (SSK). Imre Lakatos, Larry
Laudan, and "naturalized epistemology" pursued the first agenda. The
17
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"Strong Program" of David Bloor and Barry Barnes instantiated the
second ... 19

THE SOCIAL GOD AND THE CONSTRUCTIVE WORD
Having examined the emergence of social constructivism and its resulting
skepticism, it is necessary to develop an adequate Christian response. As stated above,
such a response must maintain the valid insights of social epistemology without
sacrificing objective and subjective knowledge. It is precisely here, however, that the
Christian position meets the challenge since it involves the notion of a social God who
creates an objective world through His omnipotent and omniscient Word. Consequently,
since the creation comes into existence by virtue of the divine speech, the world itself is
socially constructed, linguistically defined, and objective. Moreover, since this same act
of creation also accounts for societies of human subjects, this objective creation of the
social God also accounts for the subjective, objective, and social aspects of human
knowledge. Thus, God's knowledge is socially constructive; human knowledge is socially

reconstructive. It remains to show how this result is guaranteed by God's social nature.
As mentioned above, God's being involves a complete interpenetration ofthe
divine persons by virtue ofperichoresis. Thus, within God's being subjectivity,
objectivity, and social normativity (i.e. conventionality) mutually exhaust one another.
Because each of the persons is on an ontological par with each of the others, subjectivity
and objectivity interpenetrate without residue. Moreover, because each person is on an
ontological par with the entire divine community, subjectivity and objectivity
interpenetrate with social normativity (conventionality), again without residue.
19
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Consequently, within God's being, the intra-Trinitarian speech manifests a ruled
subjective and objective fullness because it is eternally in accordance with the
subjectivity, objectivity, and social normativity (conventionality) of God. Moreover,
since God is Himself identified with His Word, this intra-Trinitarian speech is both
reflective and productive of the divine reality. Within God's being, therefore, the real is
the verbal, and the verbal is the real.
However, if God's speech is productive of His own infinite reality, then it is also
productive of the finite creation. Since the verbal is the real within God's infinite being,
His external word suffices a fortiori to give reality to the finite creation. Moreover, since
all three persons of the Trinity are involved in creating and sustaining the world, the
world represents an objective, socially constructed product. Furthermore, within God's
being the verbal is not merely the real (objective), but also the social (normative) and the
psychological (subjective). Consequently, God's external word not only gives objective
existence to the world, but also psycho-social existence to societies of human beings who
image God both as individuals and as societies. Thus, the creation emerges as a divine
analog which manifests the subjective, objective, and social properties of God on a finite
scale. Because the world results from the constructive word of the social God, human
knowledge reflects the covenant fullness which inheres in God's being by nature, albeit
on a finite scale. The subjective, objective, and social (normative) aspects ofhuman
knowledge are therefore equally derivative aspects of the created order which image their
divine archetypes. Thus, God's knowledge is socially constructive; human knowledge is
socially reconstructive. Van Til writes:
... It were quite legitimate and true to say that the foundation of all
personal activity among men must be based upon the personality of one
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ultimate person, namely, the person of God, if only it be understood that
this ultimate personality of God is a triune personality. In the Trinity there
is completely personal relationship without residue. And for that reason it
may be said that man's actions are all personal too. Man's surroundings
are shot through with personality because all things are related to the
infinitely personal God. But when we have said that the surroundings of
man are really completely personalized, we have also established the fact
of the representational principle. All of man's acts must be
representational of the acts of God. Even the persons of the Trinity are
mutually representational. They are exhaustively representational of one
another. Because he is a creature, man must, in his thinking, his feeling
and his willing, be representative of God. There is no other way open for
him. He could, in the nature of the case, think nothing at all unless he
thought God's thoughts after him, and this is representational thinking.
Thus man's thought is representative of God's thought, but not
exhaustively representative ... Since the whole being of God, if we may in
all reverence say so, is built upon the representational plan, it was
impossible for God to create except upon the representational plan. This
pertains to every individual human being, but it pertains just as well with
respect to the race as a whole. If there was to be a personal relationship
between finite persons-and none other is conceivable-there would have
to be representational relationship ...20

HUMAN LANGUAGE AND THE QUESTION OF ANALOGY
Having examined the theological basis for an integrated view of knowledge and
language, it is necessary to apply these results to the human situation. In particular, it is
necessary to show how the socially constructed knowledge of humanity can retain its
objectivity and subjectivity. With regard to these concerns, the present section will use
the concept of analogy to establish both the equality and the interrelation of the
subjective, objective, and socially normative perspectives in human language.
As noted in the discussion above, various attempts have been made to ground
human language in subjective expression, objective reference, and linguistic convention.
In the 1930s Charles Morris realized that each of these three aspects is interrelated with
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the others and essential to language as a whole. Accordingly, Morris stressed this
interrelation by referring to these three aspects as the pragmatic, semantic, and syntactic
dimensions of a single process of semiosis (i.e., sign making). So understood, Morris'
three dimensions of language fit within Frame's multiperspectival framework as shown
below in Figure 6a. Morris writes:
The full characterization of a language may now be given: A
language in the full semiotical sense of the term is any inter-subjective set
ofsign vehicles whose usage is determined by syntactical, semantical, and
. l ru l es. 21
pragmatzca
Since the current tendency is in the direction of specialized
research in syntactics, semantics, or pragmatics, it is well to stress
emphatically the interrelations of these disciplines within semiotic [sic].
Indeed, semiotic [sic], in so far as it is more than these disciplines, is
mainly concerned with their interrelations, and so with the unitary
character of semiosis which these disciplines individually ignore.
One aspect of the interrelation is indicated in the fact that while
each of the component disciplines deals in one way or another with signs,
none of them can define the term 'sign' and, hence, cannot define
themselves. 22
Since Morris' three dimensions are interdependent within the single process of
semiosis, each dimension requires the others and so is incapable of describing the whole
apart from the other two. Thus, none of the three dimensions is foundational to the others
or to the process as a whole. Indeed, as indicated by Morris, each of the dimensions taken
individually is incompetent to define semiosis in general or even its own particular
semiotic emphasis. Rather since each fonns a perspective on the others and on the whole,
the attempt to make one of these perspectives foundational to the others leads to linguistic
reductionism and thus (assuming Frame's analysis) a three way debate between the
partisans of expressivism, referentialism, and structuralism as shown in Figure 6b.
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LINGUISTICS

LINGUISTICS
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b. reductionism

a. mulfiperspectivalism

Figure 6. Multiperspectivalism vs. Linguistic Reductionism
Because these immanent perspectives therefore provide no linguistic foundation,
it is necessary to seek a transcendent ground for human language. In this regard, it was
mentioned above that within God's being, subjectity, objectity, and social normativity
interpenetrate exhaustively. As a consequence, God's internal speech is characterized by
pragmatic, semantic, and syntactic perfection. Human speech, by contrast, is effective
only because it is the created analog of God's speech and thus grounded in the divine
original. Consequently, the pragmatic, semantic, and syntactic dimensions of human
speech interrelate because they are the respective analogs of their divine counterparts.
However, because they are finite analogs, their interrelation is only partial rather than
exhaustive and is moreover divinely mediated rather than direct. In other words, human
discourse is itself characterized by perichoresis, albeit in a finite and mediated way.
Given this fact, the subjective, objective, and normative aspects of human speech
or knowledge do not interpenetrate without residue. As a consequence, the social aspect
of knowledge, though truly significant, cannot monopolize epistemology to the exclusion
of the subjective and objective aspects. Thus, even in Thomas Kuhn's philosophy of
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science in which the social aspect of knowledge is pronounced, the objective and
subjective aspects assert their rights in times of paradigm shifts. For instance, in the shift
from Newtonian to Einsteinian mechanics, the accumulation of experimental anomalies
brought the Newtonian framework into question from an objective perspective.
Moreover, the new framework arose from the subjective creativity and imagination of
Albert Einstein. In this transition, the social aspect of knowledge was also evident in the
effort required to dislodge the entrenched Newtonian view. Consequently, while the
social aspect of knowledge is clearly important, it is not coterminous with the other two
and so cannot monopolize them. Indeed, it does not even do so in God in whom the three
perspectives exhaustively interpenetrate.
However, as paradigm shifts in science clearly demonstrate, human knowledge,
though influenced by factors of objective correspondence, is never completely objective
either. All human thought views reality through a grid that is largely socially constructed.
Since direct contact with reality is never achieved, it might seem as though the progress
of knowledge would grind to a halt in the sands of pessimism. From a purely immanent
perspective, this would be a natural conclusion. For the Christian, however, such
pessimism is not warranted because objective knowledge exists for God and has been
vouchsafed by Him to humanity. Moreover, He has given humanity its scientific task and
has established its eventual success, despite human error, by guaranteeing true, though
partial knowledge to humanity. Thus, as the wheels of history tum, and the scientific
edifice grows toward its predetermined heights, the ultimate issue is not whether human
knowledge is social or objective as commonly understood. Rather the ultimate issue is the
fact that the socially constructed knowledge of humanity has its objective grounding in
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the socially constructed knowledge of God. After all, God's knowledge is socially

constructive; human knowledge is socially reconstructive. Van Til writes:
For God, coherence is the tenn that comes first. There was
coherence in God's plan before there was any space-time fact to which his
knowledge might correspond, or which might correspond to his
knowledge. On the other hand, when we think of human knowledge,
correspondence is of primary importance. If there is to be true coherence
in our knowledge there must be correspondence between our ideas of facts
and God's ideas of these facts. Or rather we should say that our ideas must
correspond to God's ideas. 23

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIVISM
AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE POSTMODERN SELF
Apart from a frequent loss of objectivity, postmodemism is also plagued by the
loss of subjectivity. This phenomenon is variously referred to as the loss of the

postmodern self, the dissolution of the postmodern self, or the de-centered self The
dissolution of the postmodem self results from three related factors. First, by virtue of
postmodemism's social epistemology, the self is constructed in community. Second,
since the person participates in a plurality of communities, this self is distributed over
several communities, constructed differently in each, and hence fractured. Third, because
there is no overarching metanarrative which holds the entire society together, there is no
metacommunity which integrates the competing microcommunities and which would
therefore serve to integrate the fractured self. The result is that the self fractures into a
hodgepodge of discreet, unrelated roles through its distribution over a plurality of discreet
social networks.
In this regard, the importance of metanarrative to the social self follows from the
fact that communities derive their identities from both the synchronic interactions with
23
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their surrounding environments and from the diachronic connections to their past. In
other words, communities have histories which define their identities. They therefore
have an event structure which is historically extended and socially embodied. Indeed,
living communities are socially embodied stories which have not yet reached their ends,
be they happy or sad. Consequently, when there is no metanarrative to hold a society
together, the society splinters into competing local communities defined by local
narratives (or stories). Thus, the breaking up of the grand narratives which characterized
the modern age results in a fracturing of the self who is then defined by competing stories
and their related social networks. Lyotard writes:
What is new in all of this is that the old poles of attraction
represented by nation-states, parties, professions, institutions, and
historical traditions are losing their attraction. And it does not look as
though they will be replaced, at least not on their former scale ... A self
does not amount to much, but no self is an island; each exists in a fabric of
relations that is now more complex and mobile than ever before. Young or
old, man or woman, rich or poor, a person is always located at "nodal
points" of specific communication circuits, however tiny these may be ...
It should now be clear from which perspective I chose language games as
my general methodological approach. I am not claiming that the entirety
of social relations is of this nature-that will remain an open question. But
there is no need to resort to some fiction of social origins to establish that
language games are the minimum relation required for society to exist:
even before he is born, if only by virtue of the name he is given, the
human child is already positioned as the referent in the story recounted by
those around him, in relation to which he will inevitably chart his course. 24
The social subject itself seems to dissolve in this dissemination of
language games. The social bond is linguistic, but it is not woven with a
single thread. It is a fabric formed by the intersection of at least two (and
in reality an indetenninate number) of language games, obeying different
rules. 25
According to Lyotard, the breakup of metanarratives and the consequent
dissolution of the self defines the postmodern condition. The Enlightenment philosophers
24
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had sought to avoid religious conflicts by distancing themselves from metanarratives and
asserting truths that were timeless and universal. Unwittingly, however, they simply
substituted secular metanarratives for the religious ones. Among the new metanarratives
were those which attempted to justify knowledge by promising peace, prosperity, and
26

political and religious emancipation through scientific progress. What characterizes the
postmodem condition, however, is the realization that even these secular metanarratives
are bankrupt. According to Lyotard, therefore, postmodemism does not seek to replace
modem with postmodem metanarratives, but rather to attack all totalizing metanarratives
and thus to adjust to an environment characterized by communal pluralism and
competing local narratives:
... I will use the term modern to designate any science that legitimates
itself with reference to a metadiscourse of this kind making an explicit
appeal to some grand narrative, such as the dialectics of Spirit, the
henneneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working
subject, or the creation of wealth. For example, the rule of consensus
between the sender and addressee of a statement with truth-value is
deemed acceptable if it is cast in tenns of a possible unanimity between
rational minds: this is the Enlightenment narrative, in which the hero of
knowledge works toward a good ethico-political end-universal peace. As
can be seen from this example, if a metanarrative implying a philosophy
of history is used to legitimate knowledge, questions are raised concerning
the validity of the institutions governing the social bond: these must be
legitimated as well. Thus justice is consigned to the grand narrative in the
same way as truth.
Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity
toward metanarratives. 27
From what was said in the previous section, this line of reasoning is faulty on two
counts. First, since the subjective, objective, and social-conventional (nonnative)
perspectives of human knowledge interpenetrate partially rather than exhaustively, the
social-conventional perspective cannot monopolize human knowledge. With regard to
26
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human societies, therefore, the self is not socially constructed without residue, but only
partially so. With regard to the divine community, however, the subjective, objective, and
social-conventional (normative) perspectives do exhaustively interpenetrate so that it may
truly be said that the human self is socially constructed without residue by the Trinity.
Accordingly, the human self may attain integration through a personal
relationship with the triune God who stands above the world as a metacommunity and
whose metanarrative encompasses the entire span of human history. With respect to
salvation, this metanarrative is known as the missio Dei. The Father sends the Son into
the world to secure salvation for humanity through his death and resurrection. The Father
and the Son send the Holy Spirit into the world to apply this salvation to the hearts and
lives of God's people, and to gather them into Christ's body, the church. Finally, the
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit send the church into the world to introduce others to
the reign of God so that through the church and in the power of the Holy Spirit all things
can be gathered unto Christ and thence turned over to the Father who is all in all.
In salvation, therefore, one integrates his/her many local narratives into God's one
metanarrative and joins the community of God's people which socially embodies this
metanarrative in every culture and extends it historically through time. Within this
context the integration of the self is both already and not yet. The Christian enjoys the
"first fruits" of this integration in the present time and yet awaits the eschaton in which
God will achieve the fullness of integration by weaving all the seemingly disparate
narrative threads into one seamless whole. Ultimately, therefore, the self is not fractured
because it is socially constructed by the triune God whose metacommunity and
metanarrative trump all local varieties. In other words, the self is ultimately integrated
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because it is defined by God's all encompassing language-game and may therefore seek
to reconstruct this integration in a partial manner on the finite level of human society.
After all, God's knowledge is socially constructive; human knowledge is socially

reconstructive.

CONCLUSION
The burden of the present chapter has been to trace the rise of social
constructivism within postmodern philosophy and to analyze its effects from a Trinitarian
perspective. In this regard, it was shown that due to the epistemological centrality of
language, social constructivism arose from the linguistic turn in 20th Century philosophy
since social approaches to language necessarily implied a social epistemology. In making
knowledge relative to the community, however, the effect was not only to fracture
knowledge along community lines but also to reduce the subject and object of knowledge
to the status of social constructs. Thus, the effect was not only to question the universality
of truth, but even more radically, subjectivity and objectivity themselves.
To respond to this situation from a Trinitarian perspective, the attempt was made
to retain the valid insights of social constructivism without sacrificing subjectivity,
objectivity, or the universality of truth. To this end it was argued that human knowledge
is subjective, objective, and social because the world was personally, objectively, and
socially constructed by the God who is subjective, objective, and social Himself. Thus,
the subjective, objective, and socially nonnative aspects of language and human
knowledge are not to be sought in themselves alone or in their interrelations with one
another, but rather in the triune God in whom subjectivity, objectivity, and social
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normativity (social-conventionality) interpenetrate exhaustively. Ultimately, human
thought and language are covenantal in nature and thus can only be grounded in the God
who is covenant Himself.
So understood, the Trinitarian position outlined above offers a third way between
postmodern social relativism on the one hand, and the subjectivism and objectivism of
modernity on the other. In contrast to all these options, the Christian view offers an
alternative that is personal, absolute, and communitarian all at once and which champions
an ultimate truth that is universal. As a result, science may attain to relative objectivity
because the socially constructed knowledge of humanity has its objective basis in the
socially constructed knowledge of God. Likewise, by virtue of the death and resurrection
of Christ, the individual may find subjective integration within the language-game of God
and within the community of God's redeemed people. After all, since God is community,
covenant, and love Himself, He is total meaning as well as total goodness. Humanity may
therefore find meaning in the reconstruction of the prior and ultimate meaning which God
has expressed in general and special revelation.
God's knowledge is socially constructive; human knowledge is socially
reconstructive.
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CHAPTER6
THE SOCIAL GOD AND THE RELATIONAL COSMOS:
TOWARD A TRINITARIAN ONTOLOGY OF SCIENCE

The ingenious use of perichoresis to describe the manner in which the Trinitarian
persons are constituted by the mutuality of relationships within the life of the triune God
opened the way for the development of a dynamic ontology of persons-in-relationship or
persons-in-communion. This ontology characterizes the essential nature of personhood as
consisting of mutuality and interdependence. According to this understanding,
"communion does not threaten personal particularity," as John Zizioulas notes, "it is
constitutive of it." By offering the impetus toward a thoroughgoing relational ontology,
the concept of perichoresis opens the way as well for an ontology that takes seriously and
in fact ensures the integrity of both the "one" and the "many," preserving both within the
dynamic of interrelations.
Stanley Grenz, The Social God and the Relational Self

Behind the diversity of postmodemism lies a central philosophical concept. This
concept is dynamic relationality, and it gives rise to various other ideas which
characterize the divergent streams ofpostmodemism: non-foundationalism, paradoxical
knowledge, emergent order, and social constructivism. Because these elements can be
differently combined, postmodernism is quite diverse. However, by focusing on the
common elements, it is possible to see unity beneath this diversity and thus to appreciate
the pronounced contrast between modernism and postmodernism.
The modern era was mechanistic and viewed change as the result of fixed laws
applied to fixed substances. Change was simply a reconfiguration of atomic units within a
static order. Moreover, an atomistic reductionism prevailed which sought the essence of
things by breaking them into bits. As the "fundamental" particles failed to "materialize,"
however, some began to suspect that particles were themselves manifestations of
underlying fields, and thus relationally defined. Accordingly, a dynamic relationality
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began to replace the foundationalism of atomistic reductionism. Moreover, in quantum
mechanics paradoxical knowledge in the form of the wave-particle duality was traced to
the interaction (relationality) between the observer and the quantum object. Finally, in
dynamic systems theory, relationality was shown to produce the phenomenon of
emergent order. Thus, dynamic relationality gave rise to the postmodern concepts of nonfoundationalism, paradoxical knowledge, and emergence.
As evident from the citation above, 1 however, dynamic relationality is also central
to the doctrine of the Trinity. Thus, the Trinity provides an obvious point of contact
between Christianity and postmodernism, especially as in light ofNancey Murphy's third
philosophical locus, holistic relational ontology. Classically understood, God consists of
an eternal essence exhaustively expressed in each of three interacting persons. Thus,
relationality and relata (things related) are equally basic within God's being, and so are
God's eternity and dynamism. A Trinitarian metaphysic therefore challenges atomism
and monism alike as well as the extremes of eternal staticism and ultimate flux. Rather,
because God is both eternally dynamic and internally relational, a Trinitarian metaphysic
is able to account for both the stability and the dynamism of a created universe in which

relata and relationships are equally ultimate and mutually conditioning. To clarifY these
implications, it will be helpful to consider the Trinitarian theology of Cornelius Van Til.

THE METAPHYSICS OF RELATIONALITY:
THE TRINITY AS ETERNAL AND DYNAMIC
Christianity sets forth a two-layer metaphysics consisting of the eternal God and
the created universe. Whereas God is infinite and self-dependent, the creation is finite
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and dependent upon God. Accordingly, God must be both eternal and dynamic to
guarantee the world's stability as well as its vibrant relationality. As argued by Van Til,
this eternal dynamism both derives from and characterizes the Trinity itself:
In what has been said it is the triune personal God of Scripture that is in
view. God exists in himself as a triune self-consciously active being. The
Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are each a personality and together
constitute the exhaustively personal God. There is an eternal, internal selfconscious interaction between the three persons of the Godhead. They are
co-substantial. Each is as much God as are the other two. The Son and the
Spirit do not derive their being from the Father. The diversity and the
unity in the Godhead are therefore equally ultimate; they are exhaustively
correlative to one another and not correlative to anything else?
From a human point of view, of course, it is paradoxical to affinn that God is both
eternal and dynamic. After all, the finite mind attempts to interpret eternity in temporal
categories, rather than the reverse. However, when temporal categories become ultimate,
human thought is driven to univocal or equivocal extremes. Thus, eternity reduces to
either endless time (flux) or to the abstract negative of time (staticism). The result is that
eternity is either swallowed by dynamism or stands in polar contrast to it. However, when
the human mind reasons analogically, it subjects itself to God's revelation and thus to the
ultimacy of eternal categories. By faith human thought embraces the paradox of an
eternal dynamism, thus avoiding the pitfalls of eternal staticism and temporal flux:
Thus the abstract way of negation, which assumes the ability of man to
engage in independent predication, frustrates itself, it seeks an eternal
world, and ends up by finding one which is nothing but a negative
counterpart of the spatio-temporal universe. Such a being may be either
deistically or pantheistically conceived. In both cases, the difference
between Creator and creature is really ignored.
Accordingly, we begin our thought about the infinity of God by
insisting that the fullness of the being of God is back of the active fullness
and variety in the spatio-temporal world. Scripture leads us in this respect.
It has no hesitation in speaking anthropomorphically of God. It ascribes all
manner of activity to him. Of this activity we cannot think otherwise than
2
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spatially and temporally. So we are face to face with the choice either of
thinking of God as altogether like unto ourselves, or of thinking ourselves
the finite analogues of the fullness of his being. As we cannot do the first
without wiping out the difference between Creator and creature, we are
compelled to do the latter.
Thinking of the infinity of God in relation to time in this manner,
we therefore think of that fullness of internal activity of which the
movement in the temporally conditioned universe is a created replica. God
is self-determinatively internally active. 3
While God's eternity is necessarily consistent with His dynamism, the human
mind cannot harmonize these qualities without residue. However, while it cannot
harmonize these qualities directly, it can show that God's eternity and dynamism not only
fail to contradict but also positively require one another. The key to this demonstration
may be found, once again, in a consideration of the intra-Trinitarian relationships:
We may express this thought philosophically by saying that for us the
eternal one and many form a self-complete unity. God is absolute
personality and therefore absolute individuality. He exists necessarily. He
has no non-being over against himself in comparison with which he
defines himself; he is internally self-defined.
Using the language ofthe One-and-Many question we contend that
in God the one and the many are equally ultimate. Unity in God is no more
fundamental than diversity, and diversity in God is no more fundamental
than unity. The persons of the Trinity are mutually exhaustive of one
another. The Son and the Spirit are onto logically on a par with the Father.
.. In God's being there are no particulars not related to the universal, and
there is nothing universal that is not fully expressed in the particulars.4
As seen from this description, God's essence (the universal) is fully
expressed in the persons (the particulars). Since God's eternity is associated with
His essence, each of the persons together with their dynamic interaction is thereby
rendered eternal. On the other hand, since there is a diversity of persons within the
one being of God, God is internally correlative and can therefore compare and
contrast within His own being. Thus, God does not compromise His aseity--and
3
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therewith His eternity--by defining Himself in contrast to a world of nonbeing.
Rather, by virtue of God's internal self-interaction, God is internally self-defined.
Consequently, not only does the eternity of God's essence establish the dynamic
relationality of the persons, but also the dynamic relationality of the persons
establishes God's aseity, and therewith the eternity ofthe divine essence. In other
words, God is dynamic because He is eternal, and He is eternal because He is
dynamic. In God, the real is the relational, and the relational is the real.

RELATIONALITY AND THE REVOLUTION IN SCIENCE

Having examined the eternal dynamism of God, it is next necessary to consider
the relational ontology which "emerged" in 20th Century science. Through a series of
paradigm shifts, this relational conception eventually impacted all scales of reality,
producing a new cosmology. In particular, these shifts gave rise to the notions ofnonfoundationalism, paradoxical knowledge, and emergent order which would eventually
prove integral to postmodernism. Of course, certain positions, such as nonfoundationalism and paradoxical knowledge, have a long history within mystical
traditions which predate postmodernism by millennia. So perhaps the radical nature of
postmodernism is not so much the novelty of postmodern ideas as it is the incorporation
of ancient mysticism in new and unexpected places, the heart of 20th Century science.
The short version ofthe story begins in 1905 with the special theory of relativity.
According to Albert Einstein, the constancy of the speed of light implies that the relative
motion (i.e., dynamic relationality) between two reference frames will alter the values of
mass, length, and time which observers in different frames will impute to the same object
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or event. The implications of this fact were both revolutionary and weird. For instance, a
moving object appears shorter to a stationary observer while its internal time seems to
flow more slowly. To inculcate these strange ideas, physics professors used to say,
"Moving cigars are shorter, but they last longer." In addition, by demonstrating the
equivalence of mass and energy, Einstein showed that objects were really events.
However, the radical nature of the Einstein's theory was not restricted to the values of
mass, length, and time, but rather extended to an alteration of the meaning of these
parameters. As the building blocks of classical physics, they had been regarded as
independent, conceptual atoms. Einstein, however, destroyed their foundational status by
incorporating them into a relational system. Henceforth, mass would be grouped with
energy as mass-energy, and space would be grouped with time as space-time.
In 1915 Einstein set forth the more radical theory of general relativity which
applied a field conception to the entire cosmos. 5 In this theory Einstein reduced massenergy and space-time to a single field characterized by an abstract, non-Euclidean
geometry. Massive bodies were condensations of the field which served to anchor the
field lines, while the field lines, in tum, detennined the curvature of the bodies' motion.
Thus, the gravitational effect on moving bodies was interpreted as a space-time curvature.
The monistic implications of Einstein's thought and the dynamic relationality ofhis
conception are evident in his introduction to Max Jammer's Concepts of Space:
The victory over the concept of absolute space or over that of the
inertial system became possible only because the concept of the material
object was gradually replaced as the fundamental concept of physics by
5
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that of the field. Under the influence of Faraday and Maxwell the notion
developed that the whole of physical reality could perhaps be represented
as a field whose components depend on four space-time parameters. If the
laws of this field are in general covariant, that is, are not dependent on a
particular choice of coordinate system, then the introduction of an
independent (absolute) space is no longer necessary. That which
constitutes the spatial character of reality is then simply the fourdimensionality of the field. There is then no 'empty' space, that is, there is
no space without a field. 6
Although Einstein's conception was radical, he was still a detenninistic thinker.
He could not accept the indeterminism of quantum mechanics 7 and therefore spent the
last half of his career in a futile search for a unified field which would combine quantum
mechanics with gravity and electromagnetism in a deterministic way. Though he
eventually acknowledged the predictive success of quantum mechanics, his monistic and
detenninistic instincts resisted the theory as a final solution:
Quantum mechanics is very worthy of regard, but an inner voice tells me
that it is not the true Jacob. The theory yields much, but it hardly brings us
close to the secret of the Old One. In any case, I am convinced He does
not play dice. 8
For the latter decades of his life, Einstein's (often imaginary) debating partner
was Niels Bohr, the founder of the Copenhagen School of quantum mechanics. 9 In
contrast to Einstein, Bohr was a more critical realist and therefore sought epistemological
rather than ontological explanations of phenomena such as wave-particle duality. Under
certain conditions light would exhibit wave behavior while under different conditions
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particle behavior was observed. Moreover, a similar wave-particle duality was observed
in the behavior of particles such as electrons. In resolving this paradox, Bohr noticed that
these mutually exclusive behaviors corresponded to mutually exclusive experimental
arrangements. Moreover, since one could not see the quantum object itself, what one
actually observed was the interaction of the quantum object with the measuring
apparatus. Finally, since the quantum object was extremely small, the act of measurement
inevitably altered the measured behavior itself, producing differing types of behavior for
different experimental arrangements. Thus, Bohr traced the quantum paradox to the
relationality between the quantum object and the participant-observer. In a move
pregnant with postmodem overtones, Bohr connected the quantum and Taoist notions of
paradox: 10
... we must realize that the situation met with in modem atomic theory is
entirely unprecedented in the history of physical science. Indeed, the
whole conceptual structure of classical physics, brought to so wonderful a
unification and completion by Einstein's work, rests on the assumption,
well adapted to our daily experience of physical phenomena, that it is
possible to discriminate between the behavior of material objects and the
question of their observation. For a parallel to the lesson of atomic theory
regarding the limited applicability of such customary idealisations, we
must in fact tum to quite other branches of science, such as psychology, or
even to that kind of epistemological problems with which already thinkers
like Buddha and Lao Tse have been confronted, when trying to hannonize
our position as spectators and actors in the great drama of existence. Still,
the recognition of an analogy in the purely logical character of the
problems which present themselves in so widely separated fields of human
interest does in no way imply acceptance in atomic physics of any
mysticism foreign to the true spirit of science, but on the contrary it gives
us an incitation to examine whether the straightforward solution of the
unexpected paradoxes met with in the application of our simplest concepts
to atomic phenomena might not help us to clarify conceptual difficulties in
· o f expenence.
·
II
oth er d omams

10
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As shown above, the postmodem notion of paradox has its scientific touchstone in
quantum epistemology. However, Bohr did not limit himself to epistemological
explanation. After his student Werner Heisenberg derived the uncertainty principle, Bohr
began to interpret quantum probability in a fully ontological sense. Moreover, with the
later development of quantum field theory, ontological probability was incorporated into
quantum fields. Thus, whereas the modem mind had regarded unity and flux as polar
opposites, quantum field theory set forth the paradoxical specter of a monistic
indeterminism. Moreover, whereas Bohr had been reserved in drawing connections
between physics and mysticism, these connections were boldly set forth in later years
through books such as The Tao ofPhysics. 12 Finally, to the extent that such a field theory
defines postmodem ontology on a popular level, 13 postmodemism is characterized by a

coincidentia oppositorum in the manner of German Romanticism, Taoism, and Zen. 14
While chance became entrenched in quantum mechanics, determinism was
making a comeback through chaos theory. To characterize unusual phenomena like fluid
turbulence, scientists and mathematicians began playing with nonlinear dynamics.
Nonlinear dynamics arise when dynamic systems have strong internal couplings between
their components, which produce system wide relationality. In chaos theory, nonlinear
dynamics are used to explain seemingly random behaviors in terms of an underlying
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order. In complexity theory, nonlinear dynamics are used to explain the emergence of
coherent patterns in self organizing systems. 15 Thus, the concept of emergence, which is a
central postmodern idea, is itself a consequence of dynamic relationality.
With regard to chaos theory, mathematicians showed that seemingly random
behavior could be produced from simple, deterministic equations. Thus, chaos theory set
forth the strange hybrid of deterministic, unpredictable systems. An example of such a
phenomenon in nature is the weather which is governed by fluid turbulence. Although
chaos theory may eventually provide a deterministic basis for turbulence, the weather
will remain unpredictable. The reason for this is that the nonlinear equations of chaos
theory rapidly amplify small perturbations into large scale effects. This phenomenon is
referred to as "the butterfly effect" because it is said that a butterfly flapping his wings in
Beijing today will affect the weather in Los Angeles two weeks from now.
Through its unique combination of determinism and unpredictability, chaos
theory offers a direct challenge to the Enlightenment. Descartes had assumed that the
world was metaphysically deterministic and epistemologically predictable, whereas
Hume took the opposite positions. In a height of arrogance, Kant assumed that nature was
metaphysically indeterministic but that he could nevertheless predict it epistemologically.
In contrast to all these approaches, chaos theory says that nature is fundamentally
deterministic but not always predictable. Thus, one may neither predict it exhaustively,
nor negatively declare it random. Rather it carries a deeply complex and relational order
which corresponds on a finite level to the infinite mystery of God.
15
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To make this connection it is first necessary to distinguish between Christian and
Pagan concepts of mystery. For paganism both God and humanity are surrounded by the
irrational so that mystery is ultimate for both. For Christianity, by contrast, there is
mystery only for humanity since God knows Himself and His creation exhaustively.
Pagan mystery is thus like a dark and bottomless abyss, whereas Christian mystery is like
a blinding light. The Trinity, therefore, is a rational mystery and hence the mysterious
source of the creation's rationality. Van Til writes:
As Christians we say that this is a mystery that is beyond our
comprehension. It surely is. God himself, in the totality ofhis existence, is
above our comprehension. At the same time, this mysterious God is
mysterious because he is, within himself, wholly rational. It is not as
though we can first, apart from Scripture, determine the fact that there
must be a triune God if there is to be rationality. If we are Christians, all
our interpretation is in terms of this God of whom we speak. It is he who
has first revealed himself in his creation before we could know anything of
him. But if there is one thing that seems clear from Scripture it is that there
are no brute uninterpreted facts. In God's being considered apart from his
relation to the world, being and consciousness are coterminous. And
because this is so, the facts of the world are created facts, facts brought
into existence as the result of a fully self-conscious act on the part of God.
So then, though we cannot tell why the Godhead should exist tripersonally, we can understand something of the fact, after we are told that
God exists as a triune being, that the unity and the plurality of this world
has back of it a God in whom unity and plurality are equally ultimate.
Thus we may say that this world, in some of its aspects at least, shows
analogy to the Trinity. This world is made by God and, therefore, to the
extent that it is capable of doing so, it may be thought of as revealing God
as he exists. And God exists as a triune being. 16
If the world reveals God, however, it should reflect His mystery as well as His
rationality. Thus, just as God is both incomprehensible yet truly apprehensible, so the
world should be a rational mystery which is only partially penetrable to the human mind.
Consequently, to the extent that chaos theory invokes a deeply relational order beneath
chaotic surface phenomena, it suggests a rational mystery of creation:
16
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If we speak therefore of the incomprehensibility of God, what is meant is
that God's revelation to man is never exhaustively understood by man. As
by his revelation to man God says something about himself, so that man
knows something about everything that exists, so it is equally true that
there is nothing that man knows exhaustively. It is as impossible for man
to know himself or any of the objects of the universe about him
exhaustively as it is impossible for man to know God exhaustively. For
man must know himself or anything else in the created universe in relation
to the self-contained God. Unless he can know God exhaustively he
cannot know anything else exhaustively. 17
Apart from chaos theory, another application of nonlinear dynamics is complexity
science. Whereas chaos theory explains seemingly random behavior in time, complexity
theory describes the emergence of order in self organizing systems. This phenomenon is
best introduced by way of an example:
One can picture the essence of what is going on by thinking of a large
array of electric light bulbs, each of which is either on or off. Every bulb is
correlated with two other bulbs somewhere else in the array. The system
develops in steps and the form of the correlation implies that the state of a
bulb at the next step depends upon the present states of its correlates. If the
3000
net contains 10,000 elements, there are about 10
states of illumination
in which the array might be found. However, it turns out that a net started
off in a random configuration does not just twinkle away haphazardly
forever, but very soon settles down to cycling through only about a
hundred different patterns of on/off illumination. This represents the
spontaneous generation of an altogether astonishing degree of order. 18
As should be obvious from this example, emergent order results from dynamic
relationality. If the bulbs were not interconnected, they would blink independently of one
another with the result that there would be an utter chaos of about 103000 possible
combinations. However, when each bulb is connected with just 2 others, a relatively
small number of ordered patterns begin to emerge. This emergent order is produced by
the dynamic relationality which results from three basic types of relational constraints:

17
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bottom-up (part-whole), top-down (whole-part), and lateral (part-part). In the absence of
lateral (part-part) connections, the bulks blink independently so that only bottom-up
(part-whole) causality prevails. Under these conditions, the behavior of the whole is
strictly reducible to the behavior of the parts. However, when lateral (part-part)
connections are added between the bulbs, a top-down (whole-part) constraint also comes
into play since the shape ofthe whole determines the types of interconnections available
near the boundaries.
In a way, these three types of relations mirror various intra-Trinitarian relations
identified in Chapter 2: person-essence (complicatio), essence-person (explicatio), and
person-person (implicatio ). The main point, however, is that emergence is the result of a
core Trinitarian principle, dynamic relationality. Moreover, given the fact that living
systems also self organize, other postmodern concepts like social constructionism readily
assimilate to emergence theory. In fact, emergent churches self consciously employ a
relational ecclesiology both to facilitate self organization 19 and to socially embody the
imago Dei. 20 Of course, such divine imaging presupposes a recognized parallelism

between emergence theory and Trinitarian relationality. Moreover, since Leonard Sweet
has refered to emergence theory as "the generating science ofpostmodernity,"21 the
parallelism mentioned above relates to the very core ofpostmodernity. Given this fact,
emergence theory provides an obvious point of contact for Trinitarian contextualization.
After all, in both cases, the real is the relational, and the relational is the real.

19
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RELATIONALITY AND THE QUESTION OF REDUCTIONISM

As mentioned above, emergence is a holistic phenomenon which cannot be
reduced to the sum of its parts precisely because top-down and lateral forms of causation
compliment the bottom-up variety. By contrast, reductive systems derive from bottom-up
causation alone and are thus reducible to the sum of their parts. Given these differences,
the philosophical implications of emergence run counter to the reductionism which has
dominated modem science and philosophy since Laplace. Reductionism reached its
height in logical positivism with the dream of reducing all sciences to physics, and thence
to atomic interactions (i.e., sociology> psychology> biology> chemistry> physics.) In
a similar way, behaviorist psychology sought to "reduce" mental processes to brain
activity. For reductionist philosophers the focus was on things rather than relationships.
In this regard, Nancey Murphy delineates three types ofreductionism. 22
Metaphysical reductionism states that things are made of atoms, and methodological
reductionism constitutes a research strategy of breaking complex things down into their

component parts. According to Murphy, these types of reductionism are harmless.
However, epistemological or causal reductionism is pernicious because it attempts to
dismiss all higher-level concepts and laws as epiphenomena reducible to lower levels.
In opposition to this latter reductionism, Murphy advances a philosophy known as
emergent monism or non-reductive physicalism. As a species of physicalism, this

philosophy opposes both idealism and mind-body dualism. But because it is nonreductive, it also opposes atomistic materialism as well. 23 In this philosophy, reality
segregates itself into distinct hierarchical levels which interrelate without reduction.
22
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Thus, it is impossible to reduce biology to chemistry because biology often supplies a
independent top-down constraint that alters the behavior of chemical reactions. After all,
chemical reactions behave differently within a living organism than they do in a flask. Of
course, the atoms and molecules remain the same, but their behavior is changed by their
incorporation into a different network of relationships in a higher level context. 24 Thus,
there is reciprocal causality between higher and lower levels:
With each step upward in the hierarchy ofbiological order, novel
properties emerge that were not present at the simpler levels of
organization. These emergent properties result from interactions between
components. A molecule such as a protein has attributes not exhibited by
any of its component atoms, and a cell is certainly much more than a bag
of molecules. If the intricate organization of the human brain is disrupted
by a head injury, that organ ceases to function properly even though all of
its parts may still be present. And the organism is a living whole greater
than the sum of its parts. 25
At the same time that causal relations from below are being
loosened, emergent laws (laws relating variables at the higher level) are
coming to be seen as significant in their own right, not merely as special
cases oflower-levellaws. "A hierarchical arraying of parts of the physical
universe has been stabilized, each part with its quasistable ontology and
quasistable effective theory, and the partitioning is fairly well
understood. " 26
If strict causal reductionism is denied, and autonomous, higherlevellaws governing emergent properties and processes are recognized,
the door is open to an even more thorough rejection of reductionism: the
recognition of top-down or whole-part causation. It is now coming to be
widely recognized in a variety of sciences that interactions at the lower
levels cannot be predicted by looking at the structure of those levels alone.
Higher-level variables, which cannot be reduced to lower-level properties
or processes, have genuine causal impact. Biochemists were among the
first to notice this: chemical reactions do not work the same in a flask as
24
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they do within a living organism. The relatively new science of ecology is
based on recognition that organisms function differently in different
environments. Thus, in general, the higher-level system, which is
constituted by the entity and its environment, needs to be considered in
. . a comp1ete causa1 account. 27
gtvmg
As seen from this discussion, higher-level properties are not always reducible to
lower-level properties. To express this non-reducibility more formally, Murphy uses the
concept of supervenience. 28 This notion is best introduced by way of an example. In
experiments on human perception, a slight electrical shock can be experienced as either a
mild bum or a slight chill, depending upon a prior verbal suggestion which changes the
anticipations of the subject. 29 Since the physical stimulus is the same in both cases, the
perception cannot be reduced to a merely neurological level. In other words, the
perception of a chill, though dependent upon the brain, is not reducible to a neurological
shock response because it also depends upon a higher-level circumstance (the suggestion)
which is not thus reducible. Fonnally stated, a higher-level property B (the perception of
a chill) is said to supervene on a lower-level property A (the shock), if and only if,
something's being A (the shock) in circumstance c (the suggestion) constitutes its being B
(the perception of a chill). Since supervenient states can be realized in many ways (chills
without shocks) and since the same subvenient state can produce different supervenient
states (shocks without chills), the two levels, though related, are mutually irreducible.
As demonstrated formally through the notion of supervenience, reality manifests a
stratification of levels which runs counter to atomism, monism, and dualism. The

27
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decoupling between levels is the result of an intense coupling within them which
produces emergent order. Thus, reality is like a cascade in which a fundamental threeness
of relationships (bottom-up, top-down, and lateral or complicatio, explicatio, and
implicatio) repeats itselfwith fractal regularity down to the very depths ofbeing. What

"emerges," then, is a relational universe in which relationships and relata are equally
ultimate and which therefore mirrors the Trinity as a finite analog. After all, in both
cases, the real is the relational, and the relational is the real.

RELATIONALITY AND MULTIPERSPECTIVALISM

Since emergence theory explains hierarchical order via relational ontology, it
provides a metaphysical basis for multiperspectivalism. As mentioned in Chapter 3, John
Frame has developed a Trinitarian grammar in which ethics, epistemology, and
metaphysics are each characterized by a perichoretic interpenetration of three distinct
perspectives: existential (subjective); situational (objective), and nonnative (legal). The
relationship of these perspectives is illustrated for both ontology and epistemology in
Figure 7 below. Based upon the results of the previous section, a metaphysical basis for
the relation and distinction between these three perspectives can be now posited through
the recognition that the various strata of reality--physics, chemistry, biology, psychology,
and sociology--are themselves distinct and related.
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Figure 7. Multiperspectivalism in Ontology and Epistemology
First, since sociology cannot be reduced to psychology, biology, chemistry, or
physics, cultural-linguistic norms are unique social emergents which not only depend
upon human subjectivity and the objective world but which also affect them through
downward causation. With regard to psychological dependence, cultural-linguistic nonns
can only emerge from a group of people, not a flock of geese. And the dependence upon
the physical environment is likewise evident from the many words which the Eskimos
use to distinguish shades of white. With respect to downward causation, however,
"human mental and spiritual capacities arise out of the complex ordering of our physical
selves in their social environment. " 30 And through technology the physical world is
caused to behave differently than it would have apart from a social context with culturallinguistic nonns. Thus, the social nonns are both distinct from, and related to human
subjectivity and the objective world. Moreover, human subjectivity and the objective
world are also distinct yet related. On the one hand, as an emergent property of the brain,
the mind is both distinct from the brain and connected to it. Thus, the mind is directly

30
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connected to the nervous system and thence to the external world via sensory
perception. 31 Yet, since the mind can also affect the world through downward causation,
it also remains distinct. Consequently, by safeguarding both the distinctions and relations
between mind, society, and world, the relational phenomenon of emergence makes
knowledge of the external world possible, thereby transcending the egocentric
predicament of modern philosophy:
The nonreductive physicalist view does not postulate a substance
or entity, the mind or soul, as the seat of mental or spiritual powers, but
rather attributes mental and spiritual properties to the entire person,
understood as a complex physical and social organism. Since mental states
or attributes are states of the whole person, no special causal problems
arise. This view of mental states as arising from the functioning of the
nervous system is consistent with what we know from science about the
interactions between brain states and mental states: measurable effects on
the central nervous system have psychological consequences; many
psychological or mental states have physiological consequences.
The crucial difference between reductive and nonreductive
physicalism is that for the reductive physicalists the meaning and efficacy
of the mental is an illusion-it is really only the laws of physics that make
things happen. For the nonreductive physicalist human beings are more
than mere aggregates of atoms, and the activities that we class as mental
and spiritual are at least as important to the course of events as the purely
physical aspects. 32
The postmodern replacement for modern individualism recognizes
that the social level has an integrity of its own, not reducible to the level
pertaining to the individual, and, in fact, social systems condition
individual characteristics and behavior. This rejection of pure
individualism has consequences for the social sciences, political
philosophy, and ethics. 33
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As argued above, the phenomenon of emergence moves epistemology beyond the
egocentric predicament of the Enlightenment. Operating within the categories of the
Enlightenment, there was no way to preserve both the distinction and the relation
between the subject and the object of knowledge. For the idealists the subject swallowed
the object, while for the dualists the two were wrenched apart. Finally, for the reductive
materialists the object swallowed the subject. In contrast to all of these options,
nonreductive physicalists hold the mind to be an emergent phenomenon both distinct
from and dependent upon the body. Thus, it is neither an immaterial substance immune to
physical stimuli, nor is it merely an epiphenomenon. Rather, the relational ontology of
emergence provides for both the mind's distinct structure and its relation to the world.
Once again, the real is the relational, and the relational is the real.

CONCLUSION
The thrust of the present chapter has been to relate the dynamic relationality of the
Trinity to that of the world. Since God is an eternal essence exhaustively expressed in
each of three dynamically interacting persons, God is both eternally dynamic and
internally relational. Moreover, since God is thus a community within Himself, He is
internally self sufficient (a se) and therefore independent of the creation. Accordingly, He
does not adjust Himself to a preexisting creation, but rather creates the cosmos as a finite
analog of Himself. Thus, the dynamic relationality of creation reflects the Trinitarian
relationality on a finite scale.
As noted above, this relational cosmology has emerged due to a series of
paradigm shifts in 20 1h Century science. Special relativity set forth the relational nature of
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mass, length, and time, undercutting their foundational status. In quantum mechanics, the
wave-particle paradox was traced to the dynamic interaction between the quantum object
and the participant-observer. Finally, the study of nonlinear dynamics gave rise to chaos
and complexity theory, a subject which Leonard Sweet has called "the generating science
ofpostmodernity." 34 Because complex systems generate a nonreductive, emergent order,
the dynamic relationality of these systems produces the hierarchical strata of reality:
physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, sociology, etc. In fact, since the mind is likely
an emergent property of the brain, this relational view may well overcome the
Enlightenment's subject-object split by connecting the mind to the organs of perception.
At a deeper level, however, a relational view advances a profound and unique
metaphysics as the basis for these interesting phenomena. After all, to say that the world
is relational is to say that relata and relationships are equally ultimate. And since such a
view affirms an equal ultimacy of unity and diversity, it offers a true third way between
modern atomism and the monism of Romantic postmodern strains. Indeed, the
hierarchical stratification noted above manifests this simultaneous unity-in-diversity and
would be unthinkable in either an atomistic or a monistic world. Consequently, while
complexity theory is "the generating science ofpostmodernity," its relationality is best
explained in tenns of a Trinitarian metaphysic, and this fact provides an opportunity to
relate the Trinity to the very heart ofpostmodernity. After all, by virtue of creation God's
relational nature is reflected in God's relational world. In both cases the real is the
relational, and the relational is the real.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION: MULTIPERSPECTIVALISM AND THE MISS/0 DEI

The dynamic of glorification is not limited to us. Nor does our glorification
involve us in isolation from the rest of creation.
Rather, the experience of glorification through the act of giving glory to God
encompasses all creation, and all creation together. We are glorified together with
creation.
As we have seen, this glorification occurs through the Son-through the union of
all creation in the Son (Col. 1: 15-20). In the dynamic of glorification we actually
participate in the eternal relationship between the Father and the Son-who is the Spirit
within us bringing us to glorify the Father through the Son. Therefore, the eternal
community ultimately means the participation of creation through the Spirit in the glory
of-even in the life of-the Triune God (2 Peter 1:4).
This participation of creation in the Son's glorification of the Father and in the
Father's glorification of the Son marks the consummation ofthe Spirit's work. As the
Spirit of the relationship between the Father and the Son, he is the Completer ofboth the
dynamic within the Triune God and God's work in the world. In this way, the Spirit
eternally glorifies the Father and the Son both within the divine life and by completing
the mission of God in bringing creation to share in this eternal glorification.
What the Holy Spirit effects at the consummation is but the heightening of what
he is already accomplishing in the brokenness of our present experience. Ultimately,
therefore, the eternal community is the renewal of our earthly enjoyment of fellowship,
the Spirit's radical perfecting of the community we now share. Seen in this light, our
glorious future does not come as a stranger, but as a mysterious, yet welcomed friend.
The eternal glorification in which we participate is nothing else but the community for
which we were created.
Stanley Grenz, Created for Community

The purpose of this book has been to contextualize Trinitarian theology within
postmodern philosophy, and vice versa. In Chapters 4-6, Van Til's Trinitarian theology
has been used to apply the Trinitarian vision of Stanley Grenz, evident in the citation
above, 1 to the three philosophical targets identified by Nancey Murphy: non-foundational
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epistemology, socially constructive linguistics, and holistic relational ontology. 2 In this
regard, the process of explication has been facilitated by the use of multiperspectivalism,
a Trinitarian grammar developed by Van Til's former student John M. Frame. Having
performed the first task of contextualization in Chapters 4-6, it now remains to perform
the second so that postmodem philosophy may also be contextualized within the
framework of Trinitarian theology. This will be accomplished through a Trinitarian
integration of Chapters 4-6.
As will be shown below, multiperspectivalism provides the integrating grammar
which draws these topics into a single framework However, as noted above by Grenz,
wholeness is something that increases over time, reaching its culmination in the
eschatological Kingdom of God. To speak about bringing things into a whole, therefore,
is implicitly to invoke the Christian metanarrative in which the move toward wholeness
finds its context. For these reasons, the following discussion will begin with the Christian
story as it comes to expression in a theological concept known as the missio Dei. Once
this over arching context has been discussed, the more limited problem of providing the
Trinitarian integration of Chapters 4-6 will be addressed.

ESCHATOLOGICAL WHOLENESS AND THE MISSIO DEI

As noted by Grenz above, 3 the role of the Holy Spirit is to draw everything
together into a community. As the bond of communion between the Father and the Son,
the Spirit draws the entire creation into their triune fellowship. Thus, the Spirit draws all
things together and in so doing draws them forward toward a perfect unity in the
2
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eschaton. For this reason the Bible portrays the Spirit's work as both communal (2 Cor.

13: 14) and eschatological (Acts 2: 17). Using the language of Saussure, these twin aspects
of the Spirit's task will be referred to as synchronic and diachronic, respectively. 4
Synchronically the Spirit works first to gather the church and then to gather all things into
the church. Diachronically the Spirit works to draw the church and all things forward to
their ultimate communion in the eschatological kingdom of God.
The relation of these two aspects is given by a Trinitarian metanarrative which
describes God's redemptive program in history. Using the Trinitarian language of
Chapter 2, this metanarrative depicts God as unfolding Himself into the world
(explicatio), weaving the creation together with the divine life (implicatio ), and finally

folding the creation together into the divine life (complicatio), while yet maintaining its
distinctness. More specifically, the Father sends the Son into the world (explicatio); the
Father and the Son together send the Holy Spirit (explicatio), and the Three together then
send the church (explicatio). Through the church the Spirit weaves things together with
the divine life (implicatio) and then draws them forward and together in Christ
(complicatio) who will eventually tum them back over to the Father (complicatio) so that

God may be all in all (complicatio) (1 Cor. 15:24-28). The end result ofthis program will
be the arrival of the eschatological Kingdom of God in which there will be a perfect
communion (complicatio) between creation, humanity, and the Triune God who is
Himself community. Because this metanarrative describes the mission of God, Protestant
theologians in the late 1950s began to refer to this historical program as the missio Dei. 5
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Missiological Discussion (Leiden: Inter-university Institute for Missiological and Ecumenical Research,
1972).
5
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Since the church is the social embodiment of the missio Dei, Trinitarian
missiology enters into the very ontology of the church. As a result, the church continually
repeats the Trinitarian pattern of explicatio, implicatio, and complicatio. However, since
the church may neither escape to the future nor live in the past, it mirrors this diachronic
pattern synchronically for the age and the place in which God has set it. Given this fact,
the 21st Century Western church is called to enact this pattern in a postmodern world by
mirroring the centrifugal and centripetal motions of the missio Dei. Thus, the church is
called to explicate God's Word for the postmodern culture (centrifugal thrust), to

implicate this culture into new patterns of relationship (centripetal thrust), and finally to
complicate (i.e. fold together) all things within these new patterns of connectivity
(centripetal thrust). With regard to the first task, the Trinitarian faith was explicated for,
and contextualized within three loci of postmodern philosophy in Chapters 4-6. In this
final chapter it therefore remains to implicate this material into a Trinitarian framework
and thereby complicate it through new patterns of connectivity. The result of these latter
steps will be to contextualize postmodern philosophy within the framework of Trinitarian
theology, thus completing the inter-contextualization.
Of course, this latter process not only involves accepting elements of postmodern
culture; it also involves a great deal of excluding so that foreign elements are not
incorporated into the theology of the church. This calls for a critical engagement with
postmodern culture in tenns of criteria capable of distinguishing its helpful from its
harmful elements. While church history attests the fact that there are no foolproof criteria,
a helpful criterion is a grammatical rule known as final primacy, which was developed by
George Sumner, a fonner student of George Lindbeck's. According to final primacy,
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only those elements which are consistent with the Trinitarian metanarrative and thus with
the final (i.e. eschatological) primacy of Jesus Christ can be assimilated into the church's
faith. 6 For example, since the postmodem denial ofmetanarrative would contradict final
primacy by definition, the criterion of final primacy would a priori exclude such a view
from entering the church's theology. In this respect, the synchronic integration of
postmodem ideas is subject to the diachronic criterion of final primacy since only that
which can be assimilated to a retrospective narrative in which Jesus Christ has final
primacy can enter the theology of the church.

MULTIPERSPECTIVALISM AND SYNCHRONIC INTEGRATION
On the basis of the discussion above, the double contextualization pursued in this
book--together with the exclusion of harmful elements--is seen to be demanded by
Trinitarian missiology as reflected in the missio Dei. As this diachronic pattern is
mirrored synchronically by the church, the centrifugal thrust of explication is followed by
a centripetal integrative thrust. Having performed the fonner task in Chapters 4-6, it
remains to weave this material into a Trinitarian framework and draw it together.
In this regard, the integration of the material in Chapters 4-6 can be accomplished
by using multiperspectivalism as the integrating grammar. As argued in Chapter 3,
epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics each require a 3-fold formulation consisting of
interpenetrating subjective, objective, and normative perspectives. However, since the
respective foci of epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics are subjectivity (knowledge),
objectivity (existence), and nonnativity (behavior), it follows that these three subject

6

George R. Sumner, The First and the Last: The Claim ofJesus Christ and the Claims of Other Religious
Traditions (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Pub., 2004), 16-21.
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areas can themselves be arranged within a triadic framework as metaperspectives upon
one another and hence upon reality as a whole. A warrant for such integration comes
from two of John Frame's observations:
The three disciplines are closely related to one another.
Metaphysics must account for ethical norms as part of the overall structure
of reality, and for the possibility of knowledge within that structure.
Epistemology must presuppose some elements of metaphysics, and it must
understand the ethical norms to which the human quest for knowledge is
itself subject. And ethics presupposes metaphysics and epistemology,
because it must deal with behavior in the real world, and it must defend
the knowability of the norms it proposes for behavior. 7
... "Norm," "object," and "subject" all refer to the same reality; they
cover the same territory. But each attributes a different function to reality.
"Nonn" attributes to reality the capacity to govern intelligent subjects.
"Object" attributes to reality the property ofbeing knowable by intelligent
subjects. "Subject" indicates that reality is inseparable from the subject
himself and is to be found in and through his own experience. 8
When epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics are woven together perspectivally, a
triad of triads is obtained as shown below in Figure 8. While Figure 8 includes the triads
of epistemology and metaphysics from Chapters 4 and 6, it is missing the speech triad
from Chapter 5. This deficiency can be corrected by first recognizing that speech is a
nonnative entity since it provides the social norms for relating subject and object. Thus,
the speech triad from Chapter 5 can be substituted for the ethical triad in Figure 8 to yield
Figure 9. This move is possible because multiperspectivalism is a flexible grammar
capable of integrating a variety of entities into triadic relationships of subject, object, and
nonn. As can be readily observed, Figure 9 provides a single framework integrating the
material covered in Chapters 4-6.

7

John M. Frame and Comelius Van Til, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis ofHis Thought (Phillipsburg, N.J.:
P&R Pub., 1995), 52.
8
Frame, The Doctrine of the Knowledge of God, 402.
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Nom1
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Perception

Self

World

Figure 8. Multiperspectivalism as an Integrating Grammar
With regard to its appropriateness, the integration achieved in Figure 9 satisfies
Grenz's threefold theological method because it is Biblically faithful, doctrinally sound,
and culturally relevant. With regard to this cultural relevance, it integrates Trinitarian
theology with the three philosophical loci identified by Nancey Murphy, and then
incorporates these loci into a single Trinitarian framework. Moreover, the manner of this
integration is consistent with the loci themselves. First, Figure 9 shows the overall
integration to be relational, not foundational. Second, Figure 9 results from the
application of a constructive grammar which is defined by a particular rule based

connectivity. Thus, the integration is also consistent with socially constructive linguistics.
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Finally, Figure 9 embodies the complex diversity-in-unity of a holistic relational ontology
because it relates real entities in a perspectival manner that is ontologically grounded in
the Trinity. Thus, the adequacy of the integration derives from the fact that
multiperspectivalism is a non-foundational, constructive grammar which is ontologically
grounded and therefore suited to the embodiment of complex truth.
Syntactics

Reason

ONTOLOGY

EPISTEMOLOGY

Affect

Self

Perception

\Vorld

Figure 9. Multiperspectival Integration of the 3 Philosophical Loci
Finally, having described the integration achieved in Figure 9 and having
addressed its adequacy, it remains to underscore the significance of the integration as a
whole. Because of their incorporation into a Trinitarian matrix, the nature of the
philosophical loci is changed by virtue of their new context. Whereas they previously
functioned as elements of a secular philosophy, they now function together as
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interpenetrating perspectives within a Trinitarian framework. In other words, rather than
being impersonal statements of a generic relationality, they now reflect the perichoretic
unity-in-diversity of the personal, Triune God. Thus, by virtue of their incorporation
within a Trinitarian multiperspectival framework, the loci of postmodern philosophy have
now become the perspectives of a postmodern Trinitarian philosophy.

CONCLUSION
As argued above, the inter-contextualization pursued in this book is demanded by
Trinitarian missiology as reflected in the missio Dei. Within this missional metanarrative
God explicates Himself into the world, implicates the creation into new patterns of
relationship, and then draws things forward into an eschatological communion with
Himself. Within the diachronic flow ofhistory, the church mirrors this Trinitarian pattern
synchronically as it explicates God's Word within the surrounding culture, implicates the
creation into new patterns of relationship, and draws things into communion with the
church. In the 21st Century Western church, this pattern of explicatio, implicatio, and

complicatio must now be enacted within a postmodern culture.
To facilitate such a missional engagement, this book has sought to achieve a
double contextualization by enacting the above pattern on a theoretical level. To this end
the Trinitarian faith was explicated within the loci of postmodern philosophy (Chapters 46), and this philosophy was then implicated and complicated within a Trinitarian
framework (Chapter 7). While the present author has no "practical" experience as an
evangelist or a missiologist, it is nevertheless hoped that the theoretical integration
achieved herein will help others in their practical tasks by showing the affinities that exist
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between postmodem philosophy and Trinitarian theology. While this engagement must
be critical and must therefore exclude many postmodem ideas, other ideas are beneficial
and may therefore be incorporated within the matrix of Christian theology. To this end, it
is hoped that the church will explicate the Christian faith within postmodem culture and
then critically implicate this culture into a web ofTrinitarian complexity. This two-fold
engagement is both a responsibility and a privilege of the church as it fulfills its vocation
within the missio Dei.
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APPENDIX A
MULTIPERSPECTIVALISM, FRACTAL GEOMETRY, AND THE
PERICHORESIS OF INFINITY

IN THE MIND'S EYE, a fractal is a way of seeing infinity.
James Gleick, Chaos
In Chapter 4 it was stated that multiperspectivalism embodies a polycentric
relationality that opposes both the monocentric reductionism of modem foundationalism
and the de-centered relationality of postmodem relativism. This raises an interesting
question. If modem epistemology resembles a building, and if postmodem epistemology
resembles a net, what is an appropriate metaphor for multiperspectivalism? Since each
perspective includes the others and in fact becomes a center of the others, how can this
perichoresis be unraveled in tenns of a coherent picture? One possibility is that
multiperspectivalism resembles a fractal because a fractal provides a means of visualizing
infinity as noted by Gleick above. 1 Moreover, since fractals are characterized by a
repeating structure and fonn the geometric underpinnings of complex systems, to
compare multiperspectivalism to a fractal is thus to acknowledge a common element of
complexity. As will be shown below, this common characteristic stems from the fact that
both result from a type of perichoresis.
To see this point consider the repeating structure ofmultiperspectivalism shown
in Figures 8 and 9. This repetition is the result of the perspectival perichoresis. Because
each perspective always entails the other two, attempts to isolate or focus on a particular
perspective will always "drag" the other two perspectives with it. For instance, as one
attempts to focus on the vertices of the inner triangle in a "first iteration," three new
1

James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (New York, N.Y., U.S.A.: Viking, 1987), 98.
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triangles "sprout" from these original vertices to yield a total of 9 new vertices. If one
then attempted to focus on these 9 vertices in a "second interation," 9 new triangles
would "sprout" from them, producing 27 new vertices, and so on. In fact, this process
could be repeated ad infinitum because the perspectives, though distinct, are inseparable.
Thus, it would never be possible to reach a "scale" at which the "perspectives" could be
resolved into independent "parts," even after an infinite number of"iterations." Thus,
multiperspectivalism exhibits the fractal behavior integral to complex systems, and this
fact is significant since Leonard Sweet has identified complexity theory as "the
generating science of postmodemity."

2

To demonstrate this resemblance, consider the generation of the Koch snowflake
shown in Figure 10 below. The process of generating this fractal begins with a simple
triangle. In the first iteration a kink is placed in each of its sides. The effect of this
operation is to increase the length of the perimeter by a factor of 4/3. The second and
third iterations involve placing kinks within kinks with the result that the length of the
perimeter increases by the same factor of 4/3 each time. Since the fractal is generated in
the limit of an infinite number of iterations, it might seem that the length of the perimeter
would become infinite in obtaining the fractal. Yet the area within the perimeter would
remain finite because it would always be less than that contained within a circle drawn
around the original triangle. But this raises the question as to how a finite area can be
surrounded by a perimeter of infinite length.

2

Sweet, Soul Tsunami: Sink or Swim in New Millenium Culture, 80.
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Figure 10. Generation of the Koch Snowflake
As it turns out, the solution to this dilemma is that the perimeter has no length at
all because it is a fractal having a dimension d = 1.2618? Indeed, it is called a fractal
because it has a fractional dimension intermediate between the integer values that define
the dimensions oflength (d = 1), area (d = 2), and volume (d = 3). Consequently, the
fractal perimeter only appears to have infinite length because length is the wrong measure
to capture its properties. After all, just as it would be nonsensical to ask for the length of
an area or a volume, it is also nonsensical to ask for the length of something with a fractal
dimension of d

1.2618. Of course, if the generating process shown in Figure 10 had

stopped after a finite number of iterations, it would have been possible to resolve the
perimeter into a number of component lengths and then calculate its total length by
beginning from the smallest scale. However, since the fractal is obtained by an infinite
number of iterations (kinks within kinks within kinks ad infinitum), it is never possible to
reach a scale at which the fractal can be resolved into component lengths.

3

Gleick, I 02.
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In a similar manner, due to the perichoretic interpenetration of perspectives within
a multiperspectival framework, it is never possible to reach a scale at which the
perspectives can be resolved into independent parts. Thus, multiperspectivalism reveals a
repeating structure similar to that of fractal geometry and for similar reasons. In the case
of the Koch snowflake, this behavior is due to the perichoretic interpenetration of kinks.
In the case of multiperspectivalism, it is due to the perichoretic interpenetration of
perspectives. Moreover, both seek to represent a truth that is neither simple, nor elusive,
but rather complex. Consequently, while it would be a metaphorical stretch to say that
multiperspectivalism is a fractal, it is no stretch to suggest that fractal geometry provides
a compact metaphor with which to picture the perichoretic infinity of
multiperspectivalism. After all, such a metaphor seeks only to capture the finite infinity of
created human knowledge and not the divine irifinity of the Trinity Itself.
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